

# Religious Education

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## EDITORIALS

### WHY NOT MORE LOCAL CONFERENCES?

**I**N A democratic civilization, the progress of any movement depends to a large extent on the possibility of social contacts. An astute student of history once remarked that the practice of democracy is much simpler in England than it is in America because distances are so much less formidable. Conferences are easily arranged, and attendance at such conferences is comparatively easy because little time or expense is entailed by those attending. In this country distances constitute a formidable obstacle to the free interchange of thought. For a person living in San Francisco to attend a convention in New York requires something like two weeks of time and more money than the ordinary teacher or preacher can afford. National conventions in this country suffer from this circumstance.

The Religious Education Association has hitherto depended mainly upon the annual convention to create its esprit de corps and to plan for the work of the Association. It is an eloquent testimony to the widespread interest in the undertakings of the Association that the attendance at these conventions has been as large as it has. Yet every year there are large numbers who cannot give the time or afford the money to travel long distances. Inevitably a convention is of largest service to the immediately surrounding region.

The writer recently had the privilege of attending what was called a "regional conference" of the Religious Education Association. It was organized and carried through under the very efficient management of Professor Huff of Drake University at Des Moines. The program was anticipatory of the Convention at Philadelphia, in that the subject of the relations between religion and science was chosen for discussion. Teachers from

several colleges and from the public schools, ministers, and teachers in church schools came together for three days to consider seriously the application of scientific methods of inquiry and of testing to the problems of religious education. The effort was made to have the main addresses consist of interpretations of the cooperative efforts of those present to understand the important issues which must be faced. Thus an opportunity was given to think together. For serious-minded leaders in the field of religious education this was far more valuable than to sit and listen to "inspirational" addresses. Moreover, the number in attendance, while large enough to give the feeling of importance to the subject, was not too large to prevent genuine discussion and interchange of ideas or experiences. A noticeable feature of this conference was the entire absence of spellbinders or men with a hobby to exploit.

Another advantage of this regional conference lies in the fact that there is no business of importance to transact. All the time can be given to what is of most universal interest. After all, the executive and financial details of any organization have vital meaning only to those who have shared the burden of administration. A convention must, of course, determine policies and authorize budget expenditures. But the vast majority of the delegates come for something else. The smaller conference, being free from the constitutional requirements laid upon the convention, can devote itself exclusively to the interests which lie closest to the delegates.

Why should not such regional conferences be planned in various portions of the country? Half a dozen such gatherings would enlist the attendance and the active interest of many more persons than could possibly be reached by any national convention. The expense of any one such

conference would not be great, since no large auditorium is needed. A college could well serve its natural friends by providing without cost the necessary room for the meetings. It might supplement the distinctively professional program of the conference by giving the visitors some illuminating insight into the contribution which it is making to education. Carleton College has for several years held a most successful annual conference, in which the resources of the college are freely used to enrich the education of those enjoying its hospitality. This year the topic to be discussed at Philadelphia was made the central interest of this conference. The results of a yearly series of such gatherings was seen in the friendliness of the attendants and the eagerness and the freedom of the discussions.

If the Religious Education Association can be the means of carrying from group to group the inspiration and insight gained in such gatherings as this and the one at Des Moines, it will help to create and to maintain a growing sense of the significance of religious education, and an appreciation of the wonderful fellowship which grows out of a common task and an honest spirit of inquiry as to the best means by which the task can be fulfilled.

*Gerald Birney Smith, the  
University of Chicago.*

#### MORE ABOUT MAKESHIFTS AT TEACHER TRAINING

THE EDITORIAL in the last issue of *Religious Education*, which refers to three thousand students taking leadership training courses each year under the auspices of the Chicago Council of Religious Education, challenges an answer.

We admit the smallness of this number when divided among eight hundred cooperating churches, how impotent these International standard credits look alongside college or graduate credits, how they

pale into insignificance when compared with the school work of poorly equipped stenographers, and how we are only touching the fringe of things in the face of the need of a million or more parents who should have training in order to bring up their children properly. Most of us not only see the dark side of the picture as it now presents itself, but recall the way things looked a few years ago before this leadership training student body began to emerge.

Our Council does not think for a minute that it has begun to solve the problem of religious education in Chicago when our total leadership student body each year earns 3,000 credits. Not that. We just feel a bit encouraged. Churches are beginning to respond. Students are enrolling in these schools. It gives us heart to seek other thousands to join our ranks, to inspire those who have already taken work to take other courses, and still others, until three or four years hence many of them may even accumulate the necessary twelve credits to entitle them to the International diploma.

Not a few of these students may even be persuaded to take the University College courses which the Council is offering downtown in cooperation with the University of Chicago and Northwestern University,—courses in educational psychology, in childhood and youth, in teaching technique and organization. In these courses forty-eight hours are required and a major of university credit granted. These students will do serious work, read serious books, engage in field experimentation, and sit at the feet of men like Bower, Chave, and Richardson.

We were speaking to the deans and instructors of our thirty odd standard training schools when we said we were "proud of this fine record." We are proud of it—for a beginning. Very few other cities of our class in the country could produce a better record.

Of course we shall not be satisfied until

we have done all the good things Doctor Hites recommends in the latter part of his thought-provoking editorial. While we are making haste slowly in this direction, we shall continue to develop enthusiasm among the churches for this important business of leadership training, though it is now called a "makeshift." Armies have crossed rivers on makeshift bridges and won victories. Wilson used makeshift rifles in training men for the World War. The war is said to have been won—won, as some would have it, by soldiers whose training, in the beginning, was makeshift.

*Emerson O. Bradshaw, Chicago  
Council of Religious Education.*

#### A SERVICE TO RESEARCH WORKERS

THE NEED of correlating information on research projects is apparent. Numerous agencies are making surveys and lists of research in different fields. For example, the National Research Council publishes many bibliographies and surveys, two of the most recent being Manson's *A Bibliography of the Analysis and Measurement of Human Personality up to 1926*, and Marston's *Directory of Research in Child Development*. National associations, such as the American Sociological Society, survey their memberships for research interests and activities. There has been no adequate survey in the fields of religion and of character.

The Religious Education Association is not primarily a body of research workers, but in its membership are many people who carry on research, either independently or in connection with some institution. Moreover, members are in touch

with investigators in religious and character development. There is need to know what research is being carried on in these important fields. To this end, the Research Committee of the R. E. A. recently instructed its secretary to prepare and distribute blanks upon which might be entered information regarding research projects. These blanks have been sent to institutions and persons known to be fruitful sources of information. But there are, beyond doubt, many people not reached.

Members of the Association can assist in this survey of research in religion and character by writing to the office for blanks to be filled out, or by supplying information. The fields to be covered include religious education, religious experiences, church surveys, character education, conduct problems relative to character formation, testing in character or in religious development.

The items of information needed about each study include: Name of institution with which director of the project is connected; Title or subject of the project; Statement of the problem; Object of the project; Date of beginning, Probable date of completion; Present state of progress; How financed; Personnel (give name, address, and professional status of director and assistant); Methods used; Administration (under whose auspices is project carried on); Publication; Results; Name and address of person supplying the information.

Several plans are under consideration for the distribution of information gained from this survey. Every effort will be made to give wide distribution for the benefit of those interested in research.

*Ruth Shonle Cavan, Religious  
Education Association.*



# PHILADELPHIA CONVENTION OF THE RELIGIOUS EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, MARCH 6 TO 9, 1928

## EDUCATION IN RELIGION IN AN AGE OF SCIENCE

**T**HE Advisory Committee has felt it desirable to hold the program in syllabus form, at least for the present, rather than to crystallize it in topics for formal addresses.

*Tuesday evening. Difficulties for Religion in a Scientific Age.*

1. Why is religion in difficulty in a scientific age?

2. What questions are most often asked by those who are acquainted with scientific development?

3. What practices of religion are those who profess to believe in science giving up or questioning? Why?

4. How do these questions differ as compared with ten years ago? Why?

5. Which of these are questions of the rank and file of the people, which only the questions of those in scientific and educational circles? What is your evidence?

6. What are the chief points of difficulty for religion in relation to science, and what are the most important factors in the situation?

*Wednesday morning. Basic Assumptions of Science in their Bearing upon Religion.*

1. What are the basic assumptions of science in regard to:

- a. The material universe;
- b. Human personality, its development and transformation;
- c. Social progress?

2. At what points and in what ways (where and how) do these assumptions seem most to challenge the assumptions of religion? Why?

3. What kind of religion is consistent with the basic assumptions of science?

*Wednesday afternoon. Basic Assump-*

*tions of Religion in their Bearing upon Science.*

1. What are the basic assumptions of current religion in regard to:

- a. The material universe;
- b. Human personality, its development and transformation;
- c. Social progress?

2. At what points and in what ways do these agree with, at what points and in what ways do these challenge the basic assumptions of science? Why do you think so?

3. What kind of scientific attitude is consistent with religion?

*Wednesday evening. Nature of Science and of Religion and their Interrelation.*

1. What is common in the assumptions and function of science and religion? What is distinctive in the function of religion and of science in relation to:

- a. The material universe;
- b. Human personality;
- c. Social progress?

2. What is distinctive in the contribution of science and of religion?

3. To what extent and in what ways is a person's religion dependent upon his science?

4. To what extent and in what ways is a person's science dependent upon his religion?

5. What is the nature of a person's science, of his religion?

6. What is the relation between a person's science and his religion, and between his religion and his science?

*Thursday morning. Necessary Changes in Scientific and Religious Attitudes and Conceptions.*

1. What changes are necessary in the current attitudes toward and conceptions of:

a. The material universe; b. Human personality; c. Social progress? Why?

2. What changes are necessary in the conception of God and prayer? Why?

3. What changes, if any, are necessary in the practices of religion, such as worship, prayer, conversion, service, etc.?

*Thursday afternoon. Necessary Changes in Religious Education.*

1. What changes, if any, are necessary in the teaching of children in regard to religion? In the efforts for the development of religious experience? Why?

2. At what point is our religious education failing to take advantage of the results of science? What needs to be done? How?

3. What is the contribution of a developing science to religious education?

4. What changes are most needed in our present day religious education?

5. Where are we in most doubt as to what is going on? What experimentation is needed?

*Thursday evening. Banquet.*

In view of the situation as it has come to light in the convention, what is the likelihood for progress in the immediate future?

*Friday morning and afternoon.*

Program developed by the Research Commission of the Association.

#### CONVENTION SPEAKERS

Among those who will participate in the convention as speakers are the following:

Professor George A. Coe.

Professor Harrison Elliott, Union Theological Seminary.

Mrs. Sophia Lyon Fahs, Union School of Religion.

President Robert A. Falconer, of the University of Toronto.

Rabbi Solomon Goldman of Cleveland.

Professor Hugh Hartshorne of Teachers College, Columbia University.

Professor Arthur E. Holt of the University of Chicago.

Dean R. A. Kent of Northwestern University.

Professor James H. Leuba of Bryn Mawr College.

Professor Mark A. May, Yale University.

President D. W. Morehouse, Drake University.

Professor F. S. C. Northrop of Yale.

Professor Gerald B. Smith, University of Chicago.

# THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR RELIGIOUS EDUCATION OF TRENDS IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

WILLIAM CLAYTON BOWER<sup>1</sup>

THE psychology of religion is the most recent and, in many ways, the most fruitful approach to the scientific study of religion. The larger movement of the scientific study of religion may be said to have had its rise near the middle of the eighteenth century with the publication of David Hume's *Natural History of Religion*.

Various aspects of the movement have emerged from time to time—the anthropological approach during the last four decades of the nineteenth century, the historical approach during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and the sociological approach, having its origin with Comte and Spencer, but receiving fresh emphasis in the second decade of the present century. Closely related to these scientific approaches was a philosophical interest in the central problems of religious experience, having its origin in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The psychology of religion had its origin with the beginning of the twentieth century, and its movement of thought has been continuous throughout the subsequent period.

The philosophical and scientific study of religion has developed three quite distinct and sequential ways of conceiving religion. The first approach was to conceive religion in intellectualistic terms. Thus Hegel held that "religion is absolutely true knowledge. Religion is the region of eternal truth."<sup>2</sup> So also with E. B. Tylor, religion consists of a "belief in spiritual beings."<sup>3</sup> From a somewhat similar point of view Herbert Spencer derived religion from belief in

ghosts, either of ancestors or of a supernatural being.<sup>4</sup> Even more significant was Spencer's agnostic reaction to what he termed "the Unknowable."<sup>5</sup> With this intellectualistic view G. J. Romanes agreed, in taking the position that religion is "a department of thought having for its object a self-conscious and intelligent Being."<sup>6</sup>

A second approach to religion was to conceive it in terms of the emotions. Thus to Auguste Sabatier, religion "rests upon a feeling inherent in every conscious individual, the feeling of dependence which every man experiences with respect to universal being."<sup>7</sup> In this Sabatier carried forward the view of Schleiermacher, who held that the sphere of religion "is neither thinking nor acting, but intuition and feeling."<sup>8</sup> So also C. P. Tiele conceived religion as "that pure and reverential disposition or frame of mind which we call piety."<sup>9</sup>

The viewpoint that dominates the current approach to religion is voluntaristic. From this point of view, religion is one aspect of the process of man's adjustment to his total environment, and is the highest expression of the will-to-live. The basic aspect of that adjustment process is the outreach of persons toward the worthwhile ends by which men live. This current trend is well expressed by Professor Leuba, who sees religion as "that part of human experience in which man feels himself in relation with powers of a psychic nature, usually personal powers, and makes use

4. *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. III, Part IV, Chap. I; cf. also Vol. I, p. 251f.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 157, 166f.

6. *Thoughts on Religion*, p. 41.

7. *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*, p. 21.

8. *The Nature of Religion*, pp. 29, 57f.

9. *Elements of the Science of Religion*, Vol. II, pp. 198f.

1. Professor of Religious Education in the University of Chicago.

2. *Philosophy of Religion* (Speirs and Sanderson translation), I, p. 90.

3. *Primitive Culture*, Vol. I, p. 424.

of them. . . . It is, therefore, a part of the struggle for life."<sup>10</sup>

This is essentially the same position held by Dean Mathews who sees in religion "a function of human life expressing itself in an attitude to environing realities which involves (a) a sense of dependence upon the same; (b) attempts to get help therefrom through the establishment of personal relations; and (c) the utilization of social experience, culture, organization and customs in such attempts."<sup>11</sup> So also Professor Pratt sees religion as a serious and social attitude toward the Determiner of Destiny.<sup>12</sup> To Professor Wieman "religion reaches out to deal with unexplored possibilities of value."<sup>13</sup> Professor Wieman stresses the dynamic and experimental character of this process. To him "the experimental process by which it prosecutes the search is more radical than in any other undertaking. . . . This human drive toward more abundant living is the root of religion in human nature."<sup>14</sup>

In this conception of the outreach of the human spirit toward the realization of the highest values of life and intellect, the emotions and the will are integrated into an undifferentiated experience of the whole self in which, however, the conative aspect of experience is primary.

In a movement so young and so fluid as the psychology of religion, it would be impossible to say that there is any consensus among the workers in the field as to the precise nature of the religious experience, or as to the psychological processes involved. The present state of the science of psychology itself is so extremely fluid and confused that it is only possible to speak of "schools" of psychology, rather than of a psychology.

Vastly more remains to be done in the

formulation of concepts and the development of verified techniques in dealing with the extremely complex data of the science of mental phenomena, before the extremely variant viewpoints which now prevail in that field can be integrated into anything like a unified and consistent science. It may be that certain data of psychology are too intractable to permit of a science that approaches even remotely the precision and uniformity of the physical sciences, or even the biological sciences, notwithstanding the efforts of the mechanistic behaviorists to attain this result.

It is inevitable that these difficulties of the more general field of psychology should obtrude themselves into the more specialized field of the psychology of religion. In addition to these problems that inhere in psychology itself there is, moreover, the still more complicating factor that, as appears from the results that have thus far been attained in the psychology of religion, the religious experience is far more complex and difficult to deal with than any other type of experience. This is not to suggest that with the development of more precise and dependable techniques the differentia of the religious experience and the factors and processes involved may not be isolated and organized into a coherent system of findings; it is merely to record the fact that to date these insights and controls are yet lacking.

Nevertheless, enough is known about religious experience to justify the conclusion that religion is a fundamental aspect of human experience, that in order to destroy it it would be necessary to destroy both the individual and society, and that arising, as it seems to do, within the highest ranges of mental life, it is probable that, as man's intelligence increases and his achievements advance, man will not become less, but more, religious.

The problem of the psychology of religion is to differentiate religious expe-

10. *A Psychological Study of Religion*, p. 52. Cf. also p. 7.

11. *Dictionary of Religion and Ethics*, art. on "Religion."

12. *The Religious Consciousness*, pp. 2, 3.

13. "The Definition of Religion: A Symposium," *Journal of Religion*, May, 1927, p. 303.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 302, 307 *et passim*.

rience from other aspects of experience, and to discover and bring under control the processes involved in its conscious and purposive organization for the ends of human living. It would be impossible to overstate the urgency of these problems for the religious educator whose function is the organization of the religious experience as a resource for personal and social ends.

Notwithstanding the wide variations in viewpoint, method, and results, and the fact that those whose ideas when brought together constitute a more or less continuous series worked independently of each other, there is discernible a continuous trend in the historic development of the psychology of religion.

The point of origin of what may properly be called the psychology of religion may be said to rest in the work of Professor Starbuck and Professor Coe in the years 1899 and 1900. In the former year Professor Starbuck published his *Psychology of Religion* and in the latter year Professor Coe published his *Spiritual Life*. Both of these investigators were interested in the more obtrusive phenomena of conversion and gathered their data from the conversion experience of members of certain evangelical groups in whose theology and practice the cataclysmic conversion occupied a fundamental and central position. The practical interest which dominated these earliest studies is quite obvious.

In 1902 Professor James published his memorable volume on *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. The data of this study were derived from specific cases of religious experience as it appeared in literary records of concrete persons. The approach was decidedly philosophical, and the discussion centered in such problems as the reality of the unseen, the nature of the self, conversion, and immortality. Professor James' pragmatic philosophy and the dynamic conception of experience in his psychology that supplied the supporting

assumptions of this study had the effect of centering religion in the conative aspects of experience, a trend further emphasized and sharpened in his *Will to Believe*.

Experience, from this point of view, is active, outreaching towards ends, experimental, controlling. The significant fact here is that an approach is opened up for the study of religion that carries implicit within itself the matrix from which emerge value judgments at a level of consciousness, criticism, and organization, though the specific description of the psychology of the value situation remained and still remains to be worked out by other investigators.

The next step in this development of concepts regarding the nature of the religious experience was taken by Professor Höfding who in 1906 published his *Philosophy of Religion*. In this discussion Professor Höfding clearly and specifically identifies religion with man's valuational attitude toward his world. "The feeling," he asserts, "which is determined by the fate of values in the struggle for existence is the religious feeling. . . . The fundamental axiom of religion, that which expresses the innermost tendency of all religions, is the axiom of the conservation of values."<sup>15</sup> Here is a perfectly definite identification of the religious experience as belonging to the whole range of valuational attitudes. Here also is a suggestion as to at least one specific quality of the religious experience that differentiates it from other aspects of the evaluating attitude such as are involved, for example, in truth values, aesthetic values, and economic values.

The subsequent steps in the development of this consistent trend of investigation have been concerned, for the most part, with the discovery of other differentia of the religious experience. In 1910 Professor Ames and Professor Irving King published simultaneously two

15. *Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 107, 215.

significant studies, *The Psychology of Religious Experience* and *The Development of Religion*. Both of these investigators worked chiefly with anthropological data and, singularly enough, arrived independently at much the same conclusions.

Working with a philosophy and a psychology in close agreement with the work which Professor James had done, Professor Ames accepted wholeheartedly the view of Professor Höfding, that the religious experience lies in the field of man's valuational attitudes, together with Professor Höfding's criterion of conservation. In the field of differential Professor Ames carried the process still further in identifying the religious experience with social values. "Religion," he concludes, "with its changing forms, may thus be seen in its natural concrete character as a phase of socialized human experience. . . . The religious consciousness . . . is just the consciousness of the great interests and purposes of life in their most idealized and intensified forms. . . . Everywhere the sacred objects and functions are those in which the life of society is felt to center."<sup>16</sup> To Professor Ames, however, these social values are not to be conceived in static, but in dynamic, terms.<sup>17</sup> "Consciousness is intended to include more than mere awareness. It is dynamic and signifies, in this connection, interest in and endeavor to realize. The propulsive, teleological character of consciousness is constantly illustrated. Professor Coe has raised the question whether 'highest social consciousness' signifies a specific content or a varying process of social valuation. Certainly the latter is meant. It is clearly recognized that the social values which are put in the foreground of attention and made the objectives of devotion change in successive stages of any given religion."

Working from the same philosophical and psychological viewpoint, and dealing largely with the same anthropological data, Professor King arrived at substantially the same conclusion. "Thus," he concludes, "we have complex aesthetic attitudes, scientific attitudes, attitudes toward government, whether democratic, monarchical, or socialistic; attitudes toward marriage, family life, education, and so on indefinitely; and among others of these organizations of disposition and ability to react, is the *religious attitude*. As such it involves an emotional recognition of values of some kind, an intellectual tendency to affirm or deny them, and a positive inclination to act in some way or other with reference to them. Generically, religion does not differ from many other attitudes which may be described as valuational."<sup>18</sup>

With Professor King not only does the social *milieu* furnish the medium within which the religious consciousness arises, but "*religious acts and ideas are themselves an organic part of the activities of the social body*. . . . We may even go further than this and maintain that religious beliefs and practices are not merely *modeled* upon the analogy of a people's economic and social life. The religious life *is* the social life in one of its phases. It is an organic part of the activity of the social body, not merely something built upon it. In other words . . . we may hold that the religious aspects of a people's life are special differentiations of the social order which appear under certain favoring conditions."<sup>19</sup>

Thus Professor King is clearly feeling his way toward the identification of religion with social values, but he does not wholly get beyond viewing religion as an *aspect* of social values, as distinguished from social values as a whole. Neither does he clearly differentiate re-

16. *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, pp. 297f.

17. "The Definition of Religion: A Symposium," *Journal of Religion*, May, 1927, p. 295.

18. *The Development of Religion*, pp. 30f.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 38f.



ligion as a form of the valuational attitude from other aspects of it.

One of the most significant contributions of Professor King in his *Development of Religion* was an analysis of the psychological situation within which the valuational attitude arises. In this analysis he shows that conscious value arises in the gap that comes between an ongoing conative activity and the end toward which it is moving, through delay, suspense, uncertainty, or effort. In proportion as this gap is caused by delay and suspense is the end not only lifted sharply into consciousness and invested with value, but the gap itself is filled with the most powerful emotions known to human experience. This is also the pattern of the psychological situation within which critical thinking arises, as worked out in clear detail by Professor Dewey.

It is this analysis of the value situation which makes it possible for Professor King clearly to perceive that religion involves an emotional attitude toward values, an intellectual criticism of them, and a tendency to act with reference to them. This is one of the most constructive and far-reaching contributions to the developing psychology of religion, inasmuch as it makes possible a clear insight into the interrelation of the conative, affective, and intellectual aspects of the total process of a unified religious experience.

This trend in the direction of conceiving religion in terms of value finds further expression in Professor Stratton, who, writing in 1911, sees in religion an outreach toward the highest, though unseen, values. "Religion," to him, "is the appreciation of an unseen world, usually an unseen company; and religion is also whatever seems clearly to be moving towards such appreciation, or to be returning from it. Or perhaps it may be better described as man's whole bearing towards what seems to him the Best and Greatest."<sup>20</sup>

In his *Les formes elementaires de la vie religieuse*, 1912, Professor Émile Durkheim carried the identification of religion with social values to its extreme limit. He concludes that when traced back to their origins, the most primitive form of religion and the most primitive form of society merge in totemism. "The god of the clan, the totemic principle, can therefore be nothing else than the clan itself, personified and represented to the imagination under the visible form of the animal or vegetable that serves as a totem."<sup>21</sup>

This series of ideas was carried to its completest present development by Professor Coe in his *Psychology of Religion*, published in 1916. Working from a dynamic and functional point of view as the one that, in his judgment, is proving most fruitful in the psychology of religion, Professor Coe's significant contribution lies in the fact that he definitely differentiates religion as a form of the valuational attitude from other forms of valuation. In his differentia he differs from Professor Ames and Professor King, and quite radically from Professor Durkheim.

Professor Coe does not identify religion with any specialized or particularized set of values as such. Neither does he see in religion a new set of values. Rather he sees in religion a total "desire-within-desire," a "revaluation of values that both makes us individuals and organizes us into society."<sup>22</sup> "Any reaction may be considered religious to the extent that it seeks 'life' in the sense of completion, unification, and conservation of values—any values whatever. Religion does not introduce any new value; it is an operation upon or within all our appreciations. If we were to speak of religious value at all, we should think of it as the value of values, that is, the value of life organizing and completing

21. *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (Swain Translation), p. 206.

22. *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 68.

20. *The Psychology of the Religious Life*, p. 343.

itself, or seeking a destiny, as against the discrete values of impulsive or unreflective existence.<sup>23</sup> With Professor Coe, religion is directed toward the integrated ends of life and these ends are constantly undergoing reconstruction.

Proceeding from this viewpoint, he suggests five characteristics of human desire; first, human desire is not extinguished when its immediate satisfaction is attained; second, human desires undergo a process of organization toward the unity of the individual, whereby he objectifies his desires, compares them, and arranges them into a scale more or less refined; third, human desires come to include a desire to have desires, whereby man regulates his desire, not merely by forming the desire to have this or that object, but also to become this or that kind of man; fourth, human desires undergo a process of organization toward social as well as individual unity; fifth, human desire, growing by what it feeds upon, refining itself, judging itself, organizing itself, becomes also desires for the conservation of the human desire-and-satisfaction type of experience.<sup>24</sup>

Thus, with Professor Coe, religion is the revaluation of values, involving the idealization, the completion, the unification, and the conservation of all the values of life whatsoever. It is the point at which all values are fused into a total meaning and worth of life. In this way, at last, a firm ground is laid for the organization of religious experience by the religious educator.

As one surveys the present field of psychology, he is led to suspect that the next significant direction to be given to the psychology of religion may come from those who have been deeply influenced by the thinking of Freud and Jung, exploring more thoroughly the influence of the unconscious upon religious experience. Already this tendency has

found expression in such treatments as Everett Dean Martin's *The Mystery of Religion*. In this initial and somewhat negative venture upon this vast and as yet dark terrain, Martin sees in religion the mechanism of escape from the unwelcome realities of human experience, fabricated far below the threshold of man's conscious and reflective life. This movement, on its positive side, is likely to deal with the emotions.<sup>25</sup>

The significance of these trends in the psychology of religion for religious education is far-reaching. Tentative as are the results to date, and needing as they urgently do much further elaboration based upon a vast range and depth of concrete data, with the aid of precise techniques yet to be developed, they nevertheless appear to afford a solid and valid basis for the development of techniques for the organization of religious experience in growing persons through the processes of religious education.

One of the most fundamental implications of these trends for religious education consists in the emphasis which the conception of religion in terms of value places upon *persons*. Value has no meaning apart from persons. Whatever blind urges may impel lower orders of life to activity that leads to satisfying ends, it is persons only who, as far as our knowledge now extends, are capable of becoming conscious of these ends and of organizing their resources for their attainment.

In the lower orders of personality, many of these ends may still remain unconscious or only dimly conscious. But in the higher orders of personality, desires, which are only the subjective aspect of what from an objective point of view are values, are raised sharply into consciousness, reflected upon, criticized,

23. *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 70.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 66ff.

25. The limits of space do not permit even a cursory survey of the literature of the psychology of religion, to say nothing of the distinctive contributions of a great number of investigators in this field. What has been held in mind throughout the present discussion has been the discovery of significant trends in the form of a sequence of ideas.

and organized into a consistent whole. And since religion is conceived in terms of the integration of all values whatsoever into a total meaning and worth of life, it is only possible for the quality of experience that is religious to arise within the experience of persons.

Moreover, these considerations have far-reaching implications concerning the nature of reality itself. Is the world in which we live primarily a world of things or a world of persons? Within the range of empirical experience, it would appear that in the reciprocal relation of intelligence and purpose, on the one hand, and material objects and processes, on the other hand, the directive and creative functions lie on the side of intelligence and purpose. Civilized life itself is the result of the reaction of man upon his material and social environment, so that it is increasingly difficult to find elemental objects and processes that are still purely physical, and that do not bear the modifying influence of human persons, and that in accord with their intelligence and purposes, within the flexible limits of control.

It is a matter of extreme significance that within empirical experience only persons can establish *rapprochement* with our world through understanding of the nature of the orderly processes that seem to furnish its pattern and structure. The fact that our world is intelligible only to intelligent beings raises a strong presumption that at its center, and throughout its thus far explored areas, an intelligence vastly beyond the capacity of our comprehension is at work in our world.

But, by all tests, reality appears to be vastly more than the discovery of intelligence. Increasingly it seems clear that it lies closer to the drives of our older vital and practical experience than it does to our recently acquired intelligence. Whether we will or no, our yearnings, our outreachings after the things that make life satisfying on its

highest levels, determine the things that are most real for us. That is to say, reality, in the last instance, roots in our values.

We have, further, to face the fact that the highest values we possess are personal values, and the highest expression of personal values is personality itself. And if these implications are followed out to their logical outcome, they appear to lead to an interpretation of the central and fundamental reality of the universe in terms of a *Supreme Person*—the Supreme Socius not only, but, in terms of the highest function of personality, the Creator of Values.

In this way two problems that are central and fundamental in current religious education are immediately touched upon—whether religious education shall commit itself to mechanism as a philosophy or as a method, and what attitude the religious educator shall take toward the concept of a personal God. If religion is to be thought of as the integration of all values into a total meaning and worth of life, it is quite obvious that mechanism does not answer to the facts of the religious experience, and that its techniques are fruitless for the organization of religious experience for the ends of personal and social living.

Likewise it would appear that the concept of a personal God is a fundamental necessity for the religious educator. A complete working concept of religion for the religious educator, therefore, would seem, of necessity, to include the concept of God, so that in its complete form it might run thus: religion is the integration of all particular values into a total meaning and worth of life in terms of its relation to God. This would imply that God appears in human experience at the point where the fusion of all particular values occurs.

The second fundamental implication of these trends in the psychology of religion has to do with the manner in which all experience enters into the de-

termination of the content and pattern of religious concepts.

This rootage of religious concepts in the rich soil of the total experience of life can, perhaps, best be represented by a graphic figure (Figure 1). The particular and more or less specialized areas of interests and activities—intellectual, social, economic, ethical, aesthetic, etc.—may be represented by ellipses. Their inter-relatedness as areas of experience may be represented by the overlapping of areas as they approach the point of convergence. Thus it is impossible to think of any one area as isolated from the others. Economic experience, for example, has its social, intellectual, ethical, and aesthetic aspects.

In like manner man's intellectual experience has its social, ethical, and aesthetic aspects, and may be directed toward the understanding and direction of economic experience through the science of economics. So also with all other specialized areas of experience. But it is at the central point of fusion, where all particular values whatsoever are integrated into a total meaning and worth of life, that the religious experi-

ence arises. It is in this central area of fusion, as is suggested in Figure 2, that God as the central and fundamental reality of the universe appears. It is at the point of the reference of all particular experiences to God that any experience takes on the religious quality.

It is in this fact of integration and reference that we get insight into one of the most obtrusive phenomena in the history of religion that otherwise tends to remain an insoluble problem. Why is it that religious concepts, including the concept of God, vary with different social groups having differing intellectual, social, economic, ethical, and aesthetic backgrounds? And why is it that religious concepts, including the concept of God, change from time to time within the same group as the intellectual, social, economic, ethical, and aesthetic values of the group change? From this point of view, the answer is quite obvious. The content and pattern of religious concepts are derived from these various areas of interests and activities with their corresponding organized sets of values; it is through the reference of these various




Figure 1.

*Determining Influence of Experience upon the Content and Pattern of Religious Concepts*




Figure 2.

*Determining Influence of Religion upon any given Area of Experience*

*interests and activities to the fact of God that they receive their religious quality.*

A single illustration from one area of experience—the intellectual—will make this clear for all the other areas. In a pre-scientific age the ancient Hebrews held what to religious people who live in a scientific age was a very naive conception of the structure of the universe. To them our world was a flat surface resting upon its four corners. Above it was a heavenly vault wherein were set the sun, moon, and stars. Under it were the dark and abysmal regions of Sheol.

In this their conception was not wholly unlike that of the Egyptians with Re making his daily journey in his barge across the heavens and returning at night through the subterranean caverns. Nevertheless, holding to this conception, the ancient Hebrews held that the world was the result of the creative will of God—"in the beginning God." They also held that it was perpetually sustained by him. Living in a static world, they thought of creation as by fiat.

The modern religious person, on the other hand, lives in a universe of vast distances and complexity, in which our planet is an infinitesimal point, and regards the universe in its vast complexity as a *process* with a history beyond calculation and with an unpredictable future. Nevertheless, to the modern religious mind our universe is no less the creation of God, and its continuity rests upon the ordered process of his thought and energy. In each of these instances, the content and pattern of the religious concept are determined by the intellectual processes of its respective age, but each derives its religious quality from its reference to its relation to God.

This process, in its more complex forms, where all the specialized interests and activities unite in feeding into this central core of experience the content and pattern of religious concepts, may be illustrated by the changing concepts of God in the Old Testament, although

it could equally well be illustrated by the religion of any social group where there has been a continuous historical development.

The history of Israel may be roughly divided into the nomadic or pastoral period, the period of migration and conquest, the period of settlement upon the land and of nation building, the period of international conflict and adjustment, and the period of national disintegration. In the pastoral period the social organization of the Hebrews was upon the tribal or kinship level common to all primitive societies that have emerged from the metronymic stage. During this period, the Hebrews thought of Jahwe as the God of the kinship tribe, co-existent with the gods of neighboring but alien tribes, and moving from place to place as the tribe sought more fertile pastures for its flocks.

When Israel entered upon the period of migration into Canaan and of the conquest of its native tribes, the entire pattern of life changed. As under all such historic circumstances, it became militaristic. The Jahwe of the desert and the flocks became Jahwe of Hosts, a God of battle, going before his people in military conquest and giving them the victory. The characteristics ascribed to Jahwe are those which every militaristic society has ascribed to its gods. Only in a militaristic society could they think of Jahwe as commanding the extermination of entire native populations or, as an alternative, the enslaving of the males and making concubines of the women. Only in such a social framework could a member of the "chosen people" pray that Jahwe should "dash the heads of their little ones against the wall."

The period of settlement upon the land is one of the most interesting and fascinating from the standpoint of the history of religion. Entrance upon an agricultural régime called for a new set of qualities in Jahwe. These functions had previously been carried on by the baalim,



the gods of the dispossessed peoples. With conquest, the same things happened that have always happened in the history of religion when one people has been conquered by another—the functions of the dispossessed deities are absorbed by the god of the conquering people.

Only in the light of this assimilative process can the conflict between the prophets of Jahwe and the prophets of Baal be understood. But in the end, as always, the assimilative process was completed, and Jahwe became in their minds the God of sowing and harvest, as well as of conquering armies. This result is classically celebrated in the 65th Psalm. The agricultural functions in time superseded the militaristic, and the echo of a past military ideal is heard in the phrase of this psalm—"He maketh wars to cease." It was during the period of international relations and conflict with the two rival world powers of Egypt and Assyria that the writing prophets emerged. In these tense problem situations on a world scale there was present, for the first time, the psychological situation within which Jahwe could be thought of in the developing experience of Israel as the universal, ethical, spiritual, and only Living God.

And when, at the end, the structure of the nation with its cultus fell in pieces, the individual soul for the first time emerged in personal and responsible relations to God, a fundamental note first expressed in the writings of the prophets of the exile.

A survey of this continuous history of a people discloses at every step the process set forth in Figure 1. In each stage of development, the content and pattern of the concept of God is supplied by the fundamental interests and activities of the total experience of the group; the religious quality of that changing experience is derived from the reference of it to the total meaning and worth of their life, as interpreted in terms of its rela-

tion to God. To see religion in this setting is not to lose one's respect for it, but rather, perhaps for the first time, to feel the intense reality of it. So also, it is to have a heightened sense of the self-disclosure of God as the more adequate concept of him emerges within the warm and moving current of the life process.

Of course, the implications of the process represented in Figure 1 for the techniques of religious education are obvious. If religion is to be real and vital to the growing person, it cannot be transmitted by external instructional processes. Rather, it must root deeply in the vital experiences of the person undergoing religious education and of the society of which he is a member.

Did doubt still remain as to the influence of present personal and social experience upon our religious concepts, one has but to remind himself that the content and pattern of our own religious concepts are quite as much now undergoing change in the light of the expanding and enriching experience of modern life as those of any people in the historic past. The findings of science regarding the structure and duration of the universe, the creative processes involved in an industrial economy, the democratic ideal of social living—these and many other fundamental changes in our total human experience have infinitely enlarged our conception of God to fit into our conceptions of the vast extensions of our universe in time and space; they have given us a conception of God not impassively and remotely looking upon the struggles of our time, but have led us to think of him as struggling with us in the creation and achievement of the noblest ends of life; they have placed him at the center of a group of *persons* yearning for understanding, fellowship, and enabling strength in the pursuit of the high quests of life.

Translated into terms of educational procedure, this means that religious ideas



and attitudes must root themselves deeply in the rich and fertile soil of the experience of growing persons where life is being lived, where ends that are judged in the light of their relation to God are being achieved, and where spiritual selves and a spiritual society are being realized.

The third fundamental implication of these trends in the psychology of religion has to do with the manner in which religion, in turn, influences every specialized area of experience. The relation of religion to the areas of specialized interests and activities is reciprocal. If these specialized interests and activities feed into the central area where the fusion of all interests takes place in terms of their relation to God, religion, in turn, feeds back into these specialized interests a powerful reconstructing influence.

The second aspect of this reciprocal relationship may also perhaps be best represented by a graphic figure (Figure 2). Two aspects of this function of religion in reference to specialized areas of experience are apparent. One is that when religion reacts upon any given area of experience, it does not simply feed back into that area what that area had first fed into the area of the fusion of all specialized areas. Instead, religion feeds back into the specialized area the total influence of all other specialized areas.

One illustration taken from the field of economic experience will make this relation clear. Under Figure 1, it was seen that the economic interests and activities contribute material factors to the determination of the specific content and pattern of religious concepts. But when the reciprocal influence of religion is felt upon economic interests and activities, every other area of specialized interests and activities is brought to bear upon the economic interests as such.

These influences may be traced in a

concrete situation. We have, let us say, an economic process involved in production under our present industrial system—a large-scale manufacturing plant under high-powered and competent management. When religion has the effect upon this factory process of bringing it into conscious relations with experience as a whole, each specialized interest feeds back into the factory situation to modify it. The intellectual area of experience feeds back into it intelligence based upon the economic sciences. These sciences contribute the scientific structure of the process and furnish it with its techniques. As a mere matter of economic science, excessive speeding will be eliminated, as will also undue hours, exposed machinery with consequent loss to the process in terms of workers' compensation, and unsanitary conditions in the plant with the resulting depreciation of effective productivity. In this way, a crude process motivated by desire for profit in isolation from all other values of life is transformed into an intelligent, precise, efficient system.

Simultaneously, however, the social interests feed back into the process. As a result of these values, the productive process is placed in its proper social setting. Its primary function is seen to be to serve society's needs. Profits are then viewed in a social setting; as a just return for service actually contributed in the satisfaction of human wants. Moreover, when social values affect production, the plant is seen, not so much as an aggregation of high-powered machines attended by human automatons, but as a group of human beings with aspirations and wants engaged in the skillful use of machinery in producing goods for the satisfaction of other human beings. Under the impact of this consideration the question is asked: What effect does this factory have upon the human beings involved in its processes and upon human society in general? rather than simply: How much salable material commodity

has it produced? Under its influence production has been humanized.

So also when the ethical values feed back into the factory process. When the process has been lifted to a social level it has already penetrated the area of ethical values. Processes, as well as ends, are now criticized in the light of their ethical quality when judged by their consequences in the self-realization of persons and of organized society. Processes which were approved when judged in isolation from other considerations now become impossible of further consideration on ethical grounds. So also with reference to the aesthetic experience. It is no longer sufficient that commodities should be merely useful; they must also be beautiful. A repulsive plant dominating a slum district in which its attaches live in squalor now receives architectural treatment, and is set within a framework of landscaping that gives beauty and joy to those who are bound to it by productive and satisfying labor.

Thus through the converging of the varied interests and values of the total life upon the economic process, it comes to have a new significance in the light of the total meaning and worth of life that it could not possibly have when thought of in isolation from that total aspect of life. This function of religion is represented in Figure 2 by the encircling line A.

The other aspect of this function of religion with reference to the specialized areas of life emerges in the transformation which occurs in the area where all the specialized values of life are fused into a total meaning and worth of life. It is at this point that God emerges in human experience. What is fed back from this central area is more than just the sum of all other interests and values.

In this the writer cannot agree with Professor Coe in his view that religion adds no other value to human experience. In the glowing focus where all the values of experience are fused a new and in-

tense quality is added to experience. As the bringing together of two units of hydrogen and one unit of oxygen results in an entirely new product that before did not exist as such and that disappears as such when it is decomposed, so in religion, at the point of integration of all experience in terms of its relation to God, we have a new quality of experience that was not present in the pre-existing disparate experiences and that, once it has arisen, is vastly more than the sum of all of them.

It is in relation to this new and central core of experience that the fundamental reality of the universe becomes most intense and meaningful and it is in relation to God who there discloses himself that the meaning and worth of life are raised to their nth significance. The emergence of God gives more than a heightened significance to the sum of all other areas of interests feeding back into any particular area of experience, represented by the encircling line, A, in our figure; it gives a new and unique quality to experience in every area of life. This unique and dynamic influence is indicated in Figure 2 by the line B.

When this influence of religion upon the various areas of specialized experience is translated into terms of educational procedure, it means that the religious educator must devise techniques for lifting every area of experience into the light of its relation to God so that it will have that religious quality that can only come from this reference. This means that techniques must be devised so that in time the whole range of life, as well as its particular aspects, will be judged and evaluated in terms of its relation to God and of his relation to the entire human and material process.

Furthermore, it means that while religious concepts in the form of meaning will emerge from the experiences that constitute the content of normal living in the manifold relations and functions of

life, religious education must not stop with meanings. A dynamic and creative religious education based upon these trends in the psychology of religion must re-introduce these meanings as factors of reconstruction into every area of ex-

perience and into life as a whole.

In some such way as this religious education finds psychological supports for a conscious and dependable technique for relating religion to life, both as meaning and as control.

## THE NAIVETE OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATORS

BY ONE OF THEM

RELIGIOUS education is serious business and must needs be entered into with intense purpose. For some years religious educators, including psychologists, have worked strenuously and have accomplished some worthwhile objectives. Lest the grind tell too much, we might take a few minutes off and look at ourselves and our work. If the mirrors are a bit convex and concave it may relieve the tension, so long as the likenesses are good enough for us to recognize ourselves.

Who *ourselves* are, depends. Among us may be general educators, psychologists, pedagogues, ministers, directors. In a case like this, logical order would be out of place if not impossible. Some would question whether anyone knows what psychological order would be. So it is as well to start in anywhere and come out anywhere. If a reader should even catch a reflection suggesting the writer, may that too add to the gaiety of nations.

Dogmatism is generally taboo. "Nine out of ten dogmatic statements are wrong," said a teacher. "Is that one of the nine?" queried a student! While wrong things are ostensibly turned out the front door, they have a way of slipping in unobserved by other avenues. Science is as much the enemy of dogmatism as is the weasel of the rat. But the writings, speeches, and attitudes of some scientists—natural, psychological, and educational—appear to leave as little room for the views of others, even in fields beyond their spheres, as the ecclesiastical councils of the Middle Ages.

It is admitted that the educator should understand his pupils, their problems and needs, and that his work is to help the pupil meet these needs. Most educators are eloquent on this point. The reverberations of this teaching are heard round the earth. Filled with enthusiasm for this new approach, the student enrolls—only to discover that the course follows its preconceived plan as if he and his problems never existed. Even the new and fresh expounders of religious education at great centers of light and leading should glance into this mirror!

Compulsion is a wrong method in education—about as low a type of incentive as can be devised. A teacher utterly committed to this theory by speech and pen spoke thus to a child aged ten: "You eat that now, or you'll go to bed!" There was no suggestion of soft pedagogy in tone or expression. "That is the method of free choice," he said sweetly to the visitor. But when an ordinary uneducated parent says, "Do this or I'll give you a lickin'," it is compulsion. One of the values of education is that it gives the power of discriminating between this and that.

A good deal is heard these days about the scientific determination of social objectives in education. The harried, exhausted educator turns to this like the hunted stag to the water brooks. It is scientific; it is social. With eager enthusiasm he begins to read. But the clear-cut definiteness of science is not there, or it is lost in words. As far as ordinary intellects can make it out, the

scientific part consists in discovering the opinions of others. Study social situations, then find out from others—many others—what they think are most important. The cold, refreshing mountain stream is a mirage. All that is found is the parched sand of the past, the *status quo* and the quagmire of general (of course "selected") opinion.

Educational centers are doing much to break down the old, straight-laced, rigid, lockstep procedure. Education must be built up on community needs. This is one of the main tenets of educators, especially in the eastern centers such as in New York, New England, and even in Chicago. But are these centers the United States and Canada? A Chinese student in one of these educational centers wrote a highly scientific Ph. D. dissertation on a program of education for China and his results, accepted by the university, parallel the scheme and the curricula in this country, almost an exact copy. A magnificent, scientific demonstration of the perfection of our scheme for the world.

Some Columbus, let us hope, venturing forth from the warmth and glow and fronded palms of these delectable islands of learning, may fare west or south or north and return (if he is lucky enough to escape the barbarians, bears, and other beasts) telling of new lands, of strange customs, and of interesting peoples and their needs. It *would* be a "scoop" if this Columbus should be an editor—say an eastern writer, or an editor of lesson courses and educational magazines!

"The curriculum"—here's room for discussion! Not a pokey stream for paddling nor a pond for wading, but a wide flowing river with lots of seaway. Here "Come all ye. . . ." A feast, a riot of discussion. Begin anywhere and end the same. Like Omar Khayyam—up to date. Two cats mixed it and each came out "with lesser fur than in he went."

What is studied must be a life experience in its natural setting. That is settled. It can be found capably stated in

thick volumes, fat and heavy, written by experts. It sounds good and convincing. We hasten to courses offered by these writers. "Life situations in natural setting?" Few reports have been received of many of this species having been seen. We read the book again and are reminded of an opera—"Never?" "No, never!" "Never?" "Well, *hardly* ever."

A "typical" situation will do if a real one is hard to catch—and for natural setting, make it *look* natural. You cannot take the little children into the jungle actually to face a lion or have them crawl into a lion's den. So use museum specimens; if that is not possible, use a picture. But be sure it is a "live" situation in the "natural setting" (that is pictured).

Experience is everything. There is no room for two opinions about that. By experience is meant my experiences, the pupil's own experiences, and not in some future state or stage, but now. Browning was just the opposite of this truth. Man has now. Leave past and future forever to fools and apes. Get away as far as possible from the past. Civilization, that vast work of countless millions, like the coral reef of Australia, is after all but dead matter, chiefly skeletal matter. Away with it. Let it not appear in our new curricula. Let the unhampered, untrammelled, free spirit create its own life. Let the past be past and gag all who mumble about making bricks without straw!

Not enough is made of individual differences. People are not all the same, like pills from a pharmacist's machine which, like the wise scribe, turns out by the ten thousand things good and bad, and specializes in "dummies" made of harmless materials like flour and water, nicely sugar coated, for the suckers and hypochondriacs, and for the good of the doctors' bank account. No two are alike. Therefore what? An entirely different course and method for each in the ideal school. It may be well to remember that no two leaves on the oak tree are iden-

tical, yet each is unmistakably an oak leaf. Perhaps it is somewhat the same with humans—that no two persons are identical, and yet there is no mistaking that they are humans, that individual differences are slight variations of what is basically more alike than any one human is to any other non-human thing in creation.

Ideals! The word, through habit, slipped off the end of the pen. How the race has danced after that will-o'-the-wisp, deeper and even deeper into the swamp of ambiguity. If anything ever needed tracking down, it is this notion of ideals. The rosy fingered dawn of the second quarter of the twentieth century brings the answer. It is but a *trait*, a way of acting. So just decide what is the desirable action, set the stimulus to insure the right response, practice and habituate, and the ideal is grasped. The teaching of ideals is made practicable and becomes a technique easily mechanized. So another may have gained immortality like Pope who:

"... made of poetry a mechanical art,  
And every warbler has his tune by heart."

New methods of teaching are making real strides. One needs but to hear the eloquent *lectures* that are given to students on the advantages of project methods and discussion methods. Teachers excel themselves as they present such topics in glowing periods. Or it may be one can find the finest project course consists in the sort of cut and dried material pleasing to the heart of the ancient text-book writer. But the letter press is well done and you know it is a project because the volume has an attractive cover labeled *A Project Course*, and has an introduction by some person who knows saying it is a project. Therefore it is. And a new device for getting the same old medicine swallowed scores another triumph in pedagogy.

An interesting variation is when the course provides for a talk or lecture each week or at stated intervals, the class pro-

jecting itself upon the lecture in discussion perhaps a week later. So the meal served hot by a rejected process is rehashed cold every week so no nourishment is possibly lost. It is a magnificent training in thrift—thrift in thinking—and in the art of talking. It beats the queen's economy:

"Thrift, thrift, Horatio! the funeral baked  
meats  
Did coldly furnish forth the marriage table."

When people face a situation for which they must find a solution and put it into effect, a conference is essential. The nations considering disarmament must confer. No saner principle exists. It is as fundamental as human nature itself. Therefore, (the conclusion is jumped to) confer over everything by discussion. It was said that in the high days of Sovietism soldiers charging might suddenly stop on no man's land at some comrade's suggestion and discuss the situation. So, in education, any heterogeneous group of people of all sorts of experiences and backgrounds, without any common specific situation to face, may discuss for hours—for days—eloquently and endlessly, anything in heaven or in earth with great satisfaction to all who talk. "That was a *great* class. I spoke five times." Self expression is an order of the day.

"Anything that exists exists in some quantity. Therefore it can be measured." It will soon be quite easy to equate in a mathematical formula the esthetic value of a picture or other work of art and its educational influences. The results will be revolutionary. The ignorant *nouveau riche* will no longer pay thousands for an old master but will find its E. V. (esthetic value). Young artists need no longer struggle and starve. That unknown's sketch, musical score, statue may have an E. V. of 126 with a coefficient of 90. The Taj Mahal, the cathedrals, Shakespeare, Michael Angelo, Raphael, Bach, et cetera, will all soon be put each in his respective pigeon hole, properly labeled. In religious work the gain will be greater still. If a



sermon exists it exists in some (usually considerable) quantity. In calling a minister it will be possible to measure by exact mathematical formula his R. I. (religious influence). Is that a good hymn? The question may no longer be left to guess work. What is its R. I.? If spirit (soul) exists it exists in some quantity. Now it will be possible to measure the growth of spirit.

Intelligence *is* measured, so they say. The I. Q. is as well known as the A. B. C. Intelligence, not education, is measured. A group dropped low in a completion test. It was found that many of the articles belonged to city life, such as electric lamps, and were not familiar to that particular group. But there is the diabolical cleverness of the test. If they knew the articles it would be a test of education. But if one never saw an electric light bulb it is a test of real intelligence to know it should have a filament of a particular shape!

Some people resent the fact revealed that the average adult measures in intelligence but thirteen years. Only the unthinking can so react. Anyone who knows the modern thirteen-year-old feels puffed up almost to the bursting point. To be as intelligent as they are is to be intelligent indeed. Another complimentary thing (often misunderstood) is that the inmates of certain insane asylums made the average score in mental tests.

One of the most striking results of prolonged character education investigation carried on scientifically and with the help of most intricate mathematical formulae, is that the mother is an important,—in fact, one of the most important,—influences in the home.

At the recent convention of a great and noble association—the R. E. A.—a brilliant psychologist was presenting the fallacy of abstract teaching and advocating with conviction the need for life situations. One of his most clinching arguments was that in the case of a life situation the “transfer” or “carry over” would

be greater! Transfer or carry over to what? To abstract school work, perhaps. But even Homer (if there was a Homer) nods.

Democracy is a word that is creeping into the dictionary and occasionally being used in educational circles. Besides having four syllables it carries a sound with it. Has it meaning? What is meaning? An authority says the meaning of meaning is that “*this* implies (that is, means) *that*.” So “democracy” undoubtedly has meaning. Teachers who insist on it and on the scientific method are usually careful to insist also that students take copious notes on what they say in class, and that answers of this kind are the only ones that are in good form in examinations. Students, even if driven to different conclusions by democracy in thinking, must give the expected answers or pay the penalty in failure. Where are the Patrick Henrys and Nathan Hales who would like to be a thousand students to fail a thousand times in seats of learning for democracy in thinking and democracy in education? (A profound silence.) Most students, in democratic classes, are graded, as in old fashioned schools, on their fidelity (from Fido).

Life consists of “jobs.” Herein is contained one of the great discoveries of United States educators. It is, perhaps, their special contribution to learning (another great phrase). Indeed it is likely that when the best of this period comes to be written, it will be known by some such phrase as “The Period of Life-as-Jobs,” just as the literati refer to the Elizabethan Period. And what a glorious contrast. Since life consists of “jobs,” education’s aim is specific. What are the essential “jobs?” List them. They are listed. They number, let us say, 666 times 1001 (666 showing the biblical basis and 1001 the scientific). Each of these may function variously in some 365 or 366 main areas. Now all that remains is to make a cross-hash—666 x 1001 = 365



or 366. Analyze the "jobs," select the "significant" elements, make out your curriculum, and full steam ahead. The product?—*Jobbers*—the crying need of the age.

The only way to select scientifically the essential "jobs" and to discover the significant elements in each is by a questionnaire. The fifteenth century may have its discoveries; the nineteenth its Darwin; but the twentieth is the century of the questionnaire. That is the scientific way to get at anything. Make the questions broad enough so that unanimity of opinion may be secured. But how get consensus, unanimity? "Does the mosquito carry yellow fever?" The way to have solved this problem was to ask say, a random selection of ten thousand people in the fever district, and not by the cumbersome nineteenth century empirical, laborious, dangerous methods. What is the next great advance in the discovery of radio activity and of atoms? Ask a random selection of the populace. Having found it, study every motion until it becomes a pattern or habit.

This method of curriculum construction may be expected not only to produce "jobbers" habituated to their "jobs," but to preserve the *status quo*, "jobs." The "essential jobs" of today and their "significant" elements are the ones for tomorrow and the day after. So the chefs in convention assembled cannot claim everything. They assert America has contributed only Chop Suey, Hot Dog, and Hamburger Steak. We educators have also contributed.

The Mohammedan proclaims from the housetop his faith: "There is no God but God." Some religious educators would amend this thus: "There is no God but society," and others, it is said, (the writer has not met or read any such) by deleting these last two words. But there have always been careless nurses who poured out

the baby with the bath. It is probable that few are more zealous for the Christian and universal God than are religious educators.

Religious education is now a profession. Its votaries have fought steadily for their position. It has a body of experience, a technique, and trained leaders. It is professional in the sense that those who are in places of authority "profess" this. But in Christianity, so long as one believes the creeds and has the "spirit," actions do not matter. That is one of its attractive qualities.

In spite of this profession, it is not uncommon to see churches appoint as directors or as special workers in religious education persons who have never studied it; to find theological colleges with departments of religious education recommend and place students in important positions in religious education who have never studied it; schools which offer religious education calling to their chairs those who have not been trained in the work; and even to find an occasional rare head of a department of religious education recommending for an important teaching position in other institutions an "able man" who has taken no work in religious education. Truly, it is to laugh.

Should the eye of anyone who lives three hundred or three thousand years ago light on this revolutionary article and unwittingly exclaim, "A Daniel come to judgment!—Memorizing the creeds—not sparing the rod—the uniform lessons—the good old way is the way"—he should remember that, as among the living so among the dead, there is a certain etiquette and good form. One of the elemental rules is that the dead stay dead. To jump up and get lively in another century—well, it just isn't done. Besides, in the present state of psychical research, these mirrors can reflect not the dead but the living only.

## CHANGES IN THE METHOD OF RELIGION MADE NECESSARY BY PSYCHOLOGY

JAMES H. LEUBA\*

MOST of the definitions of religion offered by liberals are reducible to this: "Religion is a vivifying relationship maintained with the Supreme Power." Now, it is obvious that the meaning of that definition varies greatly with the sense given to the expression "Supreme Power." That Power may be conceived as the Great Unknowable of Spencer, or the Absolute of Bradley, or the Sea of Consciousness of William James. So defined, the Supreme Power is bare of the distinctive attributes of personality.

But the Supreme Power may also be understood as a mighty Being who maintains social relations with man, i. e., who understands him and feels with him, and, in addition, is moved to action by supplication, praise, and offering.

It is, I suppose, clear to all that the Power last defined corresponds to the traditional conception of the God of the Christian religion, and that it is, in essence, the God-conception of all the religions, past and present. My contention is that the religions, as they have been and are now,—the organized institutions going by that name, which invite us to membership and to financial support, and which claim to be the custodians and ministers of religion—are not adequately characterized by a feeling of dependence upon or of communion with a divine order of any sort, but include undeniably, as an essential element, a belief in one or several gods in personal, intellectual, and emotional relation with man. Hence the various social forms assumed by Christian worship everywhere. Everywhere the Christian worshipers speak to, praise, and supplicate an invisible Being. Replace that social God, the God of the religions, with any one of the conceptions of our great philosophers and the re-

ligions disappear. Kant, who was far from being a materialist, said of prayer, "Considered as an inner, formal worship of God, and therefore regarded as a means of grace, (it) is a superstitious delusion." This statement might have been made by such other philosophers as William James and Bergson.

The distinction just made is of the greatest practical and theoretical importance. It is an obvious distinction; nevertheless, I shall insist upon it because there seems to be in Christian countries a tacit agreement among the liberal leaders to obscure it, or even to refuse to take it into account. When they speak in glowing terms of "religion," it does not appear that they have no belief in the God of the religions. If our Christian populations should embrace the belief of our great physicist, Millikan, or of the distinguished English biologist, J. Arthur Thompson, (to speak only of scientists among the champions of "religion") traditional Christian worship would come to an end; the Christian ritual would become irrelevant. For these scientists conceive of God as a spiritual power manifesting himself, not as Christian worship implies, but in the way expressed in the laws of nature.

The present crisis of religion is precisely due to the increasing number of people who no longer can believe in the God of the religions, people who, nevertheless, usually believe in some sort of spiritual power as the core of the Universe. This crisis has had its beginning in the knowledge gained by the physical sciences, and its present culmination is mainly the fruit of the knowledge secured by the psychological and the social sciences.

From the particular conception of God entertained by the religions, it follows

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that they are characterized by the use of a distinctive method for obtaining whatever may be their aim. Whether it be the increase of game or crops, protection from accidents, the cure of disease, deliverance from evil impulses, moral inspiration, or yet eternal salvation, the religions seek their ends by the worship of one or several gods. That is their distinctive feature. This paper discusses the efficacy of that method in the light of psychology.

Although we are all familiar with the variety of forms assumed by the social relations maintained with the God of the religions, I shall nevertheless illustrate the archaism and the ethical crudity of the use of praise in Christian worship. In it, praising and begging frequently follow each other in almost regular order. Its spirit is correctly reflected in the opening declaration of the Westminster Shorter Catechism: "Man's chief end is to glorify God and enjoy him forever." Let the curious open the *Key to Heaven*, a Roman Catholic Manual of devotion much used in the United States, and read the Benediction of the Blessed Sacraments. It is described as "a devotion practiced by the Church in order to give adoration, praise, and blessing to God for his infinite goodness and love." The prayers, hymns, and litanies of this service are in three movements: begging, thanksgiving, glorifying. They remind one of nothing so much as of that servant in Mark Twain's story who secured larger and larger tips by addressing his master in loftier and loftier titles! What is true in this respect of the Roman Catholic manuals, is true in a lesser degree only of the prayer book of the Protestant Episcopal church. In the manual of that church praises are less frequent, more moderate and in better taste; but, like the *Key to Heaven*, they bear clear marks of their descent from Jacob's delightfully naive attitude recorded in Genesis XXVIII, 20-22.

I maintain here the two following complementary theses:

1. Regarding action upon the physical world, the method of the religions is worthless.

2. Regarding its effect upon the worshiper himself, whether his body or his mind, the method produces some results; but, taken all in all, they are immeasurably inferior to the results which already now can be secured by physiological and psychological methods. This amounts to saying that, in the religions, the nature of the effective agent is misunderstood. A truer understanding of the healing and invigorating force or forces operative in the religions comes with psychological knowledge.

The notion of a God Providence, a God in direct social relation with man, has come down to us from primitive man. It was the only kind of conception possible to him, and that conception has remained embodied in the worship of all our churches. And yet, belief in the efficacy of the worship of that God is disappearing. The physical and the physiological worlds have already been practically surrendered to the natural, the scientific method. Prayer to God is replaced more and more completely by fertilization of the ground, lightning rods on houses, safety devices, etc. A similar, if slower transformation, is taking place with regard to cures of the body and of the mind. It is not by the religious method that yellow fever is being eradicated from the face of the earth, not by worship of the God of the religions that the admirable triumphs of microbiology have been achieved. The efficacy of science is so obvious and so crushingly superior that, when plagues fall upon us, we no longer betake ourselves to the church, the temple, the synagogue, but to the men of science.

A few years ago, while certain English clergy were causing some excitement by practices corresponding to those of our own Emmanuel movement, a committee was appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury in order to investigate and report "upon the use with prayer of the

Laying on of Hands, of the Unction of the Sick and other spiritual means of healing." The committee offered in 1923 a long report from which I extract this single but significant passage: "Our committee has found so far no evidence of any case of healing which cannot be paralleled by similar cures wrought by psychotherapy without religion." This from a committee selected by the Archbishop of Canterbury!

A last stand in behalf of the religious method is made in the realm of the mind. Thousands of those who have become convinced that law reigns in the physical world and that it is therefore useless to expect in that world divine intervention, still believe, or try to believe, that in things mental the God of the religions avails.

These persons do not seem to know that the main significance of the recent and rapid development of psychology is the demonstration it provides that the cures of body and mind and the moral transformations taking place under the influence of the religious method are explicable independently of any direct action of a God in social relation with man. I cannot attempt here to set forth any of these explanations. Detailed, natural explanations of some of the more remarkable classes of mental effects commonly attributed to divine intervention may be found in my book on the *Psychology of Religious Mysticism*s.

The religious method of cure is now known to be merely a psychotherapeutic method, developed empirically, and applied with the ignorance belonging everywhere to empiricism. It can now, in most cases, be replaced with great advantage by scientific psychotherapy and by physiological treatment. I allude mainly to the recently gained knowledge on suggestion in its various aspects, to the psychoanalytic technique, and to treatment aiming at correcting the defective action of the glands of inner secretion.

The tragic deficiency of the religious method finds a demonstration in the pathetic and often heroic efforts of great mystics to set themselves right with God and man. The best of today's psychotherapists and psychiatrists would have been able not only to enlighten these interesting cases of social maladjustment regarding that which ailed them, but also to offer them methods far more effective for the satisfaction of their fundamental physiological and spiritual needs.

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But some may complain that I am not fair to the churches, and that I draw a caricature when I represent them as working exclusively with what I have called the religious method: glorifying, thanksgiving, supplicating, and the like. That all our churches, and especially the liberal ones, those which have broken with the narrower creeds, use also other methods, is obviously true. It would have been impossible for the churches to fail to recognize, at least in some degree, the sources of moral development and inspiration springing out of human nature. I maintain, however, that *the only distinctive, specific method of the religions is the worship of a God in direct social relation with man*. That they do not remain in the field delimited by that official conception of God, is incontrovertible. One of the most interesting and promising features of the activity of our churches is, in fact, their incorporation, in what they continue to call "religious" education, of methods that are independent of the action of the God of the religions. The present campaign for "religious" education, conducted in this country by the advanced wing of the liberals, is more and more a tacit repudiation of the method characteristic of all the religions, and a utilization, within a more or less vague spiritualistic or idealistic philosophy, of the art and science of education. It is a smuggling in of a non-religious method under the flag of the religions. Let me make this quite clear.

When a preacher imparts to his audience information regarding any aspect of life, under the conviction that it is not possible to behave for the best if one is ignorant of the world in which one lives, he is not using a religious but a secular method of advancing the coming of the Kingdom of God.

When a church organization establishes a settlement and provides workers to teach the denizens of the slums the rudiments of housekeeping, of thrift, of cleanliness, it is not, in so far, making use of a religious method. It would be doing so only if the workers were instructed to point to faith in God and Christ and to reliance on prayer as the means of achieving the desired transformation of individual and of social habits. So-called social work and education, which constitute an increasingly large part of the activity of the churches called progressive, is a non-religious method.

The teaching in Sunday schools of ethical principles and ideals by means of the lives of great and good men, or even with the help of the beautiful parables of the Gospel, is no more a religious method than any one of the methods in current use in the secular schools. Only in so far as the virtues are presented as of transcendental nature and in so far as it is sought to implant them in man by the direct action of a social God, can one speak of the method of the religions.

I have said enough to mark the extent to which the churches are using natural educational means for human development or transformation. One cannot very well refuse to admit that the churches usually regarded as progressive and effective are those which make the widest use of the secular and the least use of the religious method.

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I have, throughout this paper, and with an insistence perhaps wearisome, affirmed the presence of law and the non-recognition by the physical as well as by the psychological sciences of the action of

the God of the religions. Some readers may have been prompted to exclaim: "But law, whether in the mental or in the psychical realm, is the very form of God's will." Whoever understands God thus does not believe in the God of the Christian creeds, hymns, and prayer-books. He is not a champion of the religions, even though he should write in defense of "religion." The God of the religions may well be regarded as the author of the laws of nature but, in addition, he is supposed to hear man, to sympathize with him, and to respond to his needs and supplications by an action outside or beyond these laws. Without this addition Theism becomes Pantheism or Deism.

By rejecting the belief in the God of the religions and their method, we have not, then, settled the problem of God. One would have to be simple-minded, indeed, to think so. The mysteries of life are only removed further. The sciences reveal the lawfulness of the universe, but none of them provides the answer to the amazing problem set by that discovery. Why does the mental as well as the physical appear to human intelligence as bound by law? And, more especially, what do the particular directions taken by the life-energy indicate as to its nature? Why, for instance,—to take what seems to me the most significant of the facts in point,—why should there be in humanity not only tendencies toward a more complete adaptation to the society already in existence, but also tendencies toward the formation of a new society, a society in many ways antagonistic to the established order?

Biologists are wont to tell us that we are adaptive mechanisms, as if our only business was to fit ourselves, as snugly as we may, in the nook in which we are born. That is a false and pernicious teaching. In addition to the processes of adaptation, there are going on in us processes of creation. In my studies of the great Christian mystics I have been deeply impressed by



the energy and the tenacity of their efforts to transform themselves and society. They wanted to help establish on earth the Kingdom of God. The inadequacy of the mystics' conception of a divine Kingdom does not diminish the significance of the tremendous urge manifested in their queer way of living.

The knowledge won so far by humanity achieves two great results: it does away with the God and the method of the re-

ligions, and it points to a spiritual power working in us, with us, through us, towards a spiritual End. What that End really is, is a question for the philosopher to try to answer. But the determination of the most effective method of attaining whatever end man may propose to himself, whether in the physical, the physiological, or the mental and social realms, is a task for scientists in these respective fields.

## CHANGES IN THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION NECESSITATED BY PSYCHOLOGY

WALTER M. HORTON\*

THAT the concept of religion has changed during the last generation, may be inferred from a recent article in the *Christian Century*, where attention is called to the contrast between the questions that were hurled at George A. Gordon by the examining council when he was installed as pastor of the Old South Church in Boston, forty-three years ago, and those that were put to Dr. Stafford when he was installed last year as Dr. Gordon's successor. Dr. Gordon was grilled on predestination and limited atonement; and the council came within an ace of calling off the installation proceedings when the young candidate refused to deny the sinner a possible chance of repentance in a future life. Dr. Stafford was asked to express his attitude on such matters as prayer, missions, and the "Social Gospel"; and the sole survivor of the council which had installed Dr. Gordon asked what program of activities Dr. Stafford had in mind for the young people of the church!

We have here, as the *Christian Century* points out, no mere change of creed on the part of the church; we have a change of attitude toward creeds in general. Fundamentally, this means a change, not merely in religious concepts, but in

the concept of religion as such. This, I hardly need to add, is a matter of vital importance to all teachers of religion and makers of religious curricula. If Dr. Gordon's examiners had the right concept of religion, then a whole train of consequences follows, with regard to the proper training of religious teachers and the proper methods to be used in the church school; if Dr. Stafford's examiners were right, then a totally different train of consequences ensues. A changed concept of religion, if justified by the necessities of the case, compels readjustment all along the line.

Just here, however, there is need of caution: we cannot assume that every change in our fundamental concepts is truly justified, truly necessitated by ascertained facts. Many such changes are merely temporary changes in the "climate of opinion," temporary swings of the intellectual pendulum. Particularly in matters of morals and religion, thought hardly ever moves in a straight line toward the goal of truth; it appears rather to move in great cycles—approaching truth, one hopes, by a sort of spiral ascent, but all too often coming around to the original starting-point after a generation or two, with no perceptible sense of advance. In matters of morals, we

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seem to be alternating, generation after generation, between periods of Puritan asceticism and Cavalier licentiousness; and mores derided as "Mid-Victorian" today may become the accepted standards of tomorrow. In matters of religion, the practical, ethical emphasis of Dr. Stafford's examiners may give way, if the Fundamentalist reaction is not checked, to a creedal emphasis reminiscent of Dr. Gordon's inquisitors.

At a recent conference between American and German Protestant students, the Americans were surprised and shocked to note that the Germans were abandoning all interest in contemporary social issues, and reverting to an otherworldly type of piety, nourished solely on the "Word of God." One of the American students, with characteristic bluntness and characteristic lack of historic sense, reproached the Germans for being "behind the times"; whereupon a German student, with a quiet smile, said in substance, "We Germans feel somewhat responsible for your present state of affairs in America. You are just now feeling the full effects of the exaggerated pragmatic and social emphasis which Ritschl made current in Germany over a generation ago."

Now the teacher of religion is bound to adjust himself to any change in the concept of religion which is really necessitated by the facts; but he may well pray to be delivered from fads and crazes, and refuse to be stampeded by every change of the intellectual styles. How, then, is orderly progress in these matters to be achieved? The answer might be given in two words: *scientific objectivity*. So long as any question remains in the realm of pure speculation, opinion fluctuates between contrary extremes; but with every objective fact admitted by the contending parties, the range of fluctuation narrows, until, with the completion of a scientific survey of all the germane facts in all their significant relationships, the pointer of opinion,

in theory at least, should come to rest like a compass needle. The changed opinion which emerged at the end of this process would be *necessitated* in the strictest sense of the word, by the facts of the case.

Can we say that certain changes in the concept of religion have now been necessitated, in this sense, by that science which, more than all others, has seemed to promise to get at the roots of the religious phenomenon: psychology? Strictly speaking, No! Psychology has *necessitated* changes in specific religious concepts; it has only *suggested* the wisdom of changing the total concept of religion. Psychology has gone a long way toward settling such specific religious disputes as that between Augustine and Pelagius over original sin, or that between the Evangelicals and their opponents over the nature and value of religious mysticism and religious conversion; but it has hardly begun to settle the meaning of the concept of religion.

It would take a vast and almost universal collection of facts really to *necessitate* a change in so fundamental and general a concept as the concept of religion; and he who will not budge from the traditional position unless necessitated may stand pat as long as he pleases—particularly when it is such an easy thing to accuse the psychologists of sacrificing scientific objectivity to frankly partisan considerations, in the internecine war which now divides psychology's house against itself. But the wise teacher of religion will recognize another sort of necessity: the moral necessity of moving out of a weak position before he is driven from it; the moral necessity of treating new facts as friends instead of enemies, and modifying the concept of religion so that it may fit not only possibly, but plausibly, the latest discoveries of the youngest sciences. In this secondary sense, I believe psychology has already necessitated certain changes in the concept of religion.

1. *Psychology's first and most far-reaching effect upon the concept of religion has been to free it from all supernaturalistic connotations.* By this I do not mean that psychology has compelled us to adopt a purely naturalistic philosophy, after the style of Bertrand Russell or George Santayana; nor even that it has eliminated the possibility of what William James called a "piecemeal supernaturalism." I mean simply that the element of lawless caprice, the element of inexplicability, the element of the miraculous in the strict traditional sense of the word, has been virtually eliminated from the concept of religion.

Where the influence of psychology has not penetrated, there still lingers the conception that to "get religion" is to go through an experience which is altogether miraculous and altogether inexplicable in terms of ordinary mental processes. With the advance of the physical sciences, the disposition to see divine portents and direct "acts of God" in extraordinary *physical* phenomena, such as comets and earthquakes, has gradually ceased; but the idea that in certain extraordinary *psychical* phenomena — visions, voices, ecstasies, sudden inspirations, instantaneous conversions, startling answers to prayer, speaking with tongues, baptisms of the Holy Ghost, and the like — the idea that in these phenomena there occurs a total break in the chain of "second causes," and a direct, unmediated intervention of the great First Cause, has been defended with a tenacity born of the conviction that here was the last redoubt against the advancing forces of irreligion.

Now if the belief in the supernatural is essential to the concept of religion, lovers of religion are bound to be haters of psychology; for psychology has pursued the supernatural into its last hiding-places in the recesses of the inner life, and caused it to perish under the scalpel of scientific analysis. In case after case, the extraordinary psychical phenomena

to which we have alluded have been proved, upon careful investigation, to involve mental processes common outside the field of religion, and to occur, like other natural phenomena, only under certain well-defined conditions. The proof is not yet complete, for the psychology of religion is still in its infancy; but already we may say with some assurance that if supernaturalism is of the essence of religion, then the future belongs to irreligion. Those who are to retain their faith in religion under these circumstances must redefine their concept of religion. They must conceive religion to be a natural human function, like sleeping or eating, and endeavor to determine the conditions which govern its normal and healthy exercise.

In accepting this conclusion we are not committing ourselves, I repeat, to a completely naturalistic or humanistic conception of religion. If the word "supernatural," like the word "miraculous," had not acquired misleading connotations that tie it up with the notion of inexplicability, we might even maintain that a certain element of the supernatural still belongs to the concept of religion. That religion deals with the inexplicable, we must now deny; that it deals with the extraordinary, the supernormal, the awe-inspiring, the marvelous, we may still affirm. Psychology has succeeded in bringing extraordinary religious experiences under law; but it has not made them the less extraordinary. It has in many cases vindicated the authenticity of phenomena (such as stigmatization) which to prosaic minds seem wildly improbable. Most important of all, it has confirmed the religious man's contention that in religious experience there is a real incursion of vitalizing energy, yielding him new insight and heightening all his powers, so that he is transported, as it were, into a new dimension of existence.

In confirming this contention, psychology has not settled the question of the ultimate source from which this vitaliz-

ing energy flows; but neither has it disproved the ancient belief that it results from contact with a superhuman being. What psychology has settled is that the intake of energy in religious experience occurs as regularly and lawfully as the intake of water from a reservoir, whenever the gates are lifted, and all other conditions are properly complied with. It thus holds out the hope that religious experiences, while never ceasing to be thrilling and marvelous (and in this sense "supernatural"), may become much more common than heretofore; for when the conditions governing an experience are clearly known, it can the more easily be reproduced.

2. *A second effect of psychology upon the concept of religion has been to sharpen the distinction between religion and theology.* By this I do not mean that religion has been reduced to "morality touched with emotion," nor that rational belief in some object or objects of religious worship has been proved to be non-essential to religion. I mean simply that it is no longer possible to include belief in any *particular* theological doctrine, even the belief in a personal God, among the necessary qualifications for being religious.

Time was when all parties in the religious controversy could agree in defining religion as the belief in a series of theological dogmas, beginning with the belief in a personal God and personal immortality (supposed to be common to all religions), and going on to include more difficult dogmas like the Trinity and the Two Natures of Christ, according to the measure of one's Christian faith, and one's trust in the authority of the Bible or the Church. In the eighteenth century (if we except the Methodists and the Pietists, who defined religion in terms of feeling), it was pretty generally agreed that there were three classes of people: orthodox Christians, who believed *all* the dogmas of religion; Deists, who believed a *few* of them, and

were therefore considered *somewhat* religious; and finally the skeptics, atheists, and infidels, who believed *none* of them and were therefore utterly irreligious!

This rationalistic conception of religion received a good deal of sharp and telling criticisms during the nineteenth century, at the hands of Schleiermacher, Ritschl, and other influential theologians; but as late as 1871, the famous "minimum definition of religion" offered in Tylor's *Primitive Culture* won general assent, in spite of its thoroughly rationalistic trend: "animism" or "the belief in spiritual beings," said Tylor, was the essence of religion. It was only natural that those whose scientific studies had led them to classify animism with magic and mythology should come to regard religion as an outworn superstition. Today we have a very interesting situation: two groups of people, the ultra-conservative religionists and the ultra-radical opponents of religion, continue to define religion in terms of theological belief; while the liberal defenders and moderate critics of religion are accepting a new definition of religion, which makes it possible to call even a professed atheist religious, if he takes a certain "serious and social" attitude toward the world.

What has psychology to say concerning this shift in the concept of religion? Is it merely a "dodge" on the part of the defenders of religion, a strategic move designed to cover an inevitable retreat; or does an objective scientific survey of religious phenomena tend to confirm the proposition that the rational, theological aspect of religion is something secondary and subordinate? Well, it is noteworthy that writers on the psychology of religion, while they may differ widely in the exact wording of their formal definitions of religion, agree substantially in regarding it as a vital, necessary human function which a man can and must continue to exercise, no matter what radical changes may take place in his outlook upon life.

I would not overlook the fact, of course, that psychologists are not in agreement as to whether some reference to the Object of religious faith should be included in the very definition of religion. Some psychologists define religion in wholly subjective terms. Thus, Professor Ames calls it "the consciousness of the highest social values"; and Professor Coe calls it an "effort at completion, unification and conservation of values." Other psychologists, like Professor Pratt, insist upon including some reference to the Object of religious faith; it is a psychological fact, they contend, that religion is always a reaching-out for some supporting Reality, and that when a man comes to see his religion as something purely subjective, he immediately ceases to be religious. I believe this contention to be true; and this means that it is impossible to amputate all theological elements from the concept of religion without killing the patient. Certain world-views are more favorable to religion than others; and *some* world-view is presupposed in all vitally functioning religion.

Even this admission, however—which not all psychologists would make—leaves untouched the general conclusion that no very specific adherence to traditional theological beliefs is necessary to support vital religion. Professor Pratt himself defines his divine Object non-committally, as the "Determiner of Destiny." The Russian Communist, with his vague faith that the universe is somehow on the side of proletarian ideals, represents a type of religion which, psychologically speaking, presents striking similarities to the religion of the Puritans—who, we are told, were the true progenitors of Capitalism! We are thus led to a new "minimum definition" of religion, well formulated by Professor Wieman in his *Religious Experience and Scientific Method*:

"Religion is man's endeavor to find that adjustment to God which will yield most abundant life. For God is precisely that ob-

ject, whatsoever its nature may be, which will yield maximum security and abundance to all human living, when right adjustment is made." (p. 381.)

Here we have the objective, theological element in religion recognized, as I believe it should be; but it is distinguished from and subordinated to the search for vital adjustment, and so broadly defined that no specific type of theological belief is presupposed in the definition of religion. Religion, thus conceived, is no mere passive acceptance of traditional dogmas; it is an exploratory activity, primarily concerned with the attainment of the abundant life, and secondarily concerned with the attainment of right views about the Reality upon Which or Whom we must rely in that quest.

I do not believe that this verdict of psychology is ever likely to be reversed. We are just now going through a reversal of judgment on the question of the importance of theology; the services which a clearheaded, empirically founded theology can render to religion are coming to be recognized; but we are not likely again to make the mistake of identifying theology with vital religion. Henceforth, if theology is to be included at all in the concept of religion, it belongs at the circumference and not at the center; it is the servant and minister of something deeper, more enduring, and more sacred.

But what is that something? What is that "vital function" to which we have been alluding? Hitherto, we have been concerned with the negative effects of psychology upon the concept of religion. We have seen how psychology has pared away from it the element of the supernatural, and pushed the element of the theological out from the center to the periphery. But has psychology made no positive contribution to the understanding of the nature of religion? I believe it is in process of making a most mo-

mentous contribution, which I would state as follows:

3. *The parallel development of the psychology of religion and of scientific psychiatry is showing that between psychiatry and vital religion there is similarity if not identity of function.* By this I do not mean to suggest that religion is something abnormal, nor that its sole function is the curing of "sick souls." Both religion and psychiatry have tended at times to concentrate their attention upon the problem of saving the lost; but there is only a difference of degree between normal and abnormal people, as Bernard Hart points out in his *Psychology of Insanity*; and the process which makes abnormal people normal may go on to make normal people supernormal.

The thought of an intimate relationship between religion and psychiatry was first brought vividly to my attention when I attended a course of lectures on the psychology of religion given at the University of Paris by Pierre Janet, the eminent psychiatrist.\* In the concluding lecture, M. Janet made the prediction that as scientific psychiatry advanced, religion would gradually disappear; for religion was a blundering and unscientific attempt to secure that mobilization of reserve energies and that balancing of the mental budget which it was the function of scientific psychiatry to further.

This forecast of M. Janet's has given me much food for thought ever since. As I have studied the psychology of religious conversion and the psychology of mental adjustments, I have been impressed with the substantial identity between the aims of the evangelist and the aims of the psychiatrist. Both aim at the unification of personality around some socially desirable sentiment, and the elimination of all habits and mental conflicts which stand in the way of such unification. The evangelist often has the

higher ideal of personality; but the psychiatrist has an accurate theory and a technique for reaching his goal, which the evangelist lacks. Again, as I have studied the psychology of religious worship and religious mysticism, it has seemed to me that the real effort of the religious devotee, even in his most fanatical and hysterical moments, is to achieve and maintain that complete adjustment of the individual personality to its social and cosmic environment which the psychiatrically trained case-worker tries to help his "problem children" and his criminals and his drug-fiends and his neurotic patients to achieve.

Does this mean that Janet's dire prediction is likely to be fulfilled, and that psychiatry is to be the death of religion? Not necessarily. It would be better to put the question more concretely, and ask whether the pastor and the director of religious education are likely to be driven off the field by the psychoanalyst and the social case-worker. Thus put, the question will begin at once to answer itself; for already it is possible to cite cases of cooperation between wise pastors and trained psychiatrists, in which results were obtained which neither the pastor nor the psychiatrist could have secured by himself. Elwood Worcester was the pioneer in this field; Dr. Fosdick's collaboration with the late Dr. Salmon was perhaps the most brilliantly successful religio-psychiatric experiment so far undertaken.

Such experiments make it pretty clear that while religion and psychiatry seek the same end and perform substantially the same function, they arrive at their common goal by different paths. Psychiatry looks at a man analytically; religion looks at him synthetically. Psychiatry takes him to pieces, removes his inhibiting conflicts and complexes, oils his works, and then, unless guided by religion, puts him together again without giving him a new mainspring, or, at best, with an ordinary standardized main-

\*I wrote out a summary of these remarkable lectures, with M. Janet's consent, for the January, 1924, number of the *American Journal of Psychology*.



spring borrowed from the man on the street: ambition, or the love of a woman, or the desire to be comfortable in one's old age. Religion takes him into the presence of what is noblest and most awe-inspiring, kindles in him new loyalties, reverences, purposes, and enthusiasms, adjusts him to his fellows and to his God, and so releases floods of warm energy within him, which often melt down and sweep away those obstructions and inhibitions which the psychiatrist removes by other methods.\*

There is no more competition, then, between the work of the pastor and that of the psychiatrist than there is between the work of the pastor and that of the physician or the teacher. Religion is interested in the whole task of achieving goods and avoiding ills; and there was a time when the clergy performed all the functions now performed by the physician and the teacher as well as the psychiatrist; but religion has wisely delegated these special functions to those who have acquired special skill in their performance, while retaining for herself the general function of helping a man make a total adjustment to the meaning of life as a whole. The psychiatrist should be the best ally of the pastor, for his very title, "physician of souls," indicates the close relationship of their functions; but psychiatry will not replace religion until all psychiatrists become religious, or all pastors become skilled psychiatrists.

Our approach to the concept of religion in this article has been wholly psychological. If our object were to arrive at a well-balanced theory of the function

of religion, and a comprehensive definition of its nature, we should be obliged to supplement the psychological approach by the historical, the sociological, and many other approaches; for religion is a phenomenon almost as complex and many-sided as life itself. No purely psychological concept, we admit, can tell the whole truth about religion. Yet psychology has modified the concept of religion in at least three important respects, as we have seen; and these theoretical changes have many practical consequences for the religious teacher, some of which we may briefly suggest in conclusion:

1. If religion be something unpredictable and inexplicable, the religious development of the individual must be left, as it used to be, to the mysterious influence of the Spirit which "bloweth where it listeth"; but if it be something explicable and natural, it can be studied and taught, and scientific religious education is possible.

2. If theology and religion be identical, then religion can be taught by conveying theological propositions from mind to mind; but if our analysis be correct, religion is rather to be described as a vital function, conveyed from life to life by emotional appreciation and active emulation.

3. If the primary function of religion, as of psychiatry, be to promote the integration of personality, then the teacher of religion must himself be an integrated and radiant personality, and in his formal preparation for his calling the study of the psychology of personal adjustments must be given a place of dominating importance.

\*See Prof. Wieman's admirable article, "How Religion Cures Human Ills," in the May, 1927, number of the *Journal of Religion*.



# ACTUAL AND POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION\*

W. E. A. SLAGHT†

THE psychologist is being asked to unravel all the riddles of personality and solve all sorts of odd human problems. To do all that is asked of him he would need almost the omniscience of Deity. It is hardly fair, then, to expect this science to solve immediately all the problems of religious pedagogy. Modern psychology is very young. It is still feeling its way toward a comprehensive view.

## I. ACTUAL CONTRIBUTIONS

The immediate concern of this paper is with the contribution of psychology to religious education. Whatever its promise for the future, it is a service that is only beginning. Religious education has developed largely by trial and error. It represents the survival of long centuries of effort in training youth in the ways of religion. Modern psychology has developed in less than fifty years through many varied fields of investigation, but its application to religion was comparatively recent and at first very timid. The church has been traditionally conservative and reluctant to subject its doctrines or practices to scientific scrutiny. As a result, religious education has not been made the object of very extended psychological investigation. The majority of the studies relating to psychology and religion have been published under the title of "Psychologies of Religion" or some similar phrase. They deal primarily with such subjects as God, prayer, and conversion. They analyse and classify, and lay foundations for subsequent investigations, but in general have little to say on the par-

ticular topic of religious education. In two psychologies of religion which have been published during the year (Josey and Mahoney) less than ten pages in each are given to this very important subject. In such an otherwise valuable work as Valentine's *Psychology of Personality* the only reference to religion is a warning against the danger of certain abnormal forms.

The service religious education has received from works on psychology and even from psychologies of religion is largely indirect. It profits from the discussion of general problems, and from methods of psychological investigations, but has received comparatively little help bearing directly on the peculiar questions of education in religion. The contribution of texts on educational psychology is almost entirely in the field of methodology.

Recent interests in psychology have led to the study of problems more directly helpful to religious education. In recent years psychology has been devoted to intelligence testing. From this has developed an interest in the related field of character testing. This phase of psychological interest has direct bearing on problems of religion and of religious education. A recent survey shows that more than one hundred and fifty psychologists are now experimenting in some branch of character study. To trace the development of character, to standardize diagnostic tests, to find newer methods of developing right qualities of personality, have been some of the objectives sought. This development is significant for religious education. It is supplying the foundations upon which a superstructure of moral and religious life can be built.

\*This paper was read at the regional mid-winter conference on religious education held at Des Moines, Iowa, December 5 and 6, 1927.

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Further, it is extending research into problems that are distinctly religious.

And yet, not much has actually been done. In the list of 167 articles reviewed by G. B. Watson in his "Character Testing in 1926," only eight deal with problems that are of direct interest for religious education. Of these eight articles one uses the questionnaire method, two are case studies, the remainder are based on tests. The quality and significance of a few studies has made them important for our purposes. In order to show how this is true we shall review briefly five recent investigations.

1. Professor H. L. Searles reported briefly in RELIGIOUS EDUCATION, August, 1926, "An Empirical inquiry into the God Experience of 140 College Students." In this study the questionnaire method is used. As a result of his inquiry the author states, (1) There is a surprising richness and variety of religious experience among college students. (2) On the other hand, there is a great deal of spiritual poverty and intellectual barrenness with relation to religious values, and a consequent moral inertia. (3) Ten per cent of the students assumed a negative attitude toward the God idea; fifty-two percent believed in an impersonal God; twenty percent had discarded the traditional belief and found no worthy substitute. Religion is not functioning in a fully vital manner in the lives of these students. Further, Dr. Searles holds that "intellectual difficulties in religion in college are really traceable to an inadequate or misdirected early training in religion."

2. A study by S. P. Franklin, reported briefly in RELIGIOUS EDUCATION, December, 1926, "Testing the Comprehension Difficulty of Curriculum Materials," presents an instance of the kind of service psychology can render to religious education; not in actual results attained, but in possibilities of further work along the lines he has indicated. Professor Franklin holds that "present day curricula are

arranged according to certain psychological theories and principles which have a limited experimental basis." He attempts to develop a small portion of a curriculum based on the ability of the student to comprehend the material presented. The study seeks to determine the relative comprehension difficulties of certain of the parables and sayings of Jesus. The multiple question and other tests employed show that there is a basic age difference in the comprehension of this material which, in the past, has been offered indifferently to children of all ages. For example, he reports that the year twelve is reached before three-quarters of the pupils tested think that "a follower of God must be willing to sacrifice for Him." Any teaching of this precept before that age is quite lost. The child mind cannot grasp it. Perhaps this is one reason why so much religious instruction is ineffective. Franklin also finds that "those who never attend Sunday school or church, and whose parents never attend, did as well in interpreting the parables and precepts as those children who regularly attended all their lives and whose parents were regular attendants on religious services." Certainly it is a psychological contribution to religious education to show experimentally the age a child must reach before he is able to comprehend given types of subject matter. This has not, up to the present, been a factor in guiding the selection of curriculum material.

3. Another type of investigation is that of Professor G. B. Watson, *Program Paper No. 5*, Association Press, 1926, "Experiments with Religious Education Tests." This article contains a report of religious and ethical tests given to 15,000 boys in summer camps. It attempted the development of a "criterion score" method for determining the best answers. The tests agreed in general with the leaders' judgments of the boys. No correlation was found between biblical and

ethical tests. Such results coming from the testing of large groups of individuals will always prove helpful in giving clues to character trends that are deeply rooted in the common life.

4. All of the above reports represent direct psychological attacks on certain phases of religious education. In addition there is the larger group of investigators who work in the general field of character analysis, or who have been concerned with personality as a whole. Moral and religious problems are very closely related, and any results looking toward the knowledge or development of character will have direct value for religious education. Among the most significant of these more general studies is the work of May and Hartshorne, part of which has been reported in *RELIGIOUS EDUCATION*. They have been attempting to do for character what intelligence tests have done for the mental life. These investigators report a series of tests that are so planned as to establish and evaluate character norms just as other workers have given us intelligence standards. They hope to be able to reveal in particular individuals the degree of deviation that is shown from normally accepted standards of right and wrong.

5. A brief review of a study in character analysis made by the writer is illustrative of this new movement. Untruthfulness was studied, a quality in personality that is of great interest to the religious investigator, and an attempt was made to find the qualities of personality that are associated with this type of moral delinquency.

A group of three tests set off from a group of more than 350 children, in grades 4 to 10, two extreme groups of seventy each. One group contained children who were dishonest on the tests and then told a deliberate untruth concerning their action. In the other group the children were both honest on the tests and truthful in their reports. To these two groups was given a series of about

twenty tests, involving intelligence, memory, imagination, suggestion, and motor responses. The problem was to determine in which of these qualities the two groups differed.

An analysis of the results revealed the facts, among others, that untruthful children were (1) more quick and impulsive, (2) more open to suggestion, (3) more imaginative, (4) more easily distracted, this undoubtedly due to emotional disturbance, and (5) largely the product of poor home environment. From these and other factors certain deductions regarding educational procedure were made. For example, any adequate system of moral training must avoid the mistake of being formal in character, an error that has been made in most Sunday school training. An untruthful child could make just as correct a formal statement of a moral principle as could a truthful child; but in social experience the untruthful child revealed the standards that it had absorbed in its home training and made these the basis for moral judgments that involved true life situations.

It was found that the home was the real source of ideals, at least those associated with truthfulness. The standards of the untruthful child might be raised by revolutionizing the home. That, however, would be too slow a process. The more immediate way to effect a change is to use home methods, i. e. simple and natural ways of impressing truths, in school instruction. Instead of merely giving a measuring rod for determining character, this investigation attempts to get at the root of the moral delinquency to find its setting in child nature, and thus show the way for its possible elimination.

The investigations here briefly outlined represent a trend in psychology that is significant for religious education. A good deal of criticism has been launched against these methods of approaching problems of character. It is said, for example, that character is much too complex to be analyzed or appraised in any

set of tests. In his recent *Psychology of Character*, Roback claims that not three tests in character study have proved valid. It is also maintained, in part with reason, that the only adequate method is to deal with character as a whole, that these piecemeal studies dealing with "minute problems" will not lead to broad and general knowledge. A survey of this whole movement may be disappointing in the general progress made. Its chief promise, however, is in the technique that has placed in the hands of religious and moral educators suitable tools with which to fashion a new program,—a program in which instruction for moral and religious ends will be suited to the capacities of the child, and which will develop the maximum not only of knowledge, but of moral and religious habit.

This movement rests on the sound basis of scientific, experimental methods. The present, however, is a period of patiently working out detailed parts of the general problem. With many investigators, each working on his independent phase of personality, the results may seem contradictory and confusing. Out of the effort will inevitably come principles that will lead to a comprehensive program, to which all forms of research will have contributed their bit.

One fact is clear. Religious education must find its inspiration elsewhere than in psychology. The latter may supply the method and technique, but the continuation of large plans and unselfish service in this field must still come from a profound belief in personality and its responsiveness to the God ideal.

We have had a curriculum based on traditional methods of procedure and material selected on the basis of individual judgment. Out of psychological investigations there will develop a revised procedure that will, on a basis of careful experimentation and testing, present a program for religious training consonant with the nature of the child. It will present those phases of religious knowledge

that are suitable to the comprehension of the child, and in harmony with the physical and mental stages of personality through which the individual is passing. Such instruction will lead over into life, and form habits that will give proper expressions to religious truth.

## II. POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS

When the second portion of this topic is presented, the "possible" contributions of psychology to religious education, the fancy is left free to wander. A few points should be mentioned as ideals that may be glimpsed with longing but are as yet unrealized.

1. The unfortunate conflict between Fundamentalist and Liberal places limitations on the service which psychology may render. In his *Belief in God and Immortality*, Professor Leuba maintains that "Christianity as a system of belief has utterly broken down, and nothing definite, adequate or convincing has taken its place." If this be true, it has happened largely under the old dogmatism, and the remedy, if it is to be found, must be in a reconstructed method of religious education. If these two groups, so definitely opposed, can be persuaded to hold to the dictum of Paul and "prove all things," and then hold fast to that which is not only "good" but scientific and forward looking, then progress may be possible. One of the elements most fatal to real progress in religious education is the emphasis on disagreements instead of finding common ground on which all can work together for a desired end.

2. The great gulf between religious and secular instruction must in some way be bridged. Educational procedure has been revolutionized by psychological research. That the church school has not measured up to modern standards of education is shown by Franklin when he states that attendance on church or Sunday school has little or no effect on the comprehension of religious material. It is strange indeed that the church, sup-

porting so many colleges and universities, institutions equipped with excellent scientific laboratories, has allowed religious training to fall so far below the standards established in the state system for common education.

3. Religious education must build a proper curriculum. Much has been done but vastly more still remains. It must develop adequate methods. The grading of pupils on the basis of intelligence, the suiting of material to the mental age level, the proper selection of biblical material, the production of right habits of thinking and acting, the training of teachers,—these are some of the many questions that psychology must help to answer.

4. Time for systematic religious instruction must be found. No matter how excellent the program, if only thirty minutes a week are available for its operation, it is bound to fail. It is indeed a question whether the degree of failure in the religious education of youth may not, to a considerable extent, rest here. Short class periods at seven-day intervals are not effective. It is true that a traditional attitude must be overcome. If religion is to be educational rather than devotional, it must be taught as part of the regular curriculum of the school week. Religion must find a place in the curriculum of the school, and the child be given at least a partial chance to come in contact with the great religious ideals of the race. These ideals, presented in a skilled, scientific way, will not only inform the mind but win the imagination and will of the child, and lead to high standards of conduct and life.

5. A revival of interest in the emotions is revealed by the recent conference at Wittenberg College. The results of this gathering indicate the confusion still prevalent and the need of intensive study and experiment to find some common ground of agreement. The affective states of consciousness provide the dynamic of human conduct, and as such are

of vital importance for religious education. Experimental investigation of this neglected factor, the emotional life, will introduce new motives for conduct, and these will vastly modify the forms of religious instruction now prevailing.

These developments, the need for which is quite obvious, cannot take place until a more satisfactory relation has been established between psychology and religious education. A special psychology of religious education might be evolved, with trained psychological specialists. Some of the developments just referred to seem to lead in this direction. This, however, is not the best solution. The expert in religious education, familiar with techniques and methods in the whole field of psychology, should lead out. Psychology is a science that deals with facts, and as such it should be possible to develop a body of definite material on which all can agree. To be sure, a good deal of present psychology is unscientific, depending largely on theory and opinion. Sometimes it is narrow and sees only a portion of the facts, or is based on extreme cases which give a shortened perspective and distort the ultimate conclusions. In order to be truly scientific, psychology must present a total integration of personality. Nothing in human nature lies beyond its scope. Religion must be considered as an integral part of the total reaction of the personality. How unfortunate when a volume called *The Psychology of Personality* will not even give a single paragraph to the religious aspects of the self.

Psychology must be interested, too, in the great human values inherent in the facts of individual experience. Values and motives are as valid for its investigations as are stimulus and response. Psychology should be interested in seeing how adjustments can be made in concrete situations, but they should be adjustments of the whole personality. When such a view prevails, psychology cannot be dis-



interested in the religious aspects of experience. Is it not true that in many cases modern psychology has no meaning for religious education? The expert in this field, looking to psychology for his underlying principles as the bridge builder looks to physics for his basic facts, finds only uncertainty and divided theory.

On the other hand, religious experts must be willing to accept the facts of

psychology and follow where they lead. Psychology has helped general education to an entirely new conception of the curriculum and methods of day school instruction. In his field the religious educator must follow the facts until he, too, has evolved a new and scientific method of procedure that will be adequate for the development of personality. Psychology and religion must go hand in hand to the completion of this task.

## CONTRIBUTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY TO RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

D. M. TROUT\*

THE recent editorial by Professor G. B. Smith<sup>1</sup> aroused in many of us anticipation that the coming Philadelphia convention of the Religious Education Association will be one of the most significant events in the history of our organization. In that meeting we may hope to confer regarding the problems arising out of the need of mankind for religions adequate to an age of scientific endeavor. With such a gathering in the offing, it is the purpose of this article to set forth certain contributions of psychology to religious education.

### I. THE FUNCTION OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

To determine the function of the religious educator is still a vital problem. The history which lies back of his appearance as representative of a new profession is a fascinating story depicting the changing relations between scientific methods and ecclesiasticism. Educators and numerous other people, including many religious educators, are still trying to find out why the latter are here. To the solution of this problem psychology can make a contribution.

In order to understand the psychological approach to the problem it will be necessary to take account of certain classi-

fications of behavior.<sup>2</sup> Behaviorists have given particular attention to what are traditionally called tropisms, reflexes, conditioned reflexes, instincts, emotions, and habits. Since it is now known that no behavior originates independently of the environment, all modes of behavior included under these categories may be classified as reactions. The term reaction has the advantage of indicating that the behavior described is an interrelation of an organism and its environment. The kinds of behavior so classified are stereotyped, specific for given stimuli, and occur independently of the run of attention. They terminate without reference to environmental goals.

There are three varieties of reactions. (1) Those which occur at birth immediately upon the presentation of appropriate stimuli. Examples are the Babinski reaction and the affective behavior commonly, though perhaps erroneously, called fear. (2) Those which result from conditioning. An example is the contracting of the pupil when a loud sound is made, provided this or a similar sound has occurred a number of times just prior to or simultaneously with the act of looking at a strong light.<sup>3</sup> (3) A mode of

2. The term *behavior* as here used signifies the implicit integration of a neuro-muscular pattern which may or may not emerge in an overt functional relation between the organism and its environment.

3. Cason, H., *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 5: 108-146, 1922.

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1. *Religious Education*, October, 1927, p. 802.



behavior which was formerly performed as attention to a goal may become stereotyped and occur outside the run of attention. An example may be had by contrasting the efforts of a young child to open a door with the unnoticed opening and closing of a door by a preoccupied adult. Reactions are automatic and lack the experimental aspects usually described by the words *wish* and *purpose*. This fact makes necessary another classification.

*Response* is suggested as a convenient term to describe behavior integrated and terminated with reference to an environmental goal attended to and sought by the organism. Such behavior is experienced as willed or purposed. The wish for a drink of water, which eventuates in going to the fountain and drinking, is an example. It will be noticed that behavior of this sort lacks the stereotyped character of the reaction, and is more variable and spontaneous than automatic behavior. Behaviorists inclined to accept a mechanistic philosophy are apt to regard this as merely a complex of reactions, and thereby commit the fallacy of failing to recognize that the whole may be something other than the sum of its parts. The functionalists and the Gestalt psychologists are especially interested in the implications of this sort of behavior.

A third kind of behavior is the special concern of social psychologists, and may be classified under the term *interaction*. When two or more organisms intercommunicate by movements of muscles or body in such a way that attention shifts back and forth between them without becoming fixed on any end or goal we have behavior of this sort. An example is the ordinary parlor conversation in which no one is seeking to further his own ends.

This classification may rightly raise many questions. Its validity has been defended in a forthcoming article by the writer.<sup>4</sup> For present purposes it is suf-

ficient to note that it indicates three distinct varieties of human behavior.

It is reasonable to suppose that a minimum definition of education in the large would include the scientific control and facilitation of these ways of behaving, to the end that the organism might be most capable of efficient adaptation to its total environment. If such a definition is accepted, what is the place of religious education in the total educative process? The answer to the question may be found in a further examination of behavior.

If one attempts to describe educational procedure as it may ordinarily be observed in our public schools or as analyzed in most educational psychology texts, he is apt to decide that it is concerned chiefly with reactions. While this is hardly a fair conclusion in view of the newer project suggestions in various teaching methods, it does represent a distinctive emphasis of western education.

If one next observes religious behavior, he may find much concern for reactions, especially with reference to beliefs, rituals and ceremonials. He is apt, however, to be most impressed by the great degree to which it is controlled by what are, for the individual and the group, the most significant ends or goals conceivable. It is essentially and characteristically behavior of the response variety.

In this contrast lies the solution of our problem regarding the function of the religious educator. Public schools are giving their major attention, rightly or wrongly, to the production of reactions, with much less emphasis on goals. Especially are the more distant and, often, probably, the more significant ends neglected. The less formal social groupings tend to produce adequate interactions through emphasis on etiquette, but neither in these latter nor in public education is sufficient attention given to the more inclusive goals which are, for the time being, under varying circumstances, of supreme importance for the individual,

4. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, January, 1928.

the church, the nations, mankind in general.

A concrete illustration will make clearer the task of the religious educator as it appears from the data of psychology. The goal of world peace has been proposed. Again and again prophetic enthusiasm has burst forth in anticipation of such a state of society, but it has not been achieved. It is the special work of the religious educator to lead in examining the bases and the probability of attainment of such a goal. Once its validity and possibility are ascertained, he leads also in organizing technique, persons, and groups, for its achievement. He arouses enthusiasm and stimulates thought and endeavor until men everywhere try to conceive all their behavior as contributory to its attainment.

The full force of this hypothetical illustration comes with memory of how eagerly men gave themselves, and sought to interpret all their actions, for the winning of the world war, when our military leaders became for a time our dominant religious educators. God, science, industry, the churches, every resource of our civilization, tended to become integral factors, as men thought and acted for the achievement of what they regarded as the most important end. It is for the quickening of endeavor along every line in the attainment of that which men consider all important, that religious educators exist. To this task must be brought the knowledge of the laboratories and schools, the wisdom of the philosophers, and the cooperation of all concerned. Religious education, so conceived, stands first among applied sciences.

If then, the purpose of religious education is correctly conceived to be the scientifically controlled process of organizing human behavior for the achievement of the most important goals or ends of life, the psychological data and hypotheses relating to the emergence of ends should be made available for application.

## II. THE EMERGENCE OF GOALS

Place a stone in the path of an ant and it will go around the obstacle and proceed on its former course. Interrupt a bird when she is building a nest and she will evade you and continue her task. But try to entice the ant to go beyond the dead fly for which it was making, or endeavor to have the bird lay one more straw on her completed nest, and you fail. Throughout the organic behavior one finds these termini or "closures" which mark the ends of responses. What the experiences of the ant and the bird are under the circumstances indicated man cannot know, but by introspection he is able to describe and to classify, more or less accurately, his own systemic, kin-aesthetic and probably other sensations, when responding. There are many facts to support the position that desires are integrations of such sensations incident to the implicit organizing of behavior which may or may not eventuate in explicit movements.<sup>5</sup> This leads directly to an inquiry concerning the psychogenesis of desires. We shall take as illustrative of the processes the development of the desire for food.

When the baby is born he does not wish anything. As breathing, metabolism, and other processes go on, nerve impulses are aroused which finally result in contractions of the stomach. The systemic and other sensations incident to these movements are in adult life designated by the term *hunger*. But this is not yet a wish for food. Now, according to the law of the conditioned reaction, if two stimuli be applied simultaneously, or in proper succession, for a given number of times, either of them becomes adequate to evoke a reaction which previously could have been called forth only by one of them. If, then, the receptors of the baby's mouth and face are stimulated by food simultaneously with the hunger reactions, in time the latter will

5. Dunlap, K., *Elements of Scientific Psychology*, 328 ff., 1922.

be sufficient to set the whole organism in readiness for food. This organismic readiness is the desire for food. In similar manner all man's desires are developed.

Thomas<sup>6</sup> and Dunlap<sup>7</sup> have both published classifications of the desires. The writer has used for some time the following classification:

1. The desire for food, including water and air;

2. The desire for shelter, including all means used for keeping the body at satisfying temperature, and free from annoying external stimuli;

3. The desire for rest, including the readiness to escape *ennui* and other monotonous or fatiguing experiences;

4. The desire for sex, including all imagery of sex satisfaction;

5. The desire for dominance, including the desire to know for the sake of control, and the desire for social status as a means of control of one's fellows;

6. The desire for *rapprochement*, including the desire to appreciate even to the point of mystical union, and the desire for social unity or "perfect" understanding. This classification is included because it forms a basis for analysis of goals, and helps indicate how they emerge. Let us next take up such an analysis.

Whether one takes a description of an other worldly heaven, the dream of an earthly theocracy, the vision of universal peace, or the anticipation of a diseaseless world, analysis shows that any of them is an integration of the desires indicated above. It is a simple matter to find foreseen satisfactions of the desires for food, shelter, rest, and sex, even if the last mentioned is sometimes sublimated.

The desire for dominance acts as a rationalizing factor in refining the goal until it falls within the range of possible achievement. For example, to one who has accepted the negative evidence

of psychobiology regarding the existence of the soul as an entity distinct from the body, the goal of a heaven just beyond the clouds furnished completely with all physical comforts seems a stultification of intellect. The desire for dominance would reject such a goal. On the other hand, the same desire might be a potent factor in setting up the goal of a diseaseless world. Of course, such an end could not be achieved during the life spans of those who worked for it, but eagerness to be regarded as strong and altruistic, provided it were rationally possible, might be sufficient to give it genuine significance. In like manner, the desire for *rapprochement* draws persons together in support of causes from the successful termination of which they cannot hope to reap personal satisfactions. To be comrades in unselfish endeavor is reward in itself.

The psychology of desires suggests that the goals of a group or an individual are imaged and evaluated in terms of past experience. This fact was demonstrated by comparative laboratory tests of the imagery of individuals long before there was any clear recognition that heavens and dreams of social idealists are always wish projections growing out of past experience of the pursuers. For the religious educator this is of far reaching import. It suggests that goals appropriate to organize the behavior of one individual or group might be highly unsatisfactory as guides for some other individual or group.

Psychologists who have studied children are convinced that the experience of the child is in no sense like that of an adult. They neither perceive<sup>8</sup> what adults do nor do they have imagery comparable in complexity to that of their seniors. To imagine that the behavior of a six year old can profitably be organized with reference to the goals adequate to the needs of adults is a mark of rankst educational blundering. On

6. *The Unadjusted Girl*, Ch. I.

7. *Op. Cit.*, 324.

8. Koffka, *The Growth of Mind*, 284 f.

the other hand, there is equal folly in the position which holds that the child is non-religious until he is old enough to embrace the ends around which his father's behavior is organized. The goals towards which he strives must be natural projections of his own wishes.

The reports from autobiography and the conversations of children which indicate how, before six or eight, they said "Now I lay me down . . ." without finding any meaning applicable to themselves in it, and how they thought heaven was on some nearby mountain or in the ceiling of their mother's kitchen, should be sufficient to turn us from the notion that the adult may impose goals dear to himself upon the young child. There is an accumulation of empirical data pointing to the conclusion that somewhere between six and ten most children become capable of imaging with more precision the ends provisioned by their seniors, but even then such goals are highly unreal, and in no sense appropriate objects for the control of the behavior of childhood.

Anyone who has studied the interests of adolescents knows that what has been said of children is equally true of the period following childhood. Teen age folks project visions of their life work, their marriage, their homes. These are the prospects in view of him who is neither child nor man, but is passing into the status of the latter. Unscrupulous and ignorant adults sometimes find in adolescent emotional instability and keen desires for dominance and rapport, a ready entrance for their own hopes. The emotional evangelist, consequently, has found such a rich field for grafting on the goals around which his own behavior is organized, that some people have decided, in harmony with the conclusions of most savages, who are enthralled by the mystery of sex, that adolescence is another word for magic or *mana*.

The proposition elaborated with reference to children and adolescents applies

equally to more permanent differences in mentality. The idiot is not capable of becoming enthusiastic over the ends towards which the savant bends all his energies. The ignorant day laborer who toils from morning to night in strenuous endeavor to provide clothes for his family may not be able to throw himself into a religious movement for world peace with the same enthusiasm that characterizes a Kirby Page, or anyone else who has stood where he could comprehend the intricate relations of modern life and see far down the future.

This all means that religious education has, as one of its tasks, the guidance of individuals and groups in setting up *progressively* socialized ends or goals around which their behavior may become organized. The word *progressively* should be emphasized since we are still holding on to conversions and church joining. These are survivals of savage practice based on a conception of religious growth as saltatory, and doers of violence to religious development. The child should be thought of as born into the religious group just as he is born into his family or his nation. There is, for instance, no more painful experience for many children than to learn that the church they thought was "our" church is not theirs at all because they have never joined it. In the church which no one joins because all belong to it, ends appropriate to the age, strength, and faith of each member will be sought, presented, evaluated, achieved.

### III. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF GOALS

The preceding section might leave one with the impression that goals emerge without regard to the educative process. If one reads more closely, however, he will note that there is implied a considerable degree of scientific control. Goals may and do emerge in wishes, fancy, day dreams, and moments of ecstasy, but their achievement presents problems the solutions of which lie in the field of sci-

entific religious education. Again we turn to differential psychology for evidence.

In recent years considerable research has been devoted to eidetic imagery. The "T" or tetanoid type has imagery resembling the after-sensation, while the "B" or Basedowoid type experiences imagery more akin to that of ordinary memory. Persons who experience these phenomena are of considerable importance in religious education. Those of the "B" type readily develop free imagery independently of their environment, and easily confuse it with perceptual experience. They are apt to possess over-active thyroids and to find adequate goals in their imagination. Mysticism holds powerful attractions for them, and critical evaluations of external goals are often disagreeable experiences. They tend to become introverts, and to set up goals in imagination only. Madame Guion is doubtless an example of this type<sup>9</sup>. A relatively large per cent of children between the ages of nine and sixteen are subject to eidetic experiences. While reports are somewhat conflicting, Klüver's<sup>10</sup> estimate of forty per cent is probably conservative. The phenomenon disappears in most cases by the end of adolescence, but in some instances it seems to have continued on into later life.

The tendency of the "B" type to introversion raises a problem for the religious educator who would organize behavior for the achievement of objective goals. The Marburg investigators are still working on physiological and chemical theories for explanation, but it is not too much to hope that it may be a condition which disappears under endeavor directed to objective goals. The fact that it usually parallels puberty and adolescence, and the further fact that cer-

tain subjects, when placed in situations demanding considerable objectivity and exercise, have begun to lose the eidetic ability, seem to suggest that the religious educator might not only enlist such folks in a vigorous program of achievement, but at the same time effect the removal of the eidetic function. At any rate, such persons are his special concern because (1) they tend too readily to find satisfaction in inactive mysticism; (2) they require special attention in setting up adolescent goals to meet their needs; (3) sometimes unusual insight is needed to adapt certain of them adequately to their environment.

While the eidetic types may make more difficult the task of the religious educator who attempts to bring about their objective achievement of goals, he may at least take courage when the person of emphatic insight is considered. Under the terms *Einfühlung* and *Einsfühlung*, Lipps and others have discussed this tendency as it applies to aesthetics. It indicates the ability of a person to feel into a situation or into the behavior of another. All the reasoning in the world can not bring so quick an appreciation of a goal as this capacity. Through its exercise much of early childhood's insight comes. For all of us it provides experience otherwise inaccessible. When one's football team is within a yard of the goal lines and it is the fourth down, a rooter may all but push his neighbor on his goalward side off the bleachers as he empathizes the situation. Through this function we feel into the grandeur of architecture, the beauty of paintings, the glory of music. Persons who empathize readily appreciate goals at once, readily become *en rapport*, and are agreeable allies. These are often favorites with the religious leader, but he must be careful to develop in them ability to criticize, else their very appreciativeness may prove their undoing.

A third variety of person whom the religious educator finds in organizing be-

9. Guion, *The Life and Religious Experience of Lady Guion*.

10. Klüver, H., *An Experimental Study of the Eidetic Type*, *Genetic Psychology Monographs*, Vol. 1, 1926.



havior for the achievement of goals is the individual whose wish for dominance is outstanding. Such a person often is hypercritical and wants to have his own way. Usually the best solution in dealing with him is to set him a large task through the accomplishment of which his desire for dominance may be satisfied. This sort usually lacks empathy and is harder to enlist in active participation, but is invaluable as a critic of proposed goals. He can be made to render great service in discussions and researches for technique.

While many other classifications of personalities are possible and doubtless necessary, the three here discussed serve to indicate how important it is to take into account individual differences in attempting to actualize a goal for either an individual or a group. The extent to which this phase of the problem deserves consideration will become clearer as we turn to an examination of the two principal methods by which the religious educator goes about the task of actualizing ends.

The first of these has to do with the selection, criticism, and evaluation of ends, and means for their attainment. The typical gathering for this purpose is the discussion group. Its purpose is to eliminate conflicting ends, to show how the goal chosen offers satisfaction for the wishes of the various members of the group, to devise and direct research leading to the discovery and utilization of techniques and agencies for the achievement of chosen ends, the organization of the group in the endeavor, and, in general, the exercise of the most thoughtful and critical examination of proposed ends or goals. In the organization of procedure the assignment of tasks, if scientifically done, will develop in the eidetic type, motor objectivity; in the empathic, critical ability; and in the individual whose life is under the urge of desire for dominance, a satisfaction

of that desire in socially useful performance.

The more distinctive method of the religious educator is the process by which he unifies the goal and creates determination and enthusiasm for its achievement. This function is exemplified in present day church worship and in mass meetings of the various radical groups. In this process several psychological principles are helpful.

Laughter has been little used as a means to worship, but increasing evidence points to the conclusion that it is a mild emotional withdrawal of the subject from the object. Furthermore, it is an experience of superiority and control. It is valuable in unifying a group against opposition, and at the same time keeps them in condition for the best possible effort. They who laugh together when facing a storm both express superiority to the storm and enjoy a richer comradeship in overcoming it. Religious people are drawn together, better prepared for advance, and given a sense of superiority which assures more balanced functioning if they learn to see humorously their oppositions.

By cheering, marching, reading, singing, dancing, empathizing surrounding shades and chromatic blendings, or by any other rhythmically controlled, concerted behavior, a group may be unified and brought into *rapprochement*. The synchronous tread of armies is not alone of value in keeping everyone present. The empathic results bind them into a spiritual unity. The dance as a social unifier is unsurpassed. A football team usually possesses this unity or fails to make a success of the season. While this unifying of the group for action is important, it must be directed to the achievement of a goal.

Such direction takes place through the operation of psychological processes which function to give the goal supreme importance. Through singing praises or aspirations concerning the goal, enthu-



siasm for it is aroused. If the meeting place has on its walls paintings suggestive of the approval of great personages, the glory of altruistic achievement, these tend, by the law of conditioning, to add to the consciousness of worth inherent in the goal. Prayer as appreciation of the end sought, the soul's sincere desire, whether addressed to any one or not; prayer addressed to saints, angels, gods or other beings considered as superior, lifts the objective sought into the realm of divine value, and makes it appear more worthful, as the one who prays integrates his own wishes for the gaining of the end, or as the enlistment of divine support seems assured to those who hope for it. Preaching, ceremonial, or ritual performed by one conceived to be great, especially if it be reminiscent of the approval outstanding heroes of the past would bestow upon the undertaking, also adds to the worthfulness of the enterprise.

Finally, such worship must enable each participant to organize his conception of his own daily tasks so that they share in his thought of them, the glory of the goals worshipped. This result has a twofold significance. It arouses critical endeavor to make daily and constant contributions to the cause; and, secondly, it assures healthy spiritual performance, or, to put it in more modern terms, it produces happy efficiency in daily life.

The principles discussed in this section represent certain contributions of psychology to the positive program of religious education, but just as the early religious leader was both a priest and a medicine man, so the modern religious educator must be able to cast out the "devils" which hinder the religious development of those with whom he works.

#### IV. THE SELF AND THE GOALS

In an admirably written article, Miss Calkins<sup>11</sup> has traced the transition from

the concept of soul to that of self in western civilization. One has only to turn to Mrs. Rhys Davids<sup>12</sup> study of Buddhist psychology to learn how a similar process was much earlier taking place in the Orient. The student of psychology does not study far today before he finds that the mysteries he experienced through introspection reduce to something far different from a mystical entity such as the soul is supposed to be. What the religious leader of long ago thought to be a mysterious non-human being, modern psychology conceives as the two aspects under which a man may think of himself. One may regard himself as the object, as, for example, when he is ashamed of himself, but while he is doing this two selves seem to be involved, one, subjective; the other, objective; one, imperial; the other, empirical.

Only a worthy goal enables more sensitive persons to regard themselves as worthy. There is an old story to the effect that the early inhabitants of Ireland used to praise their children to make them love their school work. Here was a recognition of the fact that an unsatisfied desire for dominance causes malfunctioning and failure. The religious educator who performs his task well sees to it that goals are regarded as of such value that he who pursues them does so with an expansive sense of his own worthfulness. The failure of religion at this point results in weakened and heartless living. The self becomes sick of itself.

Another condition of the self to which special educative control should be given is the conception of oneself as wholly worthless and undone. In the older theology such a person was regarded as a sin-sick soul. In fact the skillful evangelist usually induces this condition as soon as possible. The effect is disheartening. The individual so affected be-

11. Calkins, M. W., *The Case of Self Against Soul*. *The Psychological Review*, 24: 278-300, 1917.

12. Rhys Davids, Mrs. C. A. F., *Buddhist Psychology*, London, 1914.

come introspective, and like the person who tries to perform a motor function with attention on himself instead of the end to be achieved, fails miserably to be good. This behavior is known as the law of reversed action. Sometimes it becomes chronic, especially if social suggestion tends constantly to define the self as bad. The earlier Christian theologians regarded such a person as having sinned against the Holy Ghost, and, therefore, hopelessly lost.

Such a definition of the self results in disintegration of socially useful functions, and the individual is forced to live a life of failure at trying to be good, because he constantly overtires with attention directed inward, or to seek approval by functioning in a "bad" or criminal group until his attention begins to turn outward again. Sometimes the latter alternative is his only salvation. Any form of extreme introversion should be given the religious educator's immediate attention. Usually it can be restored to normal by enabling the subject to organize his behavior with reference to objective standards.

Two other kinds of folks who need religious help may be described by contrast. Tolstoi is a good example of the one<sup>13</sup>. For him there came a time when nothing was meaningful unless he could decide what the ultimate end of existence was to be, and what each thing contributed to its attainment. At the other extreme are the Moon Mullinses who neither know nor care what the ultimate ends of existence are. Both types represent forms of disorganization that challenge the best scientific knowledge available for religious development. The one is an extreme introvert, the other, a pathological extrovert. The one needs quiet assurance that he has found the way; the other, a mighty awakening, a conversion to something worth while.

The dissociated self, such as that de-

scribed by Morton Prince,<sup>14</sup> is an example of alternation of function between one group of ends and another. At one time his subject would be a cigarette-smoking flapper; a little later, a serious-minded prospective missionary volunteer. The case represents a war between two sets of wishes. One or the other of them must be eliminated or reintegrated. This is an extreme instance, but religious organizations are full of folks who pursue one set of goals part of the time, and a totally unrelated, and often antagonistic set the rest of the time.

This situation arises out of larger cultural relations. Industry, commerce, government, education, and business are regarded as secular, while churches are set apart as sacred. The technique used by savages and men of pre-scientific eras for the control of environment in the attainment of their most important objectives have been strangely cherished by conventional ecclesiasticism, while lightening rods, antitoxins, weather maps, electricity, machinery, scientific agriculture, surgery, and a thousand other methods of attaining abundance of life have, in reality, become the mediators between modern man and his most desired goals. Consequently men bow to the prevailing religious system, and go into the modern world to attain their ends by modern methods; or they try to use the survivals of other ages for the attainment of the goals of other ages part of the time; then, at other times, they seek goals appropriate to twentieth century conditions by twentieth century methods. Such a situation produces numerous dissociations of personality. How can it be remedied?

One wonders whether religious leaders ever before faced such a staggering task as that to which those of this century are called. Somehow ends appropriate to remove our greatest dangers and win our most needed victories must be envisioned

13. *My Confession*, Crowell, N. Y., 1899.

14. Prince, M., *The Dissociation of Personality*, 1913.

and the resources of our age organized in such a way that all of us will find in the leadership of religion opportunity for integrating our personal goals in the larger, more significant goals of the race. Only when the ends set up by an individual for himself, his home, club, business, politics, and all the other groups to which he is allied, are conceived as directly contributory to the supreme goals of mankind, can he be regarded as a unified, religiously developing person.

The extent to which the religious educator is succeeding in bringing about the integration of the goals of each individual life, and the unification of all groups and cultures in enthusiastic achievement of ends accepted as most important, if men are to enter increasingly into abundant life, can be determined only as reliable methods of measuring changing tendencies become established. This suggests our final consideration.

#### V. MEASUREMENT OF RELIGIOUS PROGRESS

Religious education shows bewildering activities in this field. Hartshorne and May,<sup>15</sup> assisted recently by Welty,<sup>16</sup> have reviewed most of the recent tests dealing with character and personality. It is unnecessary, therefore, to mention here any particular investigation. It seems sufficient to set down two or three observations regarding tests in this field.

It is well to keep constantly before us the fact that many psychologists are becoming increasingly sceptical about the existence of traits. For example, an individual may score high for interest in detail in one situation while in another he falls to a minimum rating. One may rank high for honesty under one group of circumstances, but change the situation by the addition of a person, and the subject is a thief. One has good

memory for spelling, but can hardly remember the name of his next door neighbor. Those who rely on tests to give them traits of character are apt to find themselves leaning on broken reeds.

An observation concerning tests of the questionnaire variety may be of value. The mood of the subject, recent runs of attention, degree of alertness, recent experiences, hurry, and many other factors conduce to prevent the results from being very reliable. The subject often finds that he is in a transition stage, and what is asked for is difficult to give because either an earlier or a later experience would meet the requirements of the question. He may give either and the examiner is none the wiser.

There runs through much of the current educational psychology a misconception of the permanent reliability of a test score. It is still widely accepted that an I. Q. does not fluctuate. An examination of the varying scores of persons over a period of years, or a look at the tests generally used, suggests that such a view is untenable. Those who give us more or less permanent will profiles and emotional ratings should be more critical at this point. The function of a test is to measure a given situation in view of given circumstances. The results may or may not be valid the next day in another situation. The test is comparable to weighing scales. The score it gives at one time may be very different from the one given at another time, depending on what has happened in the interval.

While every effort for the construction of tests should be encouraged, it is probable that religious educators will for some time find their most valuable guides in information derived from observations of the functioning of persons in actual situations. It is not, indeed, too much to hope that the religious educator may make a significant contribution to general education at this point.

15. *Psychological Bulletin*, 23: 395-411, July, 1926.

16. *Psychological Bulletin*, 24: 418-435, July, 1927.

## PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PERSON

RALPH TYLER FLEWELLING\*

THE editor has posed me a question: "What new light has psychology thrown on the personal self?" The answer cannot be simple nor, one fears, very direct. This complexity and this indirection are due largely to the contradictions within psychological theory which at present widely obtain and are entertained even by individual psychologists without a consciousness of inherent incompatibilities.

Insofar as psychology has stuck to scientific procedure it has thrown light on the nature of the self. Wherein it has been chiefly philosophical it has obscured the issue even to the denial of self. The paradoxical situation lies in the fact that the modern group of philosophers who lay greatest claim to being scientific are the most given to philosophical dogmatism. They are fighting the older dogmatism of "soul" psychology with a new and quite as complete dogmatism of "natural psychology." This fact complicates the answer to our question, and the situation is intensified by the war without quarter or grace between three or four rival camps, to mention only the legitimate ones, each of which names itself psychology.

Furthermore, the term, "new" which the editor has given me injects the historical question and demands a historical procedure for which one not preeminently in the psychological field is little prepared. In fact the only excuse I can find for taking up this particular inquiry is the fact that sometimes the course of battle is more obvious to the onlookers than to the combatants.

There will not be wanting a multitude of men who will consider the question easily answered and with a categorical

reply to the question, "what new light has psychology thrown on the nature of the self," will answer briefly, "none." Their answer will have back of it a fervid belief, in these days amounting to a faith, that recent psychology has shown that there is no personal self. Concerning this group I entertain no illusions, since to them the assertion of selfhood is contemptible, an unscientific myth, and an expression of ignorance. But selfhood seems quite as necessary a postulate for life and for society as naturalism, and, even though in their narrowed sense it be unscientific, is as necessary to the men who deny it as it is to any of us. The demon of self, frequently exorcised in the name of science, has a way of getting back into the picture, bringing seven other demons of a like order with him.

Was it twenty-five hundred years ago that the oracle threw down as the important problem of life, the command *Gnothe Seanton*, "know thyself"? Though since that day we have charted the earth and the skies, there are many respects in which selfhood is the yet uncharted mystery. There is still a remnant of very respectable people, respectable so far as thoughtfulness and training go, who believe that the charting of this greatest mystery is a task more profound and illuminating than that of physical science. They would a bit paraphrase Tennyson's "Flower in the crannied wall" and declare if we knew what man is, soul and all, and all in all, we should know the meaning of God and the Cosmos. Whether or not they can make claim to intellectual respectability in our scientific age is apart from the purpose of this essay, but it is obvious to the seriously inclined that they bear in their hands the choicest treasures of our civilization, poets and dreamers though they may be.

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## I

## THE SELF IN THE HISTORY OF THOUGHT

The necessity of a historical look for the full import of our answer has already been mentioned. To best understand the movement of our own time a backward glance is often very important. That it is doubly necessary in this case is due to the essentially practical nature of the assumption of selfhood. This practical nature of the selfhood is often missed in psychological discussion because it is so common and so close to use. It is not true that the assumption of selfhood is peculiar to the dreamers and foreign to practical men. Practical men assume it without rationalizing it, assume and depend upon it even while denying its existence. It is this latter inconsistency upon which this paper makes war. The assumption of selfhood has always been the result of practical needs and demands. Contrary to current opinion, it is when materialism, mechanism, rationalism, and behaviorism have reduced all to absurdity through skepticism and denial, that some believer in the self has started the world off to some new forward movement, to some renaissance, through his vitalizing and inspiring ideal. The historical demonstration of this fact is overwhelming.

When the materialistic atomism of Democritus had joined the impersonalistic flux of Heraclitus in the relativity of Sophism to produce a skepticism of all truth or knowledge, it was Socrates' conviction of the truth in his own soul that revived the fainting spirit of a morally decayed and failing civilization. It is true that bright bowers did afterwards spring from that civilization, but it was already dead at heart, already collapsing except for the movement that sprang from Socrates himself, the thought system of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. The heart of the Socratic doctrine lay in the unshakeable conviction of selfhood which he had. Taught by Sophism to doubt truth, he arose to the fact of a

truth to which his moral self bore undeniable witness, the morally right. This indubitable truth he held to be the essential verification in the life and experience of man. Because he held it, his influence built a civilization. It became the heart of philosophies that dominated the thinking of men for more than two millenniums, and through the Stoics wrote itself into the social structure in the Roman law, becoming the vital push of the Renaissance and modern democracy. A power like this may be laughed at as absurd, abjured as "unscientific," but it can be ignored only by such minds as are lacking in a historical sense, viewing the experiences of the life of man with fore-shortened vision.

Later events in the life of European civilization have been but echoes of the original movement. When Augustine beheld the collapse of Roman civilization, the apparent loss of all institutions of culture under the overwhelming tide of Goth, Vandal, and Hun, he saw behind the threatened eclipse the one unconquerable place of civilization, namely: the human heart itself. Long cherished institutions might fail, but human selves could realize themselves in new ones. There was one fact and factor which was to him undeniable and truth-compelling. It was the truth of self-consciousness. The individual expression of this dream was *The City of God*. When, after years of darkness, the revival of Aristotle's individualism had given new life to the personal movement, it was no unaccountable thing that the rise of letters, the beginning of modern democracy, reform in church and state, joined the work of Augustine to the study of Aristotle as the fountain and inspiration of the new movement. Again in the "*Cogito ergo sum*" of Descartes, and the "creative activity of the mind in all knowledge" of Kant, the challenge was thrown down to a numbing and blighting skepticism by reassertion of the self as the highest element of reality. The first of these re-



sulted in the great impetus to the discoveries of modern science, and the second to the rational study of modern psychology. Now we are calmly asked to discard the lesson of twenty-five centuries, shut our eyes to all that exalts the twentieth century A. D. over the fifth century B. C., and receive the *ipsi dixit* of a small group of modern psychologists that there is no self. This demand could never have raised itself to vocal expression except in an entire absence of the historic sense. The work of such men as Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Lotze, Renouvier, James, Bowne, and Bergson has been built upon these same historical foundations. Because of the sense of history we have no hesitancy in believing that they will ultimately prove of the highest significance not only to human knowledge in general, and the social good, but that they possess elements the most promisingly fruitful for the progress of science itself. We have only to place over against this rich and productive self-recognizing type of thought the cold, sterile, and contemptuous work of such men as Condillac, or in our own day of behaviorism. These have denied selfhood in the interests of science, but their real unproductiveness for human needs is their ultimate condemnation.

## II

### THE PRESENT STATE OF PSYCHOLOGY

These considerations bring us to a contemplation of the present state of what calls itself psychology. Here we can linger only for some generalizations which will satisfy no psychologist and will be hotly resented by some. In reply we can only plead for ourselves that, however superficial our characterization may be, and we make no pretence to profound knowledge, this is the way it looks to an irreverent bystander. In our judgment the psychologists of the James type who have clearly recognized the place and importance of the self in any system

of psychology hold the future safely as their own. This we believe not only because of the lesson of history, but also because we believe in the essential unity of the universe. This is a scientific dogma of the first order which some will deny us because we would apply it to the self and declare that, eventually, truth of nature and truth of man will not be discovered in conflict because they are parts of the same truth. When, therefore, we see any system boasting itself as scientific and at the same time running counter to the moral convictions and spiritual aspirations of man, as in the denial of freedom, we have learned to suspect, in spite of its claims, that it is essentially unscientific. Nature includes the whole of man, and no system can be scientifically valid which leaves out disagreeable facts.

There is still another group of psychologists whose interest is a practical one. They deal principally with the abnormal. Their interest is pathological. Here may be classed the disciples of Freud and Jung and those who have come to psychology from the physician's standpoint. There is no room in this discussion for separating the one from the other, though each might more or less resent the common classification. Their interest in psychology is the practical one. Since it is practical, however theoretically denying it, this type assumes the reality of the self, if not under the name "person" or "ego," then under the name "censor" or "complex." For instance, in Morton Prince's work, the recovery of Miss Beauchamp was based upon an appeal to an enduring unit of personality which in some measure survived or transcended the various complexes or divided personalities with which she was afflicted. In speaking of her experiences, Miss Beauchamp declared that when she felt the "Sally" mood coming on she knew she ought not let herself become "Sally." It was this sense of unity or indivisibility that made self-control eventually possible. Similarly Freud's



"censor," with power of inhibition or release, is nothing more nor less than an enduring self with power to choose between contemplated courses of action.

No paper on the subject assigned this one would be complete should it fail to consider that fascinating denial of selfhood generally known to us as behaviorism. Behaviorism is the fond child of the age. It has arisen out of a demand that psychology should be scientific. This sympathy with science has led it perilously into the belief that therefore all its own assumptions are scientific because it has them. On the one hand it is a healthful reaction from a psychology of imagination and make-believe, of introspection that lightly regards the facts, but it sins as grievously in the opposite direction as that which it contradicts, and in an exactly similar manner. It vainly imagines that all facts are of a quantitative nature and that all knowledge can be adequately expressed in the quantitative formulae of science. This belief is erected into a dogma for the scientific damnation of all who refuse to believe. The effect has been to reduce investigation to physical phenomena alone. Psychology thus loses all right to its name and becomes, when consistent, merely neural physiology.

The movement presents a curious anachronism. Instead of being up to the minute scientifically, as it assumes, it is only a recrudescence of eighteenth century materialism. Its real father is not Dewey but Condillac. It worships at a false scientific shrine in the hope of escaping the unrealities of imagination which itself must employ. In the meantime science, particularly physics, where the greatest scientific advance of this generation has been made, has abandoned the materialism of the eighteenth century altogether and has conceived "force" or "activity" to be the very essence of reality. The result of all this has been to leave psychology just at the moment it is making the most strenuous efforts to demonstrate itself as a science, rather

than a philosophy, in the position of being the most belated of all sciences. If behaviorism were to remain true to its claims as a science it would need to confine itself to the measurement of nerve reactions, but it is quite rich with formulae of the imagination disguised to itself as scientific fact. It cannot escape its own symbolism. Fundamentally, its important result for society lies in its denial of freedom which undermines all moral values and provides excuse for all sorts of anti-social and anti-moral propaganda.

As a matter of fact, the greater number of psychologists would refuse to be classed as belonging strictly to any one of the before mentioned schools. The difficulty is that many try to belong to all schools that make a claim of being scientific, without clearly discovering the contradictions of essentially incompatible systems. The possibility of doing this is, in part, due to the question-begging character of anti-personalistic psychology which, at the very moment of scientifically denying personality, drags it back into the definition through the use of the personal pronoun. Since the personal pronoun is a necessity of speech and commonly used, its essential character as an assumption is forgotten. It arises, however, to betray the most behavioristic.

### III

#### WHAT LIGHT DOES PSYCHOLOGY THROW ON THE PERSONAL SELF?

What, then, can we say of new contributions to a theory of the personal self from the work of modern psychology? On the theoretical side probably not much; on the practical side a great deal. Enough has already been written to indicate that wherever psychology is practical rather than theoretic it ranges itself on the side of personality. This claim is strengthened by the appeal to history. It is confirmed by modern psychotherapy and experimental psychology. The fear of appearing unscientific has erected a

dogmatism in psychology blind to all facts which do not comport with its primary assumption of reality. Practical psychology, on the other hand, has never been able to get away from the self. Back of all experience, back of all conscious states, back of the complexes, there is a unity for which these do not quite account. This unity must be assumed as enduring through all experiences, surviving conscious states, and somehow carrying all along with itself much after the analogy of Bergson's rolling snowball. It seems to me that modern psychology has in a notable way cleared the field of superstition and false imagination. In doing so it has taken many things dear to the earlier proponents of the "soul" but it has, at the same time, displayed the weakness of materialistic standpoints and disclosed the undiminishable desideratum of the self—a self-conscious, self-referring, unit of experience. This was a task good to do and the time is arrived for constructive advance from this standpoint. From scientific sources outside the immediate field of psychology are growing indications of impatience with a self-denying, negative type of psychical theory. One of these is given by Sir J. Arthur Thompson in his recent book *Towards Health*.\*

For two thousand years at least, men have pondered over the relation of mind and body, and it remains an unsolved problem. Perhaps it indicates some limitation of human intelligence that we seem to make little progress with the question. Perhaps we have not learned to put the question in the right way.

According to one extreme school, man is a very intricate machine that makes negligible sounds which we call consciousness. Mr. Hammond constructed an ingenious "dirigible dog" with selenium eyes and an internal electromotor with automatic steering gear. When the visitor to the dark room where the "dirigible dog" was kept flashed the light of a lantern into its highly sensitive eyes, the contraption made for him on its wheels, and as the light moved to avoid the awful "it," the steering gear was correspondingly altered. The "dirigible dog" chased the visitor around the room!

Now the suggestion of an extreme school of physiologists is that a real dog is just like

this "dirigible dog" raised to the nth power of intricacy and efficiency. It is true that most of these extremists allow that the real dog has feelings and mental images and so forth; but they do not regard these as more than non-influential accompaniments, like the bubbles on the surface of a turbulent stream. They are there, these mental processes, *but they don't count*. They form a by-play; they are "epiphenomena"; they may be compared to the safety-valve whistle of an engine. The wheels of life go round because external and internal stimuli of a chemical or physical nature activate or pull the trigger of internal "mechanisms"—the pre-established reflex arcs, that is to say the linkages between sensory, associative, and motor neurons, and between the last and the muscles.

The reason why we reject this view is that it does not cover the facts. It is true so far as it goes, but it is inadequate. We cannot give an account of the behaviour of our dog without crediting it with a mental activity that counts. Our dog has feelings, memories, purposes that are actually operative. It can enregister experiences within itself in a way that is beyond any imaginable machine, and it alters its behaviour in the light of, or under the influence of, these enregistrations. We see the creature building-up associations, e. g. between a certain sound and a certain action, which are very important in its daily life. We have only to mention a person's name to evoke an extraordinary display of emotion. From half a mile off we point to the railway station and say quite quietly: "Bluff, your mistress is coming home by that train"; and off goes the dog like an arrow. We believe that it differs in kind from any dirigible dog.

Only by verbal jugglery is it possible to conjure mind out of matter, as the physicist defines matter; or a purpose out of a protein, as the chemist defines protein.

There are already many signs of the passing of a mechanistic psychology which offends the practical interests not only of individuals but of society as a whole. Only a psychology based upon a fundamental assumption of the reality of selfhood as a self-referring unit can fulfil the demands of psycho-therapy. Not only is this the case, but only upon this ground can psychology be of any value in education, intellectual, moral or religious. The incongruity is especially evident in all matters relating to character. A mechanistic child could neither have nor grow moral or any other responsibility. For proponents of religious education, a mechanistic psychology is a con-

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tradition. All organized institutions of society depend upon the assumption of free volition in man, at least sufficiently free to make the individual morally accountable. Upon this structure alone is it possible to build an enduring society and civilization.

There can be no doubt that an eventual scientific psychology will emerge that will range itself on the side of the highest aesthetic moral and spiritual values. Whatever marshals itself against these practical and superior interests is destined to be broken.

## WHAT HAS PSYCHOANALYSIS ESTABLISHED CONCERNING THE ROOTS OF CHARACTER?

JOHN J. B. MORGAN\*

CERTAINLY psychoanalysis has done something for modern thought, but when one attempts to state specifically the nature of this influence one is immediately confronted with a number of issues which must be clarified if one is to face this problem squarely.

Psychoanalysis originated as a method designed to enable the clinician to analyze the mental life of a patient whose mental processes had become more or less disordered. In brief, this method was to instruct the subject to relax and to express freely all the ideas which came to his mind. Such relaxation was found to facilitate the recovery of memories which had been partially forgotten, to enable the analyst, who listened to all the "free associations" of the subject, to reconstruct the mental development of his patient. The true analyst did nothing but listen, the benefit of such a recital lying in the fact that the very expression of all these mental processes enabled the patient to see his mental life in a new light, a perspective which often led to his readjustment.

The method was not used for any considerable time until Freud, its founder, and his disciples began to build theories concerning mental life from the material gleaned from the analyses. Consequently, psychoanalysis grew from a method into "a system" of psychology, and became a

highly theoretical discussion of human nature.

The development of the theoretical side led to a tendency to produce a closed system, a tendency which was as insidious as it proved to be pernicious. Freud himself was the greatest offender in this direction. He had not gone far until he found that persons who in the beginning had been in sympathy with him, differed from him in some points of theory. Freud, like most "prophets," immediately spurned all those who did not accept implicitly all of the tenets of the "faith" as he outlined them. He made a cult of psychoanalysis and ejected all who did not subscribe to the complete creed. The latest development of the psychoanalytic movement in its strictest sense is the establishment of a few schools which teach Freud's doctrines. No one can be a true psychoanalyst unless he has spent several years in residence at one of these schools and has obtained his "orders."

These strict Freudians have become rabid dogmatists. They are a closed cult whose influence is bound to diminish with the passage of time. To discuss the influence of this cult on the theories of character formation would be to deal with history, to describe what is past. We feel that the developments away from this strict cult are of more significance than the cult itself, because such radiations of influence will indicate to us important trends for the future. In this paper we shall, for this reason, discuss the influ-

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ences which began in psychoanalysis but which have developed away from it, rather than confine our efforts to an examination of rigid Freudian psychology.

#### THE ART OF LISTENING

Probably the greatest contribution of psychoanalysis has been the fact that it has taught us that an understanding of human nature can come best if we can get the individual under study to "talk." Before the advent of this method we had all been too prone to do all the talking ourselves. Having gleaned a fragment of the life or thought of our subject, we immediately began to instruct him in our notion of what he should be. Such instruction simply serves as a smoke screen. It shields our subject from our clear view and does him not a whit of good. Psychoanalysis teaches the analyst the noble art of keeping quiet. If the reader thinks this is not a difficult lesson to learn, let him sit and listen to some one else talk for an entire hour without saying a word except to ask some incidental question designed to keep his subject going.

Listening is an art and requires not only that the listener remain quiet, but that he impress his subject that he has a sympathetic understanding of what is being narrated. One cannot do this unless he pieces together what he hears and builds a replica in his own mind of the personality who is unfolding before him. In such a procedure the analyst, if not continually on his guard, is likely to fill in gaps left by the subject with constructions of his own. The clever analyst waits until his subject fills in his own gaps.

This part of the psychoanalytic technique is a valuable contribution and could well be cultivated by anyone who has to deal with human beings. Stated briefly it is: Learn to listen without reading yourself, your own preconceived theories, or your own standards into your subject's narrative.

The novice may object that his subject may not tell the truth. The student of character is not so much concerned with the truthfulness of his subject's statements. He is studying the subject's attitudes toward himself, toward others, toward social and moral standards, and toward the vital issues of life. For example, if a boy goes into great detail in explaining how other boys are trying to do vicious things to him, he has disclosed that he has a suspicious, fault-finding attitude toward his fellows. From the point of view of character study this is more important than ascertaining whether his statements are true or are exaggerations.

#### IMPORTANCE OF EMOTIONS

Psychoanalysis has thrown the proper emphasis upon the emotional life of the individual. The intellectualists have long reigned supreme in their contention that character depends upon the training of the intellectual powers of the man. We are now learning that character training is largely the education of the emotions.

The importance of the emotions, first discovered in the etiology of mental disturbances, has been extended to the ordering of the mental life of the normal man. This is most clearly set forth in the theory of rationalization. This theory states that our beliefs and conduct are emotionally determined, and that intellectual processes are developed as a defense for such beliefs and conduct. A man adopts a religion because of its emotional value to him and develops a theology to prove to himself and to others that his religion is the only true one. To understand a man's philosophy one should know the emotional life of the man. His philosophy is likely to be a defense of his emotional attitudes. Politics, morality, ideals, and the like are all fundamentally emotional reactions.

This being the case, a most important element in the understanding of human nature lies in the discovery of the emotional background of attitudes, behavior, and intellectual theories, rather than in

an attempt to evaluate these characteristics by objective standards. Instead of asking whether a person's belief is sound, ask why he chooses that belief. Instead of punishing him for misconduct, determine the emotional factors which drove him to commit the act.

In other words, the things that we observe in others are merely symptoms or signs of the real man which is hidden behind the overt conduct or other expressions of personality. The different ways in which conduct may serve as a defense against the exposure of the emotional background are numerous and complex. The task of the analyst is to get beyond the symptom to the emotional cause. Such a task demands frankness in the recognition of what one may discover, whether it is flattering to the patient, the analyst, or to our human ideals, or whether it is quite the reverse. It is probably in this aspect of psychoanalysis that Freud stands out more than in any others. In fact, he has been brutally frank, some have felt that he has fallen backwards in his attempt to dig out the vile phases of human life. Be this as it may, he has certainly taught us that we get more by honestly recognizing the real drives of conduct than we do by being too charitable.

#### EMPHASIS UPON SEX

Most persons believe that Freud has been extreme in his emphasis upon the importance of sexuality as a determiner of conduct and ideational activities. Sometimes it takes an extremist to give the varying forces a proper balance. There is little doubt that in the past our ideas concerning the rôle of sex have not been clear. Perhaps an overemphasis in the other direction may give us a normal balance.

Freud came from a racial stock whose people have been the greatest offenders in their derogatory conceptions of sex. What more natural than that he should swing too far in his reaction against the false inhibitions and conflicts which were

drilled into him through generations of teaching of the fear and contempt of things sexual? Why not be a little charitable here? The balanced man may admit that Freud was extreme in this respect, but he does not go into any emotional tirade against him for that reason. The fact that one finds it incumbent upon him to rave and storm against this emphasis of Freudian psychology is evidence of a probable lack of emotional balance on this subject on the part of the critic.

#### IMPORTANCE OF INFANTILE HABITS

In Freud's contention that much of the behavior of children is of a sexual nature we have a vital force in the determination of character. This theory has probably brought more protest than anything else in the whole psychoanalytic movement. Is it true, is it partially true, or is it wholly false?

Freud contended that the child's sexual impulses come to the front very early in life, but that, due to the fact that normal sexual functioning is impossible, they take a great variety of perverse forms. These perversions, being contrary to social ideals, are repressed through the early years of the child's life to such an extent that he goes through a period where the sexual impulses are latent, namely from about the seventh or eighth years until adolescence. With the physical development of adolescence the perverse tendencies of infancy again manifest themselves, and tend to disrupt the normal sexual development of the person.

The writer of this paper feels that Freud was essentially right in his observation of the facts, but was essentially wrong in his interpretation of them. The popular psychology of the time when he developed his theories ascribed to human nature a group of instincts to which it was felt that one must trace all human behavior. Consequently, if a baby did any act which to an adult appeared to be of a sexual sort, it must be due to the sexual instinct. It is because Freud went



to seed on the doctrine of instinct that he has been accused of revamping the Augustinian doctrine of inbred sin. The conduct which he observed, and which seemed to be so sexual, can be interpreted as the chance behavior of an active, virile organism; it is bad only because it is so interpreted by the oversensitized adult. The fact that the adult sees it as a bit of vicious conduct makes his emotional reaction to it so violent that he invariably affects the child accordingly. The child, as a result of this violent emotional reaction on the part of elders, either becomes violently inhibited against a repetition of the act, or builds up a strong impulse to repeat it.

This tendency of the emotional attitude of a parent to produce an unnatural reaction on the part of the child can be demonstrated very easily through an illustration. A mother, on account of certain easily explained prejudices, had a fear lest her boy develop into a "sissy." Feeling that she must overcome in her son what she conceived to be a hereditary tendency in this direction, she determined to do all in her power to prevent such a development. She encouraged him to fight, she warned him against the dangers of effeminacy, and even went so far as to teach the boy to enlist the aid of God in his attempts to be masculine—each night he offered a prayer that he might be saved from becoming a sissy. Needless to say, the boy became profoundly convinced that he was a sissy. Why all this fuss about it, were it not the truth? The fear that he might become a sissy made this mother do the things which developed him into one. In the same manner, the fear on the part of an adult that the child might develop a sex perversion may teach him to become a pervert.

A mother observing a child play with his toes will evince quite a different reaction than she manifests if she observes him in an act which she interprets as sexual. The latter may have as little meaning for the child as the former. Her

reaction "conditions" him, however, so that the two become essentially different. It used to be that mothers enjoyed watching their infants suck various objects, such as their thumbs, rubber nipples, sugar-tits, and the like. No fuss was made about such acts, since the necessary emotional conditioning was lacking. Mothers did not experience the necessity of going through a great battle in order to break their children of thumb-sucking. Since Freud has said that the mouth is an erogenous zone, and that stimulating it is a perversion, and since the physicians have expiated on the unsanitary nature of such practices, mothers have become very much perturbed by any manifestation of a tendency to stimulate the mouth on the part of their children. This perturbation develops the tendency in the child. The point is that these tendencies were not inborn, but were taught by the determination of the mother, nurse, or father to prevent them, and the behavior on the part of adults resulted from such a determination.

All this is not denying the fundamental nature of the sexual phase of human life. It merely states that when we react toward the child as though innocent bits of conduct were essentially sexual, such reactions make them sexual as far as the child is concerned. The child learns to cover his body in the presence of others, to refrain from soiling himself, and to refrain from manipulating certain parts of his body, because he has learned to associate these things with certain emotional reactions on the part of his teachers (mother, father, nurse, comrades, or school-teacher), and because he has learned that if he is to be socially comfortable he had better avoid such reactions.

We have not said that infants do not have sexual behavior. They do have, but it is sexual because the adults have made it so. A child learns a great many sexual lessons in infancy, whether poorly or well depends on the type of training.

The period which Freud called the latent period does not involve any cessation of a sexual tendency such as he posited. The child has simply learned to avoid certain activities because they are not essential to his comfort and because they have been so violently tabooed by his elders.

It is quite likely that the comfort which a preadolescent child gets from a perverse bit of behavior is of the same sort that a person gets from the continuation of a muscular tic, or from a compulsive act. The satisfaction is not so much a satisfaction in the act itself, but in the relief from the tension that comes with the urge to do an act when it is inhibited. The urge is the same whether we posit an instinct or whether we trace it to training. The value of emphasizing the training aspect lies in the fact that this emphasis provides a means of varying the treatment of the child so as to lessen the need for readjustment in later life.

#### THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX

The emphasis upon the training aspects of the child's life is especially important in considering such a factor as the Freudian oedipus complex. Freud seemed to think that there was an inherent tendency on the part of the child to fall in love with the parent of the other sex. This oedipus complex was at the center of much of his theorizing and has led to much controversy. It is likely that this complex may be found in a great many instances. It is natural that the first love of a child should be for the individual with whom he is in the most intimate contact. We are convinced, however, that when a sex component enters into this relationship, it is due to the attitude of the parent. In other words, the sexual element in the oedipus situation originates with the parent. The parent is often unconscious of this, but observation of the caresses bestowed by mother or father upon the child will convince the onlooker that such is the case. To be sure it does

not often take an open sexual form, but when a mother coos to her boy that he is her little lover and gives him passionate embraces and kisses, she need not wonder when he finds it difficult to break away from her.

A parent who has cultivated such a relationship may do everything in his or her power to keep the child in subjection to that love. Such a child must go through a violent conflict in order to gain the independence which, to a child reared differently, would come as a perfectly natural development. Freud is probably right in his contention that the parent-child relationship plays a tremendous part in the character development of the child. Most of the child's internal conflicts have their origin in this situation. But the issue is greatly changed when we place the blame where it belongs, upon the parent, and do not accuse the child of having a pernicious streak in him which must be overcome.

Whether one agrees with the Freudian conception of the development of mental conflicts in childhood, his point of view has helped to increase the emphasis which is now being placed upon childhood in the development of character traits.

#### DEFENSE MECHANISMS

The character of a person is not determined solely or even largely by the type of complex or perversion he might have developed in childhood, but by the defense mechanisms that he has learned in his attempts to adjust to his conflicts.

Although Freud does not make the statement in this form, it is quite likely that the adoption of a particular defense mechanism is by trial and error learning. In a dilemma, the child tries one type of response. If the first trial is successful in relieving the immediate tension, he is likely to adopt the same reaction on any future occasion of tension. If the first trial is not successful he will try others until a successful one is reached.

We need defense mechanisms, but a

balanced individual should be taught to use different ones on varying occasions and not to confine himself to one. If the child learns one type of defense to the exclusion of others, he will be inclined to use it on occasions where it is totally inadequate.

These defense mechanisms form a large part of our overt behavior, and are the characteristics that others observe. Psychoanalysis has shown us that if we wish to arrive at any true understanding of human life we must be able to see behind these defenses and to appreciate the struggle which has led to their adoption. When we see a boy trying his best to be a rowdy, and going to an extreme in his efforts, we cannot jump to the conclusion that he must be taught to be gentle; it may be that his excessive roughness is an attempt to convince himself that he is virile. When a person refuses to face facts as they are it may be that he is afraid to face them. You do not help such a person by trying to change his viewpoint, but by removing his fear of reality. If a person is developing sickness in order to get attention, you teach him to get attention in other ways instead of punishing him for being ill. The patient has adopted his characteristic behavior as a means to lead the observer astray. Psychoanalysis has taught us to look behind the defense mechanism.

An important thing for the student of human character to remember is that these defenses are all learned responses. Being learned there must have been a time when they were not firmly fixed. The implication is obvious. True character training necessitates a thorough knowledge of all these defense mechanisms so that they can be detected in the nascent state. But they are to be observed not to make them ineffective, for the child must have some defense, some means of escape from his mental problems. The educator should teach him new styles of defense and diversity in their

use, so that his conduct may be balanced.

A number of persons who have a smattering of psychoanalysis have made serious mistakes at this point. They have endeavored to uncover defense mechanisms, have shown the poor victim that his behavior was based on an urge toward something indecent, and have then turned him adrift. The victim of such treatment is worse as a result of the analysis than he was before. You do not help a person by knocking the props from under him, but by building stronger ones so that he does not need to rely on the flimsy support of the ones which caused him trouble.

#### SUBLIMATION

The technical term for supplying a patient with a better defense than the one which he has been using is sublimation. A poor defense mechanism leads to peculiar conduct and is called a symptom. The resolution of the symptom by means of analysis will show the urge behind the conduct, the way in which the individual learned the symptom, as well as the reason for its continued use.

The reason for its immediate use is the thing of importance in the work of reconstruction. The patient must get to the point where he can see for himself that his present method of reaction is unsatisfactory and the manner in which he can adopt another. The sublimation must be a form of gratification for the needs which gave rise to the symptom, but in addition this new form of gratification must be one which meets the needs of the personal ideals of the patient and which is socially approved. Generically a symptom and a sublimation are the same. They differ only in the judgment pronounced upon them.

#### EMOTIONAL RE-EDUCATION

Too much importance cannot be attributed to the prominence given to the emotions which has resulted directly from the psychoanalytic technique, as well as

from other lines of investigation which have grown from this technique. Most of this work has been of the analytic type, designed to discover the nature of the emotional development of the individual and the rôle it has played in the maladjustments that have manifested themselves. But analysis is not the whole story. How are these emotions to be readjusted? Knowledge of emotional re-education is still in its infancy. In its growth are to be found the great problems of the psychology of the future.

The psychoanalysts unearthed two methods of emotional re-education which should be mentioned. The first was their doctrine of catharsis. According to this theory, the revival of a primitive emotion in an analysis did away with the peculiar behavior which had resulted from its repression. The damage had been done because at the time the emotion originated it had not been allowed free expression. Now, in the analysis, it is given the privilege of coming forth in all its primitive strength and, although there is no better means of expressing it now than existed when it originated, the very fact that it comes to the surface dissipates it.

This catharsis happened to be effective in some instances when the emotional conflict was of a markedly infantile nature, but one cannot go far in the analysis of patients until he discovers that the proportion so helped is not as great as the analysts claimed. In other words, the bringing to light of an abnormal emotional reaction toward one's parents, for example, which existed in childhood, and which has been forgotten, might chance to relieve the tension produced by such repression, but whether or not such release was effective was due largely to chance. We have a feeling that in many such cases a readjustment was effected by the patients the nature of which the analyst did not understand.

Another method of resolving the emo-

tional tension was by means of what the analysts called transfer. The subject was supposed to project upon the analyst all the emotional tensions as he dug them up. The analyst would take the place of parent, lover, enemy, or what not. The task of the analyst was to handle this transfer in such a way as to relieve the patient of his conflict. But this simply reproduces an emotional situation similar to the one to which the patient had not adequately adjusted earlier in his life. One who has been too weak to adjust an emotional conflict in his youth does not necessarily make a good adjustment when he is older, even if he has a psychoanalyst upon whom to project it.

These two theories of the psychoanalysts indicate two important principles: namely, that emotions require some sort of expressive conduct, and that such expression is usually a social expression. But too much is left to chance and too much is expected in the way of heroism from the patient.

The psychoanalysts have done their part in showing to us the importance of emotions in the development of character. That they should have evolved all the laws of emotional learning would be asking too much. If educators can be as free from prejudice and as bold in their search for the laws of emotional education as the Freudians have been in the analysis of their importance in mental life, the next decade should show marvelous developments along this line.

In conclusion, we would urge that this whole psychoanalytic movement be treated as any other series of investigations should be treated. The scientist tries to dig from investigations the valid findings and is not too much perturbed when such findings carry with them some error. It is the progressive scientist who can take the good and build upon it and who is not so mystified by the accompanying error that he denounces the

whole study. In short, our problem is not whether we shall accept psychoanalysis as a cult or reject it *in toto*. We

should select the valuable contributions and use them as stepping stones to further progress.

## THE SPHINX ATTENDS A MEETING OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SODALITY

GEORGE A. COE

### THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MEETING:

Brothers—er, er, Brothers and Sisters: We have the pleasure, I may say even the honor, of having as our guest this evening a most venerable member, if not of our inmost circle (which is not yet venerable itself, having the age of only a generation), yet a member of the long and honorable succession of inquirers into what is, perhaps, the most difficult problem that has engaged the scientific intellect—the problem of the nature of man. I say “perhaps” the most difficult problem, for we who have observed the reactions of the white rat are aware how, under the rub of exact research, man disappears, like vanishing cream, in the pores of the organism. I am reminded of this with peculiar force upon the present occasion because our distinguished guest, like our laboratories, combines the human and the sub-human in a single synthesis. Renowned for her cautious judgment, she is yet more illustrious for her skill in the formulation of problems. Let me assure her that the members of this Sodality will have open ears for her questions, and that we shall be glad to focus upon them the combined and unified results of our respective lines of research. Fellow Members, I present The Sphinx!

### THE SPHINX:

Your Chairman does me too great honor when he says that I combine the upper and the lower part of me in a single synthesis. The fact is that the two

parts of me never have lived together in entire harmony. The trouble is with my head. It's forever saying “I'm human, but what is it to be human?” and this keeps the whole of me in turmoil. I've been asking this question for thousands of years, and asking it is as far as ever I get. Tough luck; but not as bad as trying to answer the questions that you don't know how to ask. Believe me, asking the right question is the greatest discovery anybody ever makes; it's the high-trapeze act of the whole scientific circus. It makes me tired—I've been too tired to stir for as much as five thousand years—to hear philosophers, and preachers, and guides of youth “explain” the mystery of human existence by prating of ghosts, and souls, and faculties that always are just around the corner and never where you can get your eyes upon them (Applause). It all comes about from asking the wrong question. In this instance, it's the mud-pie question: What's it made of? This question plays the very deuce. By the way, all of you guys are done with mud pies, I suppose? I haven't seen the last number of your Annals.

### A PRACTICING PSYCHOLOGIST:

May I introduce myself to our distinguished speaker by explaining that I am a certified practicing psychologist? From the point of view of my profession the question that has been put to us is readily answered: We are done with mud pies. We are not at all concerned to



know whether man is made out of the dust of the ground or out of the breath of divinity. Our job is simply to enable men to control, manage, and manipulate themselves and one another so as to get what they want with the greatest certainty and the least expense. And we have had no mean success in this job. If a child is backward in school, we find out why, and we tell the teacher what to do. We have evolved technics for advertising that increase sales, whip up competition, and compel combination. We can tell you how to manage salespeople or factory operatives so that both they and their foremen will be happier, the output will increase, and dividends will grow. It was a technic that we devised that enabled our officials at Washington to do the people's thinking for them during the War while the people supposed all the time that they were doing their own thinking. Psychology is what psychology does.

#### THE SPHINX:

You're just the pin in a haymow that I've been looking for ever since Bacchus went on his first spree! Nothing else has puzzled me half as much as this phase of my old question, namely: What do human beings want? Since the management of minds is your specialty, practice on me; tell me how I can manage my head or the minds of men so as to find out what would really satisfy a human being.

#### PRACTICING PSYCHOLOGIST:

I did not say that the practicing psychologist knows the whole anatomy of men's desires. For the most part he takes the word of his clients as to what they want, and goes ahead. I simply do not ask what other demands of human nature may possibly exist. At the same time I must admit that, in order to find the economical way to handle the human factor in any situation, I must always take account of a complex of instincts. The farther I go in my work, too, the

more complicated the instincts appear to be. For example, we are discovering that the workman wants out of his work a great many things besides wages, even things that wages won't buy. As yet, however, we are not sure that the capitalist (except a queer one now and then) desires anything but profits. The acquisitive instinct seems completely to explain the conduct of business.

#### A BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGIST:

What has just been said illustrates the need of an inclusive point of view from which to approach the problem of the instincts. Biology, in its concept of adjustment, presents us with such a point of view. All living beings exhibit a push towards the maintenance and the reproduction of themselves. Thus, there are two great trunk-roots of behavior, the demand for self-maintenance (at base the requirement of food), and the demand for reproduction. Where reproduction is sexual, we may say that food and sex, broadly considered, contains the clue to all behavior. It is necessary, of course, to perceive that each of these trunk-roots divides into branches and sub-divides into rootlets. Thus, food-getting includes accumulation for future use, and so it finds what is sometimes called the acquisitive instinct. Rivalry, jealousy, and pugnacity belong to the same trunk-root. On the other hand, the reproductive drive differentiates into complex activities of courtship, the care of offspring, the family organization, and all the social institutions that have sprung from it.

#### THE SPHINX:

You puzzle me. I haven't been hungry or amorous since the pyramids were built, and I know I never wanted offspring. The only thing I've really wanted for these thousands of years is to know what man is—that is, what he really wants. At this minute I'm all excited about a particular aspect of this general question of mine: Does man

himself, or only this queer head of mine, want to know what he wants? And if so, of which of the two trunk-roots of instinct is this a rootlet?

#### AN ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGIST:

The question just asked by our venerable friend reinforces a consideration that I have many times presented in our Sodality. Psychology cannot be satisfied to work within the very broad categories of biology; she must find her categories within the specific material with which she deals, and she must pursue her analyses to the end—that is, until the simple elements are laid bare. Pursuing this truly scientific procedure, she finds that mind is a general term for aggregates of sense-elements on the one hand and elementary drives on the other. These drives, inherited, of course, and having biological significance, are more numerous than we once supposed. Each of the so-called trunk-roots is in reality a cluster of roots, and there are others not contained in either cluster. The sex-instinct knows nothing of offspring; does not look forward to progeny nor provide care for the young—often quite the opposite. These things are managed by another set of instincts. Moreover, food-getting is not the only sort of instinctive getting. Curiosity, the prime root of science, is obviously instinctive. Therefore we may affirm that the trouble with The Sphinx's head is the unrest of an unsatisfied instinct.

#### A SINGLE-TRACK BEHAVIORIST:

This makes me as tired as it must make The Sphinx. Instincts, forsooth! An instinct is nothing but a name for a class of responses; it does not do anything nor explain anything. You can have as many or as few instincts as you like by choosing your method of classifying behavior. In fact, the whole notion that desires, instinctive or other, explain the occurrence of anything is simply a left-over from the belief in flitting ghosts who did things in the

dark but never where you could see just what was happening. Bring the facts into the light, and what do you see (for I know nothing but what I see and touch)? You behold in our behavior nothing whatever but a few reflex movements modified in numerous ways by the conditions, purely physical, under which they occur. Behavior, which is change of place, has to be explained from within its own genus, which is, change of place. This is the last mountain height of psychology; climb up here, and you shall see that there are no desires, no wants. Men don't want anything; a want is nothing but a bit of vocal or sub-vocal behavior.

#### THE SPHINX:

Professor, you are a man after my own heart. You make things so simple. From what you say I get a hunch that maybe I have been foolish to be so inquisitive. For thousands of years I have believed that I was asking my big question about man because I wanted an answer. You make it clear that I didn't ask because I desired an answer, or anything else, but only because I liked to ask questions. Come to think of it—it's plain as a wart on a nose—I couldn't ask a question *because* of anything. In fact, it was not questions, but movements of my lips, that occurred. I've just been kidding myself, and I don't need to worry any more about what goes on in this head of mine. I really don't want an answer, and I don't want to ask questions. Still, I should like to know what the rest of you fellows think about this.

#### A GESTALT-PSYCHOLOGIST:

The latest experiments upon both men and lower animals fails to justify any of the theories that man's mind or his behavior is a composite of elements. The behavior of men, of chimpanzees, and even of domestic hens displays types of organization that cannot be explained as conditioned reflexes, or instinctive pushes,

or associations of sense-elements. The organization is there when the response first occurs, not merely afterwards, and new organizations appear within new responses. The unit for psychology is the configuration, which is not a simple element. We are not composites of any kind of elements; we do not merely repeat and recombine old reactions; our behavior, through and through, looks forward to the organized world in which we live. I find the question of The Sphinx, therefore, not only rational, but inevitable. The supreme problem of psychology is: Whither? What are these already organized wholes that we recognize as mind? How and in what direction do they grow, and what are they going towards? Applied to man, the question is, What does this species really want?

THE SPHINX:

Thank you! You have saved my self-respect, and . . .

A PSYCHOANALYST:

Pardon me, not too fast! Don't respect yourself until you find out whether you are respectable, and above all, don't rationalize. I am sure that you will welcome this interruption when I tell you that I am dealing daily with the dynamics of human conduct in its most intimate phases, so intimate that people cannot even recognize them as their own without my help. I walk among the mud-geysers and the volcanoes that show what's really inside. What men think they want—in fact, most of what you psychologists think they want—isn't what they really want, for the most part, but a lot of deceptive substitutes for what men really want and have failed to get.

Dig down into the Unconscious, and you shall find libido, the simple spring that turns all the wheels of the machine. It is sex-desire broadly considered, though some would say desire to exalt the ego, or desire just to live (of which sex-desire is, of course, the chief constituent). Because these desires are repressed by social conventions, they seek outlets in strange and deceptive ways, and what we call our character becomes chiefly a mass of self-deluded virtues and self-deluded faults. Now, this restless longing of The Sphinx, which she thinks is a genuine desire to know what man is, conceals. . . .

SEVERAL VOICES:

Mr. Chairman! Mr. Chairman, I . . .

THE CHAIRMAN:

Brethren, every member of this Sodality knows exactly what every other member is about to say. Would it not be well, instead of listening to ourselves, to hear the comments of our honored guest?

THE SPHINX:

I won't admit, no I won't, that this discussion has given me a headache. I want you to think me more hard-headed than that, and moreover I might unwittingly reveal something in my insides that might shock the Psychoanalyst. All I can say, in view of your hospitality, is this: When you find out what you want, I hope you'll one and all get what you want, provided you care to have that kind of want. As for me, the next steamer back to Egypt, where I shall brood over these things, perhaps, for a few more thousand years.

## NEEDED INVESTIGATIONS IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHARACTER

GOODWIN B. WATSON\*

TO PROPOSE problems to be investigated is carrying coals to Newcastle. Almost every doctor's dissertation in this, as in other fields, concludes, "One of the greatest contributions of this study has been the large number of unanswered questions it has suggested." Buckingham has expressed a regret which others will share, that research so often ends in turning over to a vague general public the problem with which the investigator began and this, although he is in a much better position than most others to work ahead until he finds an answer. It is indeed welcome that groups such as the Character Education Inquiry are relieving the vast desert sands of problems with a few oases of thriving young conclusions.

Yet even a cursory survey of research having a bearing on religious education raises some doubt as to how generally really fundamental problems are chosen for attack. Some graduate schools have ceased to require the publishing of doctors' dissertations, because nobody wants to buy them. They constitute a problem in storage space. Worse, they represent the investment of some people's lives at their best. The keenest minds of the student generation, working with enthusiasm for hours uncounted, often at great sacrifice, pouring priceless vitality—into what? Giving some modified tests to a few reluctant groups, describing a few cases, or rearranging some historical dust, adding a few tables, preferably some correlations and a graph, a statement of limitations, and suggestions for further research. Fortunately not all research enterprises are cut to this pattern, but it is not impossible to discover in any grad-

uate school theses which are no more original, creative, or far reaching than such a model suggests.

Hence the first proposal is a research into research. The aim is to discover how some of the waste of energy can be checked. Perhaps the outcome will be a new academic organization, the "Society for the Prevention of Useless Research." The establishment of criteria for usefulness will be no slight part of the work. No one person's judgment will be adequate. No short-sighted, practical values to be obtained next week must be allowed to obscure remote ends. Yet it seems probable that a careful review of the research of the last fifty years would give many leads as to the difference between enterprises which can conceivably be said to offer large contributions, and those which represent simply the occasion for an article or the granting of a degree. Perhaps, as the basis of such a study, there might be held a conference of those interested in a given field, with several days cleared for the discussion of the really important next steps in research. In some such fashion, it should be possible to propose standards which will aid in determining how far any new problem is worth the price of hours and energy which some people will have to put into it.

The second area proposed for investigation is that of method. A variety of techniques are now being used for obtaining data and for dealing with the facts when gathered. Few of these techniques have been adequately investigated in comparison with the others. What are the peculiar values and limitations of data gathered in a laboratory? How do these compare with data gathered from the field? Is it best to cover a narrow field intensively as in testing, or to cover a

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broader field of the individual's life and behavior in the more comprehensive form of the case study? For what kind of evaluation is each superior? In obtaining data, what are the distinct values and defects of the psychoanalytic method which uses free reverie, of an informal interview, a formal interview, and a questionnaire? In what fields can individuals' statements about themselves and their behavior be trusted? Perhaps the criteria of evidence built up in legal procedure will be helpful. All of these questions bear directly upon the soundness of the raw data. There is no more fundamental question in psychological research. The statistical and experimental and comparative and descriptive and other techniques work, for the most part, indiscriminately upon good data and upon bad. Imposing structures can too readily be built of insubstantial stuff. What facts are sound and dependable? Will someone help us in this our deep need?

Then the question of method carries us on into the use which is to be made of the data, the processes of its analysis and synthesis. Two illustrations may be cited of the type of development that is needed. It is customary at present to compare measures in terms of a statistical meaning, the probability being that the difference between them would, if the experiment were repeated, fall on the same side of zero. Once that chance goes beyond nine hundred and ninety-seven chances out of a thousand, presto, it is called practical certainty. The difference is called statistically significant. This is an important feature of the difference, no doubt, but as Symonds has pointed out, any difference, however small, can be made practically certain if enough cases are gathered. For practical concerns it is much more valuable to translate differences into terms other than probability. The probability that boys in a summer camp made a certain gain is important, but that that gain is an insignificant

fraction of the differences due to heredity would, if true, be invigorating in its application to the religious agencies running the camps. Phrase the question thus, "How shall differences between methods, experimental factors, and the like, be stated? Will translation into hours of time, or numbers of persons, or commonly observed units of difference or dollars of cost, or what other measures, be most effective in influencing the persons who should use the results?"

The second illustration is even more fundamental. The statistical analysis of the frequencies of vibrations, their amplitude, and so on, may represent what takes place in a melody without giving awareness to the reader of the melody. Indeed, it may be that the complete melody is something other than its analyzed parts. In religious concerns it is particularly difficult to put together pieces and get a total that is satisfying. Someone may rightly protest, "It is not the number of units you put together but *how* they have been put together that matters for religion." Statistical methods since Des Cartes have been built in rigid framework. When we approach the study of personality, the distortion of the Procrustean application of data to these frames becomes more apparent. Will someone devise a statistics which will tell us not only how much inclined Miss Jones is to exaggerate her own importance to the world, but will also indicate the points at which that becomes great enough to make a difference in her disposition, to alienate her friends, to make her an unsuitable campfire leader, to make her unfitted to live an independent life? How shall the inter-relation of this attitude of hers to the presence or absence of lovers be put down in the shorthand of a space-time framework? And, to carry the problem into its more inclusive form, how shall Miss Jones be compared with Miss Brown, who is more winning but less intelligent, who compensates in other realms? The techniques we



have seem to be either the loose adjectives and clauses of the case study, or the detailed partial methods of statistics built upon independent variables and only by great labor adapted to complex inter-relationships. Are there better methods?

The third area in which investigation is proposed is that of the repetition of important experiments. Most educational theories hang by slender threads so far as experimental evidence is concerned. Two out of three experiments favor the project method, but the third was the best controlled. A student in a western city found little relationship between the newspapers men read and the viewpoints of these men upon current issues. As yet, it is only suggestive. Someone will need to try it again and again, in various situations, and then perhaps we shall have trustworthy information about the influence of the press.

Again, much interest has been attracted by a study in cooperation with the Character Education Inquiry which suggested that children did not correspond in general moral knowledge score to the scores of their teachers and Sunday school teachers. This has been interpreted by some to belittle the influence of such teachers, when no such conclusion is warranted. Are all the adults, perhaps, exercising specific rather than general influences, here up and there down? If so, the present evidence would not reveal it. Repetition, modification, more intensive study of the same question, is suggested by the substantial contribution already made.

To choose a fourth example, it seems remarkable that the transfer of moral attitudes should have received so little attention. Bagley and Ruediger almost twenty years ago observed the transfer of neatness trained in one classroom. Voelker touched the point of transfer, but found his data in conflict, some indicating greatest transfer from least specific training. We know from his study and from

those of the Character Education Inquiry that wide generalization of trustworthy behavior is very uncommon. People who cheat at one time do not cheat in other situations. Yet are there not types of training which do transfer more widely? Does the present lack mean that it is improbable that generalization can take place, or only that present methods are inadequate? All programs of religious education await with eagerness light upon the conditions under which training in one necessarily limited situation can have an influence in other situations.

A fourth area for study is suggested by any field in which many hypotheses flourish without much basis in scientific study. Such a field, for example, is that of mental hygiene. It is most extraordinary that so large a body of systematized dogma about human beings should have grown up in a field nominally scientific, with so little accompanying check upon the truth of the statements. One may search far and long in the realm of complexes, rationalizations, repressions, transference, maladjustments, and fixations, without coming upon the kind of controlled experiment which would make a scientist feel at home. This does not mean that there is no truth in the point of view. Presumably interpretations which have found so wide and hearty an acceptance, which seem to illumine so much of behavior (at least of other people's behavior), and which lead to such helpful service as the child guidance clinics are rendering, must include sound observations. There is also a fair chance that the truth will be diluted with many an unnecessary, although possibly artistic, phantasy.

It is commonly believed that children without brothers or sisters have a peculiarly difficult environment, emotionally. Do they? Laird's study suggests that they are better adjusted than children from larger families. What childhood factors are most likely to lead to shyness, timid-

ity, and a sense of inadequacy in early adult life? Is it having an over-affectionate or an undemonstrative home, or does neither bring the result? Is it a matter of having been sickly, delicate, or injured by severe accident in childhood? Is it a result of having been badly frightened as a child? According to J. O. Chassell's preliminary investigation in this field, none of these factors have any clear relationship to the symptom. The factors that do have bearing are having been an unfavored or unpopular child, having been considered lazy, and, oddly enough, having had younger brothers and sisters.

It is not hard to find explanations after we have the facts. It is the facts that are missing, for the most part. What, in terms of later behavior, have been the consequences of sparing the rod, of stern fathers, of much fondling by mothers, of having gotten good grades in school, of having been of a social group looked down upon by others, of having engaged in much petting, of having been scared by bogey-men or big dogs? Each of these questions demands study with control groups, actual comparison of those who do and those who do not, or the same people before and after taking. Are readjustments, in cases of problem children, made primarily as a result of the analysis, the testing, the interest of a sympathetic adult, the changed environment, the changed viewpoint of the child, the prominence which he has attained by virtue of becoming a problem, or by processes of maturation and knocking up against the world which would have changed him, anyhow? Who knows? Isolated cases will not suffice. Mere coincidence of a devoted mother and certain adult behavior is quite inadequate, except as it is found not to appear under certain other circumstances.

Evidence gathered by those who have been trained to expect certain precedents for conduct will continue to be open to

the charge that anyone can find what he is looking for in so complex a realm as human motives. If not read into the results, it may have been suggested to the subjects, quite unconsciously. Until experiments are planned with adequate numbers, hedged about with control groups, carried on with antiseptic safeguards against the influence of the experimenter's bias, practically all counsel that is given in the realm of pre-school child training, sex education, mental hygiene, adolescent problems, parental education, and the like, will be comparable to the proverbs of the tribe. It will represent the notions of wise and observant persons, who are neither always wrong nor always right.

A fifth area for studies comprises the many which are searches for causes. With the growing faith that character and spiritual values develop in accord with uniform processes, the need for scientific research grows. What had been once attributed to whim, chance, or Providence, must now be traced to its specific source.

Probably the most fundamental suggestion in recent study, has been Spearman's re-emphasis of Webb's idea of a general factor of character, comparable to general intelligence. It, according to Spearman, is not a composite of specific habits. It is an innate factor of the individual, unitary, varying from one person to another, but always underlying the formation of specific abilities. If such a general character factor exists, upon which specific training must build, it is a matter of great significance. To answer the question will involve building many more tests than we at present have, and much better tests than most of those now in use. It is perhaps a task for a group of scholars in a university, ready to spend ten years in the single project.

For more immediate hope of progress, let us consider some causes of more limited characteristics. There is the province

of the aesthetic, from a scientific point of view almost unexplored. To ask a single question, how far are reactions to musical forms innate, how far dependent upon training and associations? Is martial music, for example, stirring because of the way it affects the organism, or because of conditioning which has brought it to us so often in connection with stimuli which are stirring? A similar problem might be raised with almost every emotional response. Is John B. Watson right in his guess that all anger is the result of conditioning and re-conditioning and re-re-conditioning from a very few reflex type responses, or is McDougall nearer the truth in his formulation of anger as an innate emotional response to thwarting, its specific stimulus and overt behavior response being subject to education and modification, but the core of it being an inborn emotional pattern? It might require the observation of infants with great care over several years to answer such a question. Many social theories and not a few educational procedures await the outcome.

The causal factors back of concomitant learning constitute an attractive field for research. Four boys are made to stay in after school and learn the same poem. One develops a mighty hatred of the poem. Another reacts against the teacher. Still another finds himself emotionally upset every time he experiences the odor which permeated the school that afternoon. The fourth may show no sign of having been influenced at all by the experience, except that it may remain an unpleasant memory. Indeed, rebellious at first, he may find in later years that he has developed a genuine affection for the poem learned that bitter afternoon. Why these varied learnings? We do not know. We know almost nothing about the control of the variables upon which concomitant learning depends, yet we trust them for most of our character education. Miss O'Shea's dissertation sug-

gests that the most effective concomitant learning comes when interest in the main center of attention is neutral or at the most mild. Are all our club programs, perhaps, too interesting? It would seem to be time we were finding out.

From the point of view of social progress, there is a genuine need to learn more about the causes of prejudice. We know that radicals and reactionaries are alike in certain respects, but the factors back of the particular attitude, and the methods of shifting such attitudes, are closed books. It should prove easy to compare exhaustively the background of radicals and reactionaries and moderates, thus gaining clues for further research. Carefully controlled experiments in the introduction of factors which might bring about change (such as: a change of environment, new information, example of a friend, shift in social approval, being psychoanalyzed, sharing satisfactions in other realms with opponents) ought to prove valuable to all religious workers having to deal with biased and obdurate human nature in others, if not in themselves.

Many of the causes related to character can best be studied in anthropology, biography and history. Societies have differed widely in the type of family life provided for children. Have adult characters shown corresponding variation? What have been the factors leading to unusually brave, cruel, self-indulgent, socialized, or sensitive national groups? Suppose two groups of persons be compared, one group made up of those given to immediate gratification of impulses, the other notable for the self-denial which placed remote and intangible satisfactions foremost. How have these two groups differed in factors which might have been causes?

A sixth area for research at present includes those many problems which involve choosing the best of several possible techniques. We know ways of teaching

reading, which will develop a rate and ease of reading which can hardly be achieved with multiplied effort if other techniques are used. There are few such studies in the realm of character. What, for example, is the best method for training a child not to play in the street? This is no trivial problem, with casualty companies predicting 723,000 victims of auto accidents during 1928. Shall we recommend scolding, spanking, explanation, visits to hospitals, rewards for correct behavior, electric shocks, honor systems, mild accidents, or some combination of such factors?

A field in which the devising and selection of the best technique is of primary importance, is that of immunization from propaganda. How can people be trained so they will not be swept off their feet? Is it best to keep them from any attempts to manipulate them, or to expose them to a great many, some pulling one way and some another, or to show them the psychological backstage and point out how the machinery works, or to give them courses in critical thinking, or is there some better technique? It seems probable that progress toward world peace depends more upon the success we have in building up resistance to propaganda, than upon treaties, conferences, or pacifist pledges. Indeed, it may be that because of our lack of knowledge in this field, organizations designed to promote peace actually succeed in increasing susceptibility to war behavior.

No less important is the need for the experimental validation of techniques in group thinking. Here religious education has been, for the most part, in advance of public educators. The recent evidence which indicates that the products of group thinking are superior in quantity and quality to the products of the best individual of the group, is not surprising to many religious educators. But the questions of technique are bothersome. What is the relationship between type of

task and size of group? What are the conditions for the efficient behavior of this higher and more complex form of intelligence, group intelligence? How do committees which are effective differ from the ineffective? The problem becomes acute when congregations and communities are divided. The issue may be one of a new building, a particular personality, prohibition, race relations, or industry. How can these divided community groups be led into a creative re-integration of their forces for constructive progress? There is great need for analysis of what has actually happened in hundreds of such situations.

This survey cannot pretend to be exhaustive. Starting with a need for evaluation of types of research, it went on to mention types of method in collecting and comparing data, the repetition of important experiments, the fields where hypotheses flourish without adequate root, the search for causes, and the studies in devising and improving techniques. Several illustrations have been given in each area, but they cannot be said to be surely the most important. It is believed that all of them concern problems which make a large difference, both immediately and in the long look ahead. It is believed that all of them are problems upon which investigation can begin at once, whenever any person or organization is willing to set aside the astonishing amount of time and money which will be required.

The closing word should be one of hope. The experimental method is the best established road to truth. If someone points out to us another, we can hardly choose between them save by assuming the validity of the scientific method. It has been well said that Nature will answer any question if we but learn how to ask it. If there were no other sign of hope, encouragement could be gathered from the increasing skill with which religious education is asking ques-

tions. To that must be added the graduate courses in experimentation and measurement, the tendency of workers in local fields to apply experiments in finding out how better to do their own work, the selection of national officers in religious organizations with a definite responsibility for encouraging research, and the gratifying progress already made under grants from foundations.

The road is open before us. It is far

from an easy road, as those who have travelled it know full well. It reminds one of that vivid poem by Stephen Crane,

The wayfarer,  
Perceiving the pathway to truth  
Was struck with astonishment.  
It was thickly grown with weeds.  
"Ha," he said,  
"I see that no one has passed here  
In a long time."  
Later he saw that each weed  
Was a singular knife.  
"Well," he mumbled at last,  
"Doubtless there are other roads."

## THE CHRISTIAN QUEST PROGRAM

JAY A. URICE \*

THE Christian Quest program materials,<sup>†</sup> a series of five pamphlets, issued by the International Council of Religious Education, represent an important advance in religious education. The importance is primarily in the experimental approach which is frankly adopted. Each pamphlet states that it is "approved for experimental use." Report forms are included for securing accounts of use of the processes with groups. These forms encourage users to make detailed critical reports on each phase of the plans. The procedures outlined give evidence of an almost complete abandonment of the notion of "best methods" of meeting problems. They deliberately foster a maximum of adaptation. The plan will not need to be "revised"; it will *grow*. This promises a healthy use of the materials and a possible continuous development of the "program" itself. It is most encouraging to have the International Council provide leadership of this sort.

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<sup>†</sup>The Christian Quest, Youth and Jesus' Way of Life.

Materials to be used as Aids in Building a Church Program with Youth. A series of pamphlets prepared by the Committee on Religious Education of Youth. International Council of Religious Education, 1927.

No. 1. Qualities of an Effective Leader, 34 pages.  
No. 2. How a Leader Proceeds with a group, 36 pages.  
No. 3. How to Study Individual Growth, 18 pages.  
No. 4. How a Leader Uses Organization, 33 pages.  
No. 5. Program Suggestions for Group Leaders, 54 pages.

The Council's Committee on Religious Education of Youth set out to develop a basis for cooperative effort by denominations and Christian Associations in providing better programs for adolescent girls and boys. The general plan resulting is a model of "overhead" cooperation. Not only does it provide for experimentation in group processes, but it offers a basis for cooperative experimentation by denominational organizations. Each denomination which participates will both gain and contribute. It will foster a stimulation of thinking within its own ranks, and do so as a part of a comprehensive plan. Instead of a sterile standardization with formal endorsements, here is a plan for working helpfully together around a practical method of creative effort.

The Christian Quest approach is also a refreshing way for encouraging local denominational and organizational cooperation. All too much good energy has been spent in trying to diagram relationships or to define the proper scope of home, school, church, etc. Much of this has turned attention from boys and girls, and, if done apart from particular communities, has failed to take their differing conditions into account. Here, now, is not a general plan to be adopted by local councils, but rather a suggested way by which they can seek to meet the needs



of their adolescents. They will find in it every encouragement to adapt the materials to the circumstances of each church or Association. There is a basis for active cooperation in sharing of experience with the use of the materials. This means that the uppermost concern is always likely to be how youth can best be helped.

The writer has before him a report of a conference of church, school and Association folks in one city. It tells of an earnest consideration of the problems of groups under way and a lively exchange of experiences around the use of the materials. Such cooperation is in itself a Christian Quest, which will surely lead on resultfully.

The growth of group leaders will be encouraged by the use of these materials. They are penned with a view to enriching his or her experience as a leader. Each pamphlet has an introductory page listing "what to do with this pamphlet?" Concluding pages in each offer suggestions for further training and for helpful reading. The report forms give guidance in an appraisal of the usefulness of the various processes suggested and do this in a way that will help leaders evaluate their own workmanship. Any group leader who cares to do so may contribute to the development of the general plan by sending in narrations of his experiences. He may have a genuine part in perfecting the tools he is using. Group leaders are, thus, themselves encouraged to set out on a Quest.

The materials give evidence of good committee work. They have been produced through a pooling of the experience of several organizations and denominations. While occasional footnotes give credit for adopted suggestions, the whole is handled in such a way that the prestige of neither writer nor publishing house is at stake in its general form, content, or assumptions. It embodies an unusually consistent following of an educational point of view which is generally difficult

to carry through without accretions of unharmonious details. The committee evidently worked thoroughly enough that the writers of the various sections saw the entire plan with some clearness.

The materials seek to provide a basis for group work on the thorough going assumption "that character is developed in experience, that is, in some activity. The word activity here does not mean only bodily activity. It means any active interest."

The committee has sought to describe the various processes involved in working with groups on the basis of that assumption. Considering the relatively meager experience we in religious education have had in providing curriculum materials which will aid leaders to cooperate with youth in this spirit, the pamphlets are worthy of high praise. What a contrast they offer to the plan of meeting the religious education problem of a special age group by selecting writers to "prepare new courses."

There will be eleven pamphlets in the series as announced. Those issued thus far form the "basic materials" of general suggestions. Pamphlet Number One, *Qualities of an Effective Leader*, contains sections on these topics:

1. A Passion to Serve Youth
2. An Understanding of Youth
3. A Comradeship with Youth
4. A Vision of the Goal
5. An Appreciation of the Process by which Character Develops
6. An Understanding of a Youth Program
7. A Skillful Use of the Principles of Program-Making
8. A Wise Use of Growing Loyalties
9. A Wholesome Personality
10. Growing Christian Experience and Character

There is added a chart for use by leaders in rating themselves on these "qualities." The description of the general viewpoint regarding learning, the rôle of

the leader, and program-making, are given quite simply and with a commendable freedom from educational jargon. "Program" is assumed to be "a method of so using curriculum, that is, materials, the experiences, and activities of youth itself, and the experience and personality of the leader, in guiding youth through his life situations; that he may achieve full-rounded Christian personality."

Ways of choosing materials are described on a scale ranging from prescription through to choice around compelling central interests. Leaders can thus see their type of leadership and its educational implications. They are made aware of the possibility of moving their work to the plane of group defined interests.

The most valuable parts of this pamphlet are those which describe points of view and general methods. These will help the average group leader to understand the bearing of his or her method of work on the resulting outcomes in the lives of group members. After all, are not these matters more practically fundamental than "qualities" of leadership? The leader who seeks to improve qualities in himself is likely only to become self conscious around elusive things. "A Passion to Serve Youth," may be discouragingly awesome to novices in group leadership. Why not greet them with something of the genuine fun that comes through wholehearted comradeship in enterprises with boys and girls? Adults who truly share in this sort of program with boys and girls will have a right good time along the way. Let's tell them so.

A most compelling source of satisfaction for leaders is found in their growing ability to meet effectively the various situations that arise in their work with groups. In aiding them gain confidence in their own ability, we have the most certain method for deepening and strengthening their interest in their task. The satisfactions that come from good workmanship center interest wholesomely in

the task instead of in themselves. The entire series of booklets contributes to that. In future editions we would suggest that this pamphlet be devoted entirely to "Effective Leadership," and given that title.

Pamphlet Number Two offers in a few pages a wealth of easily understood suggestions to enable leaders to catch hold of and develop group interests. Getting acquainted, welding members into a real group, helping the group determine its goal, setting up a program, carrying out a program, testing results, and such processes are described and illustrated by brief stories from actual groups.

To foster an understanding of the general point of view that "all activities of life are possible elements in character building," much is made of a schematic analysis of eleven "areas of experience" of boys and girls. These are given as health activities, educational activities, economic activities, vocational preparation, citizenship, recreation, sex, parenthood, family life, general group life, friendship, aesthetic interests, and specialized religious activities. The leader is encouraged to see "program" around these areas of life in three ways: (1) the group program; (2) each member's purposes for himself; (3) the leader's purpose for each member. The chart given for recording the status of group members in the activity areas provides an easily understandable way for a leader to record and follow the development of members of his group.

Pamphlet Number Three offers a character evaluation chart built around the eleven areas of life and on a five point scale. It is for use with boys and girls themselves. Six possible desirable results which may follow from the use of such a chart with individual boys and girls are stated. It is to be hoped that the committee will conduct careful experimentation with the chart, under its own auspices. We need to know more

precisely just what such charting really does mean for boys and girls who undergo it. Reports sent in by group leaders may not be sufficiently discriminating around the critical matters to afford a basis for determining actual results from charting. It would be desirable to enlist the aid of persons competent to conduct a careful study of the effects of the use of such a scheme by volunteer leaders on the attitudes of those girls and boys who take them seriously.

Running through the series is the assumption involved in the chart-plan, that character lacks can be diagnosed and remedial treatment applied. Wholesome boys and girls throw themselves wholeheartedly into their activities, because of the appeal in what they seek to do. Such experiences are not confused for them by personal references. They play games, read books, carry out dramatics, eat their meals, worship, enjoy friends, because these things are, from their standpoint, worth doing. We should ask of our religious education that it foster this self forgetfulness.

The question is always pertinent as to whether plans made under such incentives as those of self improvement achieve the ends hoped for them. It is quite possible that a direct, self conscious attack on one's habits and attitudes may but lead to a change of outward forms which misses entirely the heart of the matter. To be sure, it is desirable to see a picture of one's life patterns. Those occasions when life is caught up and seen as a whole, in its relationships, and in terms of high ideals, are great experiences. The danger comes in trying to set up such experiences, hoping that they can be made meaningful when imposed at the will of a leader. In attempting such an analysis with a boy or a girl, or in "presenting" the "ideal of complete Christian living" (Pamphlet Two, page 20) it is certainly most desirable that the experience shall be intrinsically vital. These occasions, of all times, should not be brought about

in disregard of our best educational knowledge.

That "organization" shall be, in itself, an educational affair is the fine assumption of Pamphlet Number Four. There are excellent suggestions given for helping groups perfect and conduct their organization in such ways that they shall learn how to use the forms of associated effort to serve their purpose. Those of us who spend our lives in the midst of organizational machinery must regret that we, and many of our comrades, did not have such education in the meeting of organizational form and control when we were younger!

Program Suggestions for Group Leaders, Pamphlet Number Five, is a small encyclopedia of information for both leaders and group members. The writers call it a "cash and carry system" of suggestions. They have listed and classified under interest headings the things groups can do together, things individuals can do, desirable outcomes, and reference materials. The range of these materials is all along the alphabet from athletics to worship. Almost any interest a group develops can be enriched from these resources of suggestions.

Bound up in the title, *The Christian Quest*, is an idea centrally vital to religious education. The comments above regarding charting have come from a fear lest the character diagnosis—activity prescription procedure will center the interest of boys and girls on personal achievement—or even on "growth." Nothing, quite so surely as interest in self, thwarts that spirit of adventure in compelling enterprises which grip youth so vitally. A quest is more nearly analogous to an enterprise than to an effort at self-improvement. What better education can be had than meaningful enterprises? From these, and these alone, come worthy character. We hope for Christians who, in His Spirit, can lose themselves in the enterprises of life.

## RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE\*

THE COMPENSATORY FUNCTION OF THE SUNDAY "FUNNY" PAPER. (Harvey C. Lehman and Paul A. Witty, in *The Journal of Applied Psychology*, June, 1927, pages 202-211.)

Over 5,000 children, ages 8½ to 15½, in city and rural schools of Kansas, were asked to indicate from a large list (about 200 items) of play activities "only those in which they had voluntarily engaged during the preceding week." Tests were made at three different times within a period of a year. Looking at the Sunday "funny" paper ranked first with both boys and girls, except in the rural schools. Even country children, however, gave it high ranking. The authors suggest as an explanation that the characters of the comic strips, in their utter defiance of natural as well as man-made laws, offer the child who is hampered by the conventions of actual life a means of vicarious satisfaction for thwarted and restrained desires. P. R. S.

EMOTIONAL INSTABILITY OF COLLEGE STUDENTS. (J. W. Bridges, in *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, October-December, 1927.)

As measured by the Woodworth questionnaire, the women in 168 students of Arts and Medicine were more unstable than the men, and Arts students more unstable than Medical. There is a corresponding greater variability as regards symptoms. The typical psychoneurosis is an anxiety neurosis, although hysteria and psychasthenia are rare. There is no correlation between intelligence and emotional stability, nor between emotionality and academic standing. P. R. S.

AN EXPERIMENT IN CREATIVE DRAMATICS. (George R. Bell, in *The International Journal of Religious Education*, November, 1927, pages 21-22.)

Fifth grade boys wrote in the form of a drama the story of finding out some needs of a Christian worker among the Blackfeet Indians. They presented it as the core of a worship service. As a result, the service committee of the junior department decided to raise \$25 to help meet the need. P. R. S.

FINDING REALITY THROUGH WORSHIP. (Norman E. Richardson, *Church School Journal*, November, 1927.)

Worship is communion, direct and immediate, between man with his sense of limitation and Ultimate Reality, which is a personal, kind, dependable God. But religious educators

are confronted with the problem of adapting their methods of promoting this communion to the level of experience of the growing individual. True worship will have an effect on everyday living. P. R. S.

THE GREATEST PRESENT NEEDS OF THE WEEK-DAY CHURCH SCHOOL. (Nathaniel F. Forsyth, *Church School Journal*, December, 1927, pages 634-635.)

The greatest present need is "to know how to build Christian experiences in the lives" of pupils already enrolled; and a curriculum which is part of a unified program for the entire church, as well as Christian and life-centered, not material-centered. P. R. S.

HAVE CHRISTIANS A VITAL MESSAGE? (Arthur Judson Brown, in *The Missionary Review of the World*, November, 1927, pages 831-838.)

The Christian conception of God as a just, merciful, loving Father is needed by animists at one extreme and Buddhists at the other. The concept of the incarnation, of mankind as a brotherhood of equals before God, of the seriousness of sin and the power of salvation from sin—such elements as these compose a message vital to the needs of Confucian, Buddhist, Mohammedan, and animist with their unrebuked untruthfulness, sexual vice, gambling and bloody cruelty. P. R. S.

THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE ON FAITH AND ORDER. (Peter Ainslie, in *The International Journal of Religious Education*, November, 1927, page 12.)

This conference was the fruitage of seventeen years of preparation. Practically all the larger communions of Christendom except the Roman Catholic were represented. Out of the discussions emerged a tentative statement of the message of the Church to the world, and plans for continuation of the movement. The Conference "established the principle of diversity within unity and the impracticability of conformity, the right of Christian liberty, and the need of a united Christendom." P. R. S.

MORAL JUDGMENTS OF HIGH-SCHOOL STUDENTS. (G. S. Slavens and A. P. Brogan, *International Journal of Ethics*, October, 1927, XXXVIII pages 57-69.)

Opinions of 100 girls and 100 boys in each of two Texas high schools were taken on the relative "worseness" of 15 practices, and on the relative frequency of these practices among members of their respective sexes. The results showed a high degree of uniformity in moral judgments, and fairly close correlations with opinions of university students. Plans for moral education should be grounded more firmly on such studies as these. P. R. S.

\*Abstracts initialed P. R. S. were prepared by Paul R. Stevick, Professor of Bible and Religion in Morningside College, Sioux City, Iowa. Those initialed F. B. O. were prepared by Frederick B. Oxtoby, Professor of Biblical Literature and Philosophy in Illinois College, Jacksonville. That initialed R. A. S. was prepared by Raymond A. Smith, Director of Religious Education in Winston-Salem, N. C.

MUSIC IN THE CHURCH SCHOOL. (John Mann Walker, *Church School Journal*, November, 1927.)

Since music is an inevitable expression of Christian worship and fellowship, it is important to have trained leadership. Orchestras "will be more successful if they appear only when they have a valuable contribution to make." "Congregational singing is the most important of all."

P. R. S.

OUR CHILDREN'S TOYS. (John Leslie Lobingier, *The International Journal of Religious Education*, December, 1927, page 9.)

Play is now recognized as essential in the educative process. The small child most enjoys reflecting the normal activities of the life he sees. But play with toy war equipment tends to create the impression that killing others is a normal human activity. It is better to give Christmas toys that allow for reflection of the more constructive and peaceable experiences.

P. R. S.

PICTURES IN THE HOME. (Alma Palmer McKibben, *The International Journal of Religious Education*, December, 1927, pages 14-15.)

The possibilities, educational and aesthetic, in pictures are so great that parents should study the principles which make a picture both good and interesting, and with the help of their children provide a beautiful and meaningful collection of pictures for the home.

P. R. S.

RELIGION IN EDUCATION. (Hon. James J. Davis, Secretary of Labor, in *Good Housekeeping*, October, 1927, page 18f.)

"Deep within himself man wants more than the approval of his fellow beings: he wants the approval of his God. Education will never be education until it supplies every being with the moral training he needs for the one approval, the religious quickening he needs for the other." For the reason that we need moral training religion is a necessity. A man cannot be truly moral unless also he is religious. In some of our institutions of learning professors are going out of their way to wreck the faith of their students, thus laying themselves open to the same criticism as is justly given to those who would fasten dogmas upon the minds in both the public school and in higher education. Present day education is failing in its neglect of training the emotions, the "heart." Arnold's definition of religion as "morality touched with emotion" is acceptable as the ideal toward which we are to work in education.

R. A. S.

THE SO-CALLED "GENERAL CHARACTER" TEST. (Paul A. Witty and Harvey C. Lehman, in *Psychological Review*, November, 1927.)

The assumption that character is a unitary trait or a combination of unitary traits rests

on shaky foundations. Symonds, Brown, Trow, and others have shown that a given individual will behave differently with regard to a given "trait," as conditions vary. Education in morality should, therefore, consist of the formation of specific approved habits. Attempts at character measurement are spurious and unnecessary.

P. R. S.

THE SOCIAL STUDIES IN THE CURRICULUM. (H. C. Morrison, in *Chicago Schools Journal*, 1927, pp. 164-168.)

Social studies, more than any others, represent that kind of education for which people are taxed. Instead of a single perfunctory course occupying a corner of the program, they should constitute a well organized curriculum of many very definite courses, each as exacting as physical science or mathematics or language. Education has a social import and purpose. Schools exist to make citizens. Education consists fundamentally in certain learnings which constitute the individual's adjustment to the life in society which all must in common live. Such adjustments are found in sciences, literature, and fine arts in general, and in moral training. These are, of course, the tool subjects, that is, subjects essential to fundamental adjustments, but which are not the adjustments themselves. Some of these, like reading and a modicum of mathematics and linguistics, are essential.

F. B. O.

"THEY": SOMETHING FOR PARENTS TO THINK ABOUT. (Mrs. Cora Trawick Court, *The International Journal of Religious Education*, December, 1927, pages 16-17.)

Reflection upon the opinion many boys and girls have of their parents after they have grown up should give valuable material for discussion groups in parent education. "After all, if we haven't time to help our children find God as we walk along the way together, how indeed shall we succeed in giving them a guiding line into that abundant and joyous life which we like to call the good life."

P. R. S.

THE USE OF GROUP RIVALRY AS AN INCENTIVE. (Elizabeth B. Hurlock, in *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, October-December, 1927.)

The experiment measured improvement in ability to solve arithmetic problems. Pupils from grades IV to VI were subjects. The results indicated that after allowance is made for sex, age, and ability factors, rivalry is an effective incentive with grade school children for improvement of both speed and accuracy. Rivalry between groups of equal ability aids in building a cooperative spirit as opposed to selfish individualism.

P. R. S.



**WHAT DETERMINES THE CURRICULUM.** (D. L. Geyer, in *Chicago Schools Journal*, 1927, pp. 215-219.)

There are many indications that heralded revisions of curriculum are not to be general or in any sense fundamental, but are to consist in rearrangement of old topics, some change of emphasis, and occasionally the introduction of a single new study. Any such procedure as asking frankly what the schools exist for and what material would best help them to attain this purpose is anathema.

Professors of education plead the necessity of preparing the child for adult life, of giving him health and vigor, vocational and civic and avocational efficiency. Efforts have been made to circumvent educators by putting the "right people" on the revision committees, by pleading the limitations of buildings and textbooks and the inadequate equipment of the teaching force, and by pointing to the entanglements of preparatory and conventional values. There is only one force that is capable of bringing about a change—competition from outside by private schools. F. B. O.

**WHAT KIND OF CONSCIENCE HAS A NEWSPAPER EDITOR?** Interview with Robert Lincoln O'Brien, editor of the Boston Herald. (Edward H. Cotton, in *The Christian Leader*, July 9, 1927.)

Why print all this crime and scandal business? Why print news that gives thrills—news with a flavor? Because people want about what they are getting. Besides, publication of news about crime and its punishment has a warning value. News of moral failures and scandals may act as deterrents, though it may have a directly opposite effect on morbid imaginations. We are not publishing papers for weak types of mind. It does not pay to coddle people too much. To publish a newspaper today, make it succeed, pay its bills, and leave a reasonable residue to divide among the owners, the editor must find a buying public and give them what they want. F. B. O.

**WHAT OF THE STUDENT CONFERENCES?** (Gladys E. Meyerand, *Church School Journal*, November, 1927.)

The tendency of recent national gatherings representing the student "youth movement" has been to center on such questions as the Christian attitude toward America's racial and social problems, the problems of internationalism, and similar real "hot spots" of the day. Not speeches, but exchange of ideas, has been the favorite procedure. P. R. S.

**WHAT RELATION HAS CHURCH TO STATE?** (Clarence True Wilson, *Church School Journal*, November, 1927.)

Historically, Christianity has been a militant force in combating one form of entrenched evil after another. American tradition and

fundamental law prevent direct interference of any Christian body as such with governmental operations, though as a body of citizens a group may unitedly voice its sentiments on matters of government policy. The Methodist Board of Temperance, unlike some of its bitterest opponents, uses constitutionally honorable methods in promoting sentiment for human welfare measures. P. R. S.

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
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